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Ware v Wimborne-idrissi & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment arises from a defamation claim concerning two publications: a radio programme broadcast on 11 July 2019 (the First Publication), during which the First Defendant was interviewed, and a webpage from the website of the Second Defendant published on the same date (the Second Publication). The Claimant, a journalist and broadcaster, alleges that defamatory meanings are conveyed by specific words in these publications. The claim was issued on 7 July 2020. The preliminary issues, determined without a hearing, relate to the meaning, defamatory nature, and classification of the complained words as fact or opinion, as well as whether any opinion indicated its basis.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the words complained of bear the meanings pleaded by the Claimant or, if not, what natural and ordinary meanings they bear;
- Whether those meanings are defamatory at common law;
- Which parts of those meanings are statements of fact and which are statements of opinion;
- Whether, in respect of parts that are statements of opinion, the statement indicated, generally or specifically, the basis of the opinion.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Claimant contends that the words complained of in the First Publication convey a Chase level one meaning that he is guilty of Islamophobia and involvement in far right extremist politics, with no suggestion of mere suspicion.
- The Claimant asserts the statements are factual, defamatory, and that the references to Wikipedia confirm the allegations as verifiable facts.
- In relation to the Second Publication, the Claimant argues it conveys factual meanings that he performed below professional standards, deliberately misrepresented the Labour Party’s situation on antisemitism, and produced a biased, unprofessional programme.
- The Claimant maintains that the Defendants’ suggested meanings omit key defamatory imputations and that statements such as "right wing racist work" are factual, not opinion, and lack an indicated basis.
- The Claimant rejects the Defendants’ reliance on hyperlinks and references to Wikipedia as insufficient to constitute a basis for any opinion expressed.
Appellee's Arguments
- The Defendants submit that the meanings are at Chase level two, indicating reasonable grounds to suspect the Claimant’s conduct rather than asserting guilt.
- They argue the context of a highly charged debate and programme format would lead a reasonable listener to treat the statements as criticism of the Claimant’s journalism rather than allegations of extremist political involvement.
- The Defendants rely on the immediate responses on the programme, including the presenter’s description of the Claimant as a distinguished journalist and characterisation of the First Defendant’s remarks as “desperate”, as antidotes reducing defamatory impact.
- They contend that some statements, such as "right wing," are inherently opinions based on political viewpoint, and that the basis of opinions was indicated generally by reference to the Claimant’s journalistic record, the Panorama programme, and linked materials.
- The Defendants rely on precedent for the low bar required to indicate the basis of opinion and submit that the radio programme’s reference to Wikipedia suffices for this purpose.
- They submit the Second Publication’s meanings are factual except for some italicised words which are statements of opinion supported by the post’s content and linked materials.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hewson v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 650 (QB) | Procedure for determining meaning in defamation claims without hearing. | The court adopted the procedure described by Nicklin J for determining meaning. |
| Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17 | Principles for ascertaining the natural and ordinary meaning of words in defamation. | Guided the court to determine a single natural and ordinary meaning from the perspective of a reasonable reader/listener. |
| Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) | Clarified principles on reasonableness, intention, and approach to meaning and opinion in defamation. | Provided distilled principles applied to the facts, including treatment of opinion and basis indication. |
| Ware v French [2021] EWHC 384 (QB) | Contextual considerations for political speech in defamation. | Supported the court’s approach to political speech as passionate and requiring avoidance of over-analysis. |
| Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772 | Classification of defamatory meanings into levels of gravity. | Used as shorthand for assessing gravity of meanings in this case. |
| Triplark Limited v Northwood Hall (Freehold) Limited [2019] EWHC 3494 (QB) | Approach to distinguishing fact from opinion in defamation. | Informed the court’s approach to fact/opinion distinction and basis indication. |
| Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 933 | Tests for fact/opinion and indication of basis under Defamation Act 2013. | Supported court’s analysis of opinion and factual statements. |
| Zarb-Cousin v Association of British Bookmakers [2018] EWHC 2240 (QB) | Assessment of meaning in broadcast context including effect of immediate denials. | Analogous case used by Defendants to argue for a Chase level two meaning due to denial and context. |
| Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 | Standard for indicating the basis of an opinion in defamation. | Applied to hold that the basis of opinion was indicated in general terms. |
| Joseph v Spiller [2011] 1 AC 852 | Summary of Kemsley v Foot regarding basis indication for opinion. | Referenced to support the low threshold for basis indication. |
| Tinkler v Ferguson [2018] EWHC 3563 (QB) | Warning against inferring adjectives/adverbs as opinions improperly. | Applied to reject addition of “extremist” as an inferred adjective to meaning. |
| Barron v Collins [2015] EWHC 1125 (QB) | Approach to fact/opinion and meaning determination. | Supported integrated approach to fact and opinion issues. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court commenced by adopting the established principles for determining meaning in defamation, focusing on the natural and ordinary meaning from the perspective of a reasonable listener or reader, considering the entire publication and its context. It emphasized that the intention of the publisher is irrelevant and that over-elaborate or literal analysis should be avoided.
Regarding the First Publication, the court found that the reasonable listener would understand the complained words to mean that the Claimant had been disciplined by the BBC in connection with allegations of Islamophobia and far right politics, leading to a BBC apology, and that there were reasonable grounds to suspect the Claimant had an extensive record of such conduct. The first part was a statement of fact at Chase level one, while the second part was a Chase level two meaning, reflecting suspicion rather than guilt.
The court rejected the Defendants’ contention that the reference to far right politics concerned only the Claimant’s journalism, concluding it referred to political engagement. It also found no part of the meaning to be opinion, as the statements were presented as factual assertions, and the indication of basis via Wikipedia was insufficient for radio listeners to treat as a basis for opinion.
For the Second Publication, the court found the natural and ordinary meaning to be that the Claimant’s journalistic record included right wing, racist work and that he deliberately misrepresented the Labour Party’s position on antisemitism in the Panorama programme, acting unprofessionally by assembling biased and malicious allegations rather than conducting a proper investigation. The court held the term “right wing” to be an opinion, while the allegation of racist work was a bare factual comment lacking identified basis. The criticisms of the Panorama programme’s content were opinions with a general basis indicated by the post’s detailed criticisms and linked materials.
The court acknowledged that parts of the meanings were not defamatory, such as the factual statement that the Claimant is a reporter and the opinion that the programme was biased. However, taken as a whole, the meanings were defamatory at common law. The court held that the indication of basis for opinions was sufficient in general terms.
Holding and Implications
The court held that:
- The natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of in the First Publication are:
- The Claimant was disciplined by the BBC in connection with allegations of Islamophobia and extreme, far right politics, leading to a BBC apology;
- There are reasonable grounds to suspect the Claimant has an extensive record of Islamophobia and involvement in extreme, far right politics.
- The natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of in the Second Publication are:
- The Claimant is a reporter whose journalistic record includes right wing, racist work;
- Through his work on the Panorama programme, the Claimant deliberately misrepresented the true position concerning antisemitism and acted unprofessionally by compiling biased and malicious allegations rather than investigating properly.
- The meanings are defamatory at common law.
- The First Publication meanings are statements of fact.
- The Second Publication meanings are statements of fact except for the parts identified as opinion, for which a general basis was indicated.
The decision directly affects the parties by resolving the preliminary issues on meaning and defamatory nature, setting the stage for subsequent proceedings. No new legal precedent was established beyond applying established principles to the facts.
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