Beaumont Hospital Board & Anor v O'Doherty (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, Company A Board and an individual affiliated with Company A, initiated a defamation action against the defendant. On 9th July 2021, the court made an interlocutory order under section 33 of the Defamation Act 2009, directing the removal and restraining further publication of three videos posted on the defendant’s website, which contained defamatory statements about the plaintiffs and the first plaintiff’s staff. The order was interlocutory, intended to be effective until the trial of the action. The plaintiffs sought permanent injunctions and damages, which were to be determined at trial, likely before a judge and jury. The interlocutory motion was grounded on affidavits from the chief executive officer and director of nursing of Company A. The defendant represented herself and contested certain procedural and substantive aspects of the interlocutory hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the interlocutory order restraining publication of defamatory material should be granted pending trial.
2. The appropriate order as to costs of the interlocutory motion, specifically whether costs should be costs in the cause or otherwise.
3. The procedural fairness of the interlocutory hearing process, including issues of notice, evidence, and opportunity to respond.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

• Supported the proposed costs order that the costs of the interlocutory motion should be costs in the cause, meaning costs would be determined at the conclusion of the trial.
• Asserted that the defamatory nature of the statements was clear and that the defendant had no defence likely to succeed at trial.
• Maintained that interlocutory orders were necessary to prevent ongoing harm pending full trial.

Defendant's Arguments

• Argued that no order for costs should be made at the interlocutory stage.
• Misunderstood the nature of the interlocutory hearing and the provisional costs order.
• Contended the initial application was made ex parte without notice, although this was clarified as an application for short service.
• Claimed the hearing on 18th June was unfair due to absence of witness testimony, cross-examination, and limited time to gather evidence.
• Asserted that the subject matter of the videos was of acute public interest and that the action’s substantive merits remained undecided.
• Expressed concern about potential injustice in making a costs order at this stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court clarified that the interlocutory order was made pursuant to section 33 of the Defamation Act 2009, intended to prevent further publication of defamatory material pending trial. The defendant’s submissions revealed misunderstandings about procedural aspects: the initial ex parte application was for short service to expedite the hearing, not for substantive relief without notice; interlocutory motions are typically decided on affidavit evidence without oral testimony or cross-examination; and courtroom attendance was limited due to social distancing requirements.

The court emphasized that the interlocutory order was provisional and subject to the outcome of the full trial, where the defendant could present evidence not available at the interlocutory stage. The court found the words complained of to be defamatory and that the defendant had no defence likely to succeed at that stage. The costs order as costs in the cause was appropriate because it allows costs to be decided at trial depending on the final outcome, recognizing the possibility that the defendant might ultimately succeed.

Holding and Implications

The court ordered that the costs of the interlocutory motion and the plaintiffs’ costs of the application for short service be costs in the cause. This means that the costs will be determined in the final judgment of the action, with the eventual loser bearing the costs. The decision ensures that no immediate costs burden is imposed prematurely and preserves fairness given the interlocutory nature of the order. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling applied established principles regarding interlocutory relief and costs in defamation proceedings.