Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff initiated proceedings by Writ of Summons on 20 October 2015, claiming damages for alleged defamation arising from an article published in a newspaper on 25 November 2007. The article described an alleged physical attack by the Plaintiff on a lawyer in a tribunal courtroom precinct. The Plaintiff certified a Certificate of No Defence on 20 November 2015, asserting the Defendants had failed to enter an appearance or serve a defence within the prescribed time. Judgment in default of defence was entered on 8 December 2015, followed by an application to assess damages.
The Defendants applied on 1 March 2016 to set aside the default judgment, which was granted by the Queen's Bench Master on 10 November 2016. The Plaintiff’s appeal against this order was dismissed by the High Court on 13 November 2019, with a written judgment delivered on 21 October 2019. The judge refused leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, describing the grounds as potentially insulting and abusive.
The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on 5 February 2020, challenging the High Court’s order. Due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, an inter-partes remote hearing was conducted before the Lord Chief Justice (LCJ) on 6 July 2020, where the Plaintiff appeared in person and the Defendants were represented by counsel. The court granted the Plaintiff’s application for an adjournment and set a timetable for the substantive appeal hearing.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff sought further adjournments citing health issues related to COVID-19 and alleged institutional bias within the judiciary, specifically alleging a Roman Catholic bias. The Defendants neither consented nor objected to the adjournment requests. The court identified defaults on the part of the Defendants in complying with practice directions and issued a case management order on 2 November 2020, rescheduling the substantive appeal hearing for 18 December 2020.
Following the 2 November 2020 order, the Plaintiff challenged the constitution of the judicial panel and sought recusal based on alleged religious bias. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, evidenced by a Confidential Schedule and a Tomlin Order, which included withdrawal of the appeal and a stay of proceedings upon compliance with specified terms.
A further hearing on 2 December 2020 proceeded without the Plaintiff’s attendance but with Defendants’ representation. The court explored whether the Plaintiff’s consent to the settlement agreement was valid. The substantive appeal hearing scheduled for 18 December 2020 was vacated pending the court’s reserved decisions, which were promulgated in draft on 18 December 2020 and finalized on 28 January 2021.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the default judgment entered against the Defendants should be set aside.
- Whether the Plaintiff’s appeal against the High Court’s refusal to reinstate the default judgment should succeed.
- The validity and enforceability of the settlement agreement (Confidential Schedule and Tomlin Order) between the parties.
- Whether the judicial panel was properly constituted and whether there was a real possibility of bias requiring recusal.
- The appropriateness of the court’s case management directions and adjournment decisions in light of the Plaintiff’s health and procedural conduct.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Plaintiff alleged defamation by the Defendants arising from a 2007 newspaper article.
- The Plaintiff contended there was institutionalised Roman Catholic bias and racism affecting the judicial process, including bias by the Defendants, court staff, and judiciary involved.
- The Plaintiff argued the judicial panel was improperly constituted by judges of the same religious persuasion as the Defendants, breaching the rules of natural justice and the principle that justice must be seen to be done.
- The Plaintiff sought recusal of the judicial panel due to perceived bias and unresolved complaints to the Judicial Complaints Officer.
- The Plaintiff asserted that the Defendants failed to comply with court directions and that the court’s orders favored the Defendants unjustly, including the handling of adjournments during the Plaintiff’s COVID-19 isolation and hospital appointments.
- The Plaintiff challenged the validity of the settlement agreement, asserting lack of genuine consent and procedural irregularities in its conclusion.
- The Plaintiff relied on case law relating to apparent and actual bias, emphasizing the test that a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias.
Respondents' Arguments
- The Defendants sought to set aside the default judgment on procedural grounds and complied with court directions once ordered.
- The Defendants entered into a settlement agreement with the Plaintiff, embodied in a Confidential Schedule and Tomlin Order, which required withdrawal of the appeal and stay of proceedings.
- The Defendants neither consented nor objected to the Plaintiff’s adjournment requests related to health issues.
- The Defendants contended that the settlement agreement was legally binding and properly executed.
- The Defendants opposed the Plaintiff’s allegations of bias and the recusal application.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 |
Test for apparent bias: whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias. |
Applied as the key standard for assessing allegations of bias and recusal of judges in the case. |
| Breeze Benton Solicitors v Weddell [2004] EAT |
Recusal principles where unresolved complaints exist and the importance of the complaint itself in determining appropriateness of a judge sitting. |
Referenced in relation to unresolved complaints against members of the judiciary and the necessity for recusal. |
| Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd (2000) IRLR 96 |
Guidance on actual and apparent bias and the fair-minded observer test. |
Used to support the legal framework on bias and judicial impartiality. |
| In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No.2) (2001) 1 WLR 700 |
Further guidance on bias and judicial conduct. |
Applied alongside other authorities to assess claims of bias. |
| Lodwick v London Borough of Southwark [2004] EWCA Civ 306 |
Interpretation of the fair-minded observer test in bias claims. |
Cited to clarify the application of the bias test in the context of the appeal. |
| Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2003] UKHL 35 |
Consideration of subconscious bias and the threshold for real possibility of bias. |
Informed the court’s understanding of the nature and threshold of bias claims. |
| Ansar v Lloyd TSB & others [2006] EWCA Civ 1462 |
Application of bias principles in case management decisions. |
Referenced to distinguish bias claims in case management from substantive hearings. |
| Chris Project v Lara Hutt [2006] EAT |
Recusal on grounds of real possibility of pre-judgment. |
Used to support arguments for recusal based on perceived bias. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined the procedural history, including the entry and subsequent setting aside of default judgment, the High Court’s refusal to reinstate it, and the Plaintiff’s appeal. The court considered the Plaintiff’s allegations of institutional and judicial bias, particularly the assertion that the panel was improperly constituted on religious grounds and that this compromised fairness.
Applying established legal principles on bias, notably from Porter v Magill and related authorities, the court assessed whether a fair-minded and informed observer would perceive a real possibility of bias. The court noted that unresolved complaints against members of the judiciary do not automatically require recusal, but the circumstances must be considered carefully to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.
The court also reviewed the Plaintiff’s conduct, including extensive electronic communications alleging bias and procedural impropriety, and the Defendants’ compliance with court directions. The court found that the Defendants had defaulted in complying with certain practice directions but had subsequently rectified the defaults.
Regarding the settlement agreement, the court determined that the parties had reached a legally binding agreement, evidenced by the Confidential Schedule and Tomlin Order, which included provisions for withdrawal of the appeal and stay of proceedings. The court examined whether the Plaintiff’s consent was valid and concluded that there was no sustainable objection to the agreement’s validity.
The court granted the Plaintiff’s application for adjournment due to health reasons but emphasized the need for detailed case management to prevent further delays. The court also addressed the Plaintiff’s challenge to the constitution of the panel and recusal requests, ultimately finding no sufficient basis to set aside the order of 2 November 2020 or to recuse the panel.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the Plaintiff’s appeal against the High Court’s order setting aside the default judgment and refusing leave to appeal.
The court APPROVED the settlement agreement between the parties, incorporating the Confidential Schedule and Tomlin Order, and ordered a stay of proceedings accordingly.
The court UPHELD the case management directions issued on 2 November 2020, including the adjournment and timetable for the substantive hearing, which was ultimately vacated pending the settlement.
The court REJECTED the Plaintiff’s allegations of institutional and judicial bias sufficient to require recusal of the judicial panel or to invalidate the proceedings.
The direct effect of this decision is the resolution of the dispute by settlement and the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s procedural challenges. No new precedent was established beyond the application of established bias jurisprudence and procedural principles.