Director of Public Prosecutions v C (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Accused (“Appellant”) was convicted by a jury on 22 February 2018 of multiple counts of rape and sexual assault committed against his daughter (“Complainant”) between 2006 and 2010 in both Ireland and New Zealand. On 23 April 2018 Judge Murphy imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years’ imprisonment for each rape and six years for the assaults, with the final year suspended.

After conviction but before sentence, the Complainant visited the Appellant in prison. A range of social-media messages and telephone calls—instigated by the Appellant, his wife (“Stepmother”) and acquaintances (“Friend” and “Friend’s Mother”)—pressed the Complainant to retract her evidence. The Appellant’s solicitor (“Attorney Collier”) telephoned the Complainant and suggested that she swear an affidavit admitting she had lied at trial, but no affidavit was ever produced.

On appeal, the Appellant sought to adduce this alleged post-conviction retraction as fresh evidence. The Court of Appeal heard live testimony from the Appellant, Attorney Collier, the Friend’s Mother and the Complainant. Finding the new evidence incredible, it refused to admit it and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted leave limited to three questions concerning the treatment of post-conviction evidence and has now delivered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

1. The correct methodology for an appellate court when assessing an application to admit post-conviction evidence.
2. The appropriate threshold test for the admission of such evidence.
3. The constitutional role of an appellate court when it is invited to act as a primary finder of fact.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• Article 38.1 reserves fact-finding to the jury; therefore, if post-conviction evidence might influence a jury, an appellate court must admit it and order a retrial.
• An appellate court should not itself decide credibility except in cases of evidence that is “obviously fanciful.”
• Cited People (DPP) v Dutton and R v Parkes to contend that the test is whether evidence is “capable of belief,” not whether judges themselves believe it.

Prosecutor’s Arguments

• Courts must conduct a two-stage analysis: (1) assess credibility and materiality by reference to the trial record; (2) admit the evidence only if, when so assessed, it could render the conviction unsafe.
• An appellate court is constitutionally obliged to reject fresh evidence that is incredible or immaterial; otherwise the administration of justice would be undermined.
• Relied on People (DPP) v O’Regan, People (DPP) v Willoughby, and DPP v Gannon to support a structured credibility test.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Charleton, delivering judgment for a unanimous Supreme Court, held that appellate courts must employ a two-stage analysis derived from Palmer and consistent with Irish authority:

1. Credibility Stage: The court must decide whether proposed post-trial evidence is reasonably capable of belief when viewed against the entire trial record and the circumstances in which it emerged.
2. Impact Stage: Only if the evidence survives the first stage should the court ask whether, taken with the trial evidence, it could reasonably have affected the verdict.

Applying that approach, the Court found:

• The Complainant had endured years of manipulation from the Appellant and the Stepmother, a pattern that intensified after conviction.
• The alleged retraction was unsupported by any contemporaneous note, affidavit or digital record; Attorney Collier’s interpretation rested on assumption rather than explicit confession.
• Testimony from the Appellant and the Friend’s Mother was self-serving, internally inconsistent and directly contradicted by documentary social-media material.
• Given this context, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the proposed evidence was not credible and therefore failed at the first stage. The impact stage did not arise.

The Court further provided guidance for defence solicitors: direct, potentially pressurising contact with prosecution witnesses post-conviction should be avoided; neutral written correspondence and referral to independent counsel is the recommended practice.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTION AFFIRMED.

Immediate effect: the Appellant’s conviction and sentence remain intact. Broader implications include a definitive confirmation that Irish appellate courts may—and must—evaluate credibility directly when considering fresh evidence, and that only evidence passing that threshold may proceed to the “reasonable doubt” analysis. The judgment also establishes best-practice guidelines for solicitors engaging with witnesses after trial. No new cause of action or precedent was created, but existing principles were clarified and reinforced.