Rothery v Evans

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Plaintiff for an interim injunction to restrain the Defendant, a political party, from proceeding with its candidate selection process for a forthcoming mayoral election scheduled for 6 May 2021. The Plaintiff was originally shortlisted as a candidate but was subsequently removed from consideration when the Defendant decided to restart the selection process with a new shortlist excluding the Plaintiff and the other originally shortlisted candidates. The Plaintiff alleges this removal breaches express and implied contractual terms contained in the Defendant’s rule book, which governs the contractual relationship between the party and its members. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent the Defendant from proceeding with the new selection process and requests a speedy trial to resolve the matter before the election timetable progresses further. The Defendant denies breaching any contractual obligations and asserts the power to amend or cancel the selection procedure under its rules.

Legal Issues Presented

1. What is the scope of the express and implied contractual obligations, if any, owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in relation to the mayoral candidate selection process?
2. Has the Defendant breached those express or implied obligations by removing the Plaintiff from the original shortlist and restarting the selection process without including her?
3. Whether the Plaintiff has established a sufficiently arguable case to justify the grant of an interim injunction restraining the Defendant from proceeding with the selection process.
4. Whether a speedy trial should be ordered to resolve the dispute before the election timetable advances.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant’s removal of her from the original shortlist and refusal to permit her to be considered for the new shortlist constitutes a breach of express and implied terms of the contract between them, as set out in the Defendant’s 2020 Rule Book.
• She relies on an express general obligation in the Rule Book requiring the Defendant to treat members with dignity, respect, and fairness, and for party officers to act in good faith and ensure procedural fairness.
• The Plaintiff submits that implied terms require decisions concerning candidate selection to be taken on reasonable grounds, in good faith, and without arbitrariness, capriciousness, or irrationality.
• She argues the Defendant acted unfairly and in bad faith by reinterviewing her, removing her from the shortlist, and refusing her further consideration without good reason.
• The Plaintiff seeks an interim injunction to restrain the Defendant from proceeding with the new selection process and requests a speedy trial to resolve the matter before the election deadlines.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant denies owing the express or implied obligations relied upon by the Plaintiff in relation to the candidate selection process.
• Even if such obligations exist, the Defendant denies breaching them.
• The Defendant asserts it has an absolute power under its Rule Book, specifically vested in its National Executive Committee (“NEC”), to cancel or amend candidate selection procedures and to impose candidates if deemed necessary.
• The decision to restart the selection process and exclude the originally shortlisted candidates was a political judgment made in good faith based on concerns about candidate integrity and the need to select candidates with the best chance of winning the election.
• The Defendant submits that the court should exercise restraint in interfering with political decisions of this nature and that the Plaintiff has delayed unreasonably in issuing proceedings.
• The Defendant opposes the grant of an interim injunction and a speedy trial on the grounds of prejudice to the party’s election preparations and procedural fairness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging the contractual nature of the relationship between the Defendant political party and its members, governed by the Rule Book. It accepted that the Defendant held broad powers under the rules, including the power to amend or cancel candidate selection procedures and to impose candidates, delegated to the NEC and its committees.

The Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant breached express and implied terms requiring fairness, good faith, and rationality was carefully examined. The court held that these duties do apply in the context of candidate selection but must be understood in the political and contractual context, which allows wide discretion to the Defendant in making political judgments.

The court noted that the Plaintiff was not guaranteed a right to be shortlisted again once removed and that the Defendant’s decision to restart the selection process and exclude the original candidates was a political judgment made in good faith to protect the party’s electoral interests amid sensitive circumstances.

The court reviewed the specific concerns the Defendant had about the Plaintiff’s suitability, including inconsistencies in her statements, connections with a previously arrested incumbent, and comments made during hustings. It found that none of these amounted to irrationality, arbitrariness, or bad faith in the Defendant’s decision-making.

Regarding the injunction test, the court applied a stricter standard than the usual “serious issue to be tried” because the injunction would effectively determine the outcome of the case. It found that the Plaintiff did not meet the high degree of assurance required to establish a right to mandatory relief.

The court further considered the balance of convenience, concluding that even if there was an arguable breach, the political and procedural prejudice to the Defendant in delaying the selection process was significant. The urgency of the election timetable and the need for the Defendant to proceed with its candidate selection weighed heavily against granting the injunction.

The court also declined to order a speedy trial due to the practical difficulties of preparing the case on short notice, the prejudice to other litigants, and the fact that the court was well placed to decide the issues at this interim stage.

Finally, the court emphasized judicial restraint in interfering with political party decisions and noted the absence of any evidence of actual or apparent bias by the selection panel.

Holding and Implications

The court refused the Plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Defendant may proceed with its revised candidate selection process for the mayoral election without including the Plaintiff on the shortlist. The court did not order a speedy trial, meaning the substantive issues raised by the Plaintiff will not be resolved before the election timetable advances further. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the decision reaffirmed established principles regarding the contractual relationship between political parties and their members, the wide discretion political parties enjoy in candidate selection, and the high threshold for judicial intervention in such matters.