Maynard-Ellis & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Solicitor General applied for leave to challenge the sentences imposed on two offenders, following their convictions for murder and other related offences. The offenders, referred to as the first and second offenders, were convicted after a several-week trial before Judge Soole and a jury at the Crown Court in The City. The first offender was convicted of murder, multiple counts of rape, attempted rape, and making threats to kill, while the second offender was convicted of murder. Both had previously pleaded guilty to disposing of a corpse and perverting the course of public justice.

On 21 December 2020, both offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment with minimum terms set at 30 years for the first offender and 19 years for the second offender, less time spent on remand. The sentencing included concurrent terms for the other offences. The first offender received additional concurrent sentences totaling 14 years for the sexual offences and threats to kill related to a complainant referred to as "CW".

The background facts revealed that the first offender had engaged in a violent and controlling relationship with CW starting in 2007, involving sexual violence and threats. The first offender had an obsession with death and violent fantasies, which were evident in his behavior and possessions. Later, the first offender entered into a relationship with the second offender, and by 2019 they lived together in a small flat.

On 11 May 2019, the first offender met a woman, referred to as the victim, at a pub. The victim, who was intoxicated, left the pub with the first offender and went to the flat they shared. There, both offenders attacked and killed her. Afterwards, they dismembered her body into twelve parts and concealed them in various locations. Evidence showed attempts to cover up the crime, including burning bloodstained clothing and replacing the flat’s carpet.

The disappearance of the victim was reported, leading to police investigation and the arrest of the offenders. Both offenders initially gave false accounts denying involvement. The first offender later admitted to killing the victim, claiming diminished responsibility due to Asperger's Syndrome and Chronic Depressive Disorder, which was contested at trial.

The trial judge found that the offenders acted together in the murder and subsequent dismemberment, with the first offender instigating the attack and the second offender joining in. The judge rejected the proposition that the murder involved sexual or sadistic conduct as defined by law, setting the statutory starting point for minimum terms at 15 years. After considering aggravating factors such as premeditation and the concealment of the body, the judge imposed the minimum terms as noted above.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed on the offenders were unduly lenient, specifically whether the starting point for the minimum term for the murder convictions should have been 30 years instead of 15 years under paragraph 5(2)(e) of schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which applies to murders involving sexual or sadistic conduct.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in principle or made findings of fact not open to him in concluding that the murder did not involve sexual or sadistic conduct.
3. Whether the total sentence for the first offender, taking into account the additional sexual offences, was unduly lenient.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• The minimum term for the murder convictions should have been set at 30 years, reflecting the particularly high seriousness of the offences due to sexual or sadistic conduct.
• The trial judge erred in law or in fact by taking a starting point of 15 years instead of 30 years for the minimum term.
• In relation to the first offender, the total sentence should have exceeded the 30-year minimum term to adequately reflect the seriousness of the sexual offences committed against CW.
• Argued alternatively that the illustrative examples in paragraph 5 of schedule 21 are not exhaustive and that the circumstances of this murder warranted a higher starting point.

Court's Response to Arguments

• The appellate court was not persuaded that the trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence was flawed or that the findings were outside the range of reasonable conclusions.
• The court emphasized that the statutory language requires sexual or sadistic conduct, not merely motivation, and found that the evidence did not support such conduct during the murder itself.
• The court noted that the judge had properly considered psychiatric, pathological and witness evidence and had made a reasoned decision on the starting point.
• The court rejected the submission that the total sentence for the first offender was unduly lenient, finding the judge had appropriately considered totality and the gravity of offences.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully reviewed the trial judge’s detailed sentencing remarks and the evidence considered at trial. The judge had concluded that while the first offender’s underlying fantasies and motivations were depraved and formed an aggravating factor, the actual conduct during the murder did not involve sexual or sadistic elements as required by the statutory language and relevant case law. The court emphasized the distinction between motivation and conduct, noting that the evidence did not establish sadistic or sexual conduct during the killing or the dismemberment.

The court recognized that the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the expert psychiatric and pathological evidence, and that the judge’s decision to set the starting point at 15 years was within the range of reasonable conclusions. The appellate court rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that the starting point should have been 30 years, finding no error of law or principle or unreasonable factual findings.

Regarding the total sentence for the first offender, the court noted that the judge had accounted for the additional sexual offences and had applied the principle of totality appropriately. The resulting minimum term of 30 years was not unduly lenient in the court’s view. The court also found no merit in the argument that the second offender’s sentence was unduly lenient, given the findings about his role and support of the first offender.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED LEAVE to challenge the sentences imposed on both offenders.

The direct effect of this decision is that the minimum terms set by the trial judge—30 years for the first offender and 19 years for the second offender—stand as imposed. The court did not find the sentences to be unduly lenient and therefore did not alter the sentencing structure. No new precedent was established; the ruling affirmed the principle that appellate courts should be cautious in overturning trial judges’ sentencing decisions where those judges have had the advantage of hearing all evidence firsthand and where their factual assessments are within the range of reasonable conclusions.