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Food Standards Agency v. Bakers of Nailsea Ltd

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Food Standards Agency ("the FSA") appealed under section 111 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 against a ruling by District Judge Taylor at Yeovil Magistrates' Court. The ruling held that three sets of applications for summons issued by the FSA against Bakers of Nailsea Limited ("BNL") were invalid for failing to comply with Rule 7.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules ("CPR"). Consequently, the District Judge ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the cases as the informations were nullities.

BNL is a food business operator running an abattoir near Bristol. The applications concerned multiple allegations under the Food Safety and Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013 relating to hygiene failures and breaches of specific regulations, with offences alleged between January and June 2018. The FSA conceded non-compliance with CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i), which requires that an application for a summons demonstrate that it was made within any applicable statutory time limits.

The District Judge held a preliminary hearing in November 2019 to consider jurisdictional and abuse of process points, ultimately concluding the applications were invalid and the court had no jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge erred in law by concluding that the informations were nullities due to non-compliance with CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i).
  2. Whether the FSA is entitled to resile from its prior concession of non-compliance on appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The FSA argued that CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i) does not require explicit statements of the legislation, specific time limits, expiry dates, or reasons for timeliness in the application; it only requires the prosecution to demonstrate that proceedings are brought in time.
  • The term "demonstrate" should not be read as mandating specific information in the application; if the application is within time, that fact alone suffices.
  • The court is presumed to know applicable time limits, and the issuance of a summons indicates the court was satisfied the application was in time.
  • The FSA contended that the District Judge was wrong to hold the applications invalid and that they should not be nullities.
  • The FSA maintained that a concession on a point of law that is incorrect should not bind the party on appeal, relying on Whitehead v. Haines to support this principle.
  • The FSA briefly submitted that even if the applications were invalid, the court had jurisdiction under the overriding objective of the CPR, though this was not pursued on appeal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • BNL argued the FSA is bound by its concession of non-compliance and cannot now advance a contrary position on appeal.
  • Reliance was placed on Lycamobile UK v. London Borough of Waltham Forest, which restricts appellate departures from positions taken below except in exceptional circumstances.
  • BNL submitted that CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i) imposes mandatory content requirements on applications for summons, including demonstrating compliance with time limits, and failure to do so renders the application a nullity.
  • BNL contended the District Judge correctly found the applications invalid and that the FSA's appeal exceeded the scope of a case stated appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Whitehead v. Haines [1965] 1 QB 200 Permits appellate courts to consider points of pure law not raised below if necessary to prevent conviction for an offence non-existent in law. The court distinguished the case, holding it did not apply as the FSA's point was not a pure point of law and had been expressly considered and rejected below.
Lycamobile UK v. London Borough of Waltham Forest [2014] EWHC 1829 Admin. Limits appellate courts from remedying failures to adequately present cases below except in exceptional circumstances. The court applied this principle to deny the FSA permission to change its position on appeal absent exceptional circumstances.
R v. E [2018] EWCA 2426 Crim. Addresses concessions made during hearings and the principle that parties should "get it right first time". Used to emphasize that the FSA should not be allowed to resile from its concession without exceptional justification.
R v. R [2015] EWCA Crim 1941 Clarifies the treatment of concessions and changes of case on appeal. Supported the court's view that changes of case on appeal are only permitted in very exceptional circumstances.
Tesco v. Harrow London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 2929 Admin. Explains the rationale for statutory time limits in prosecutions: protection of citizens and promoting timely investigations. Referenced to underline the importance of compliance with time limits in criminal proceedings.
R (Key and Another) v. Leeds Magistrates [2018] 2 CrApp R 27 Establishes that Magistrates' Courts have a judicial function to determine whether offences are time barred before issuing summons. Supported the court's interpretation that CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i) requires clear demonstration of compliance with time limits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the procedural objection that the FSA had made a clear and valid concession of non-compliance with CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i). It found compelling circumstances would be necessary to allow the FSA to resile from this concession, which were absent in this case. The court distinguished Whitehead, noting that unlike that case, the FSA's point was not a pure legal issue, but one of mixed fact and law, and had been expressly considered and abandoned below.

The court rejected the FSA's construction of CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i), holding that the Magistrates' Court must be properly and fully assisted in establishing that the offence is not time barred. This requires more than merely stating the allegation; the application must at least reference the applicable time limit to "demonstrate" timeliness. The court found the FSA's interpretation would render parts of the rule otiose and create practical difficulties, especially where time limits run from the date of discovery.

The court emphasized the positive nature of the verb "demonstrate" in the rule, requiring a positive step to show compliance with time limits. Given these reasons, the court concluded the FSA's concession was correctly made and binding.

Accordingly, the court held that the applications were nullities due to non-compliance with CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i), and the District Judge correctly ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the cases.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal by the Food Standards Agency.

The direct effect of this decision is that the applications for summons against Bakers of Nailsea Limited are invalid and the Magistrates' Court had no jurisdiction to hear them. The FSA is bound by its prior concession of non-compliance with CPR 7.2(3)(b)(i), and no exceptional circumstances justified allowing the FSA to change its position on appeal. The ruling reinforces the importance of strict compliance with procedural requirements in criminal prosecutions and the principle that parties must "get it right first time". No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles on concessions and procedural compliance.

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Food Standards Agency v Bakers of Nailsea Ltd

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Food Standards Agency v Bakers of Nailsea Ltd
(Nov 3, 2020)