Du Plooy v Sport Ireland & anor (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 8 March 2013, the Plaintiff was injured while descending a waterslide at a swimming pool and water activity centre located at the premises known as the “National Aquatic Centre” in The City. The Plaintiff alleges an impact injury to her coccyx caused by a dangerous protrusion, resulting in personal injury, loss, and damage. Proceedings were initiated by personal injuries summons issued on 13 May 2019.

Prior to issuing court proceedings, the Plaintiff made an application to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) as required under the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003. The initial application was deemed complete on 6 March 2015, close to the expiry of the limitation period. PIAB declined to make an assessment and issued an authorisation on 30 June 2016 permitting the Plaintiff to commence legal proceedings.

The Plaintiff initially named “National Aquatic Centre” as the defendant, but it was discovered that this was not a registered corporate entity or active business name at the relevant time. The Plaintiff’s solicitors then sought to amend the authorisation to name the “National Sports Campus Development Authority” (NSCDA), but this entity had been dissolved on 13 May 2015, with its liabilities transferred to Sport Ireland under the Sport Ireland Act 2015.

In January 2018, the Plaintiff instructed new solicitors who identified the appropriate defendants as Sport Ireland and NSCDA (Operations) DAC. An amended authorisation was requested and issued by PIAB on 18 February 2019. Subsequently, NSCDA (Operations) DAC changed its name to Sport Ireland (Operations) DAC, requiring a further amended authorisation issued on 11 April 2019. Proceedings were then issued on 13 May 2019 against Sport Ireland and Sport Ireland (Operations) DAC.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claim on the basis that it was statute barred, which is the issue before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff’s proceedings, issued more than six years after the alleged accident, are statute barred.
2. Whether the amended authorisations issued by PIAB under section 46(3) of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 provide a legal basis to disapply the limitation period for the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff, represented by Attorney Devlin SC, relied on the Supreme Court decision in Renehan v. T & S Taverns Limited [2015] 3 I.R. 149, which interpreted section 46(3) of the Act of 2003 regarding authorisations for bringing proceedings against omitted defendants.
• The Plaintiff argued that the limitation period was disapplied beginning from the date of the original application to PIAB on 6 March 2015, and ending six months after the authorisation dated 11 April 2019.
• The Plaintiff contended that the amended authorisations issued by PIAB were valid under section 46(3) as the Plaintiff omitted defendants through genuine oversight or ignorance of all facts at the time of the original application.

Appellee's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Defendants’ legal arguments beyond their application to dismiss the claim as statute barred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the interplay between the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 and the Statute of Limitations Acts. It emphasised that the Act of 2003 mandates mandatory pre-litigation steps and provides for disapplication of limitation periods during the PIAB process to prevent claims becoming statute barred.

The Court identified that the relevant limitation disapplication period begins on the date of the Plaintiff’s original application to PIAB (6 March 2015) and ends six months after the issuance of an authorisation under section 46(3) of the Act (11 April 2019). The Court accepted that the Plaintiff’s amended authorisations were valid as they fell within the statutory framework allowing for the inclusion of defendants omitted through genuine oversight or ignorance of facts.

The Court noted that any challenge to PIAB’s reliance on section 46(3) should have been made through proceedings against PIAB, which did not occur. Accordingly, the Court found no basis to dismiss the claim as statute barred.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the Defendants’ application to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim as statute barred.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Plaintiff’s proceedings are deemed timely and valid under the statutory regime governing personal injury claims and PIAB authorisations. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and Supreme Court authority.