IM v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant, originating from The City in Country A, arrived in The State on 9 June 2019 and filed a claim for international protection on 10 June 2019. The claim was based on alleged persecution and serious harm due to assaults by an unnamed neighbour in 2009 and 2012, and on the basis of the Applicant's ethnic minority status inherited paternally. The protection office conducted a preliminary interview and issued a report recommending refusal of refugee or subsidiary protection status, relying partly on the designation of the Applicant's country of origin as a safe country. The Applicant appealed this decision, requesting an oral hearing which was initially deferred pending medical documentation. The oral hearing request was ultimately denied due to non-submission of documents within the stipulated timeframe, and the appeal was considered on the papers. The First Respondent affirmed the refusal of both refugee and subsidiary protection status.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether sections 33 and 72 of the Act of 2015 are ultra vires and/or incompatible with Ireland’s obligations under Council Directive 2005/85/EU (the Procedures Directive) and the Common European Asylum System.
2. Whether the designation of Country A as a safe country of origin by the Second Respondent was lawful and reasonable under section 72 of the Act of 2015.
3. Whether the First Respondent’s decision refusing refugee or subsidiary protection status was lawful, rational, and properly reasoned.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant contended that sections 33 and 72 of the Act of 2015 are ultra vires and/or incompatible with Ireland’s obligations under the Procedures Directive and the Common European Asylum System because these provisions derive from the Procedures Directive Recast, which Ireland has not adopted.
• The Applicant argued that the designation of Country A as a safe country of origin was unlawful as the Second Respondent could not reasonably have been satisfied that there was generally and consistently no persecution, torture, or threat of indiscriminate violence in Country A.
• The Applicant sought an oral hearing to present medical documentation and to explain the delay in its submission, asserting a minority ethnic status to disapply the safe country designation.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Respondents submitted that the safe country of origin concept is established by the original Procedures Directive and was incorporated into domestic law through successive legislation culminating in the Act of 2015.
• They argued that Ireland remains bound by the original Procedures and Qualification Directives, notwithstanding non-adoption of the Recast Directives, and that the domestic asylum system lawfully reflects these obligations.
• The Respondents contended that the designation of Country A as a safe country of origin was lawful and consistent with the statutory requirements, noting that Country A had been designated safe by multiple other Member States.
• Regarding the request for an oral hearing, the Respondents maintained that the Applicant failed to demonstrate that the interests of justice required such a hearing, especially given the delay in providing medical documentation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the legal framework underpinning the safe country of origin concept, tracing its origins to the original Procedures Directive and its incorporation into Irish law through successive legislative instruments culminating in the Act of 2015. The Court noted that Ireland has not adopted the Procedures Directive Recast but remains bound by the earlier Directives, which continue to govern the asylum system domestically.

The Court rejected the Applicant’s argument that sections 33 and 72 of the Act of 2015 are ultra vires or incompatible with Ireland’s obligations, holding that the domestic legislation lawfully reflects the binding original Directives. The Court further reasoned that the application of the safe country of origin concept to both refugee and subsidiary protection applicants is consistent with the Directives.

Regarding the designation of Country A as a safe country of origin, the Court acknowledged the statutory power of the Second Respondent to make such designations and noted that Country A has been recognized similarly by multiple other Member States. The Court found that the Applicant failed to establish any arguable ground that the designation was unlawful or unreasonable, particularly given the absence of evidence to the contrary and the procedural delays in presenting medical documentation.

The Court found that the First Respondent’s refusal of protection status was challenged on traditional judicial review grounds including illegality, irrationality, failure to consider material evidence, and improper evaluation of credibility. The Court determined that the Applicant had established substantial grounds on these aspects and granted leave to apply for judicial review on those grounds.

Holding and Implications

The Court GRANTED LEAVE to the Applicant to apply by way of judicial review challenging the First Respondent’s decision refusing refugee and subsidiary protection status on grounds of illegality, irrationality, and failure properly to evaluate evidence.

The Court REFUSED LEAVE on the grounds challenging the validity of sections 33 and 72 of the Act of 2015 and the designation of Country A as a safe country of origin, finding these claims unarguable.

The decision means the Applicant may proceed with judicial review on the merits of the refusal of protection but not on the constitutional or EU law validity of the safe country of origin scheme or its application to Country A. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles and statutory interpretation. The proceedings were adjourned for the filing of Respondents’ opposition papers.