Gabbana, R.

Factual and Procedural Background

On the evening of 24 February 2011, the victim was fatally shot in the head at point-blank range outside a pub in Liverpool. Two men had previously been convicted in relation to the murder, with one identified as the gunman and the other as the organiser. The appellant was subsequently tried and convicted by majority verdict for directing and financing the killing and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 33 years.

Nearly seven years after conviction, the appellant sought to appeal against conviction on grounds related to the trial judge's rulings on the admissibility of bad character evidence under s. 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the judge's directions to the jury. The initial application for extension of time and leave to appeal was rejected by a Single Judge but granted on renewed application by the Full Court, subject to the appellant explaining the delay. The appellant was represented by new counsel during the appeal proceedings.

The prosecution case at trial relied heavily on mobile phone and cell-site analysis linking the appellant, the gunman, and the organiser. Evidence also included previous convictions of co-defendants and witness testimony about a falling out between the appellant and the victim, including disputes over a car. The appellant gave extensive evidence denying involvement, but admitted to certain lies in interview and inconsistencies in his account.

The trial judge admitted evidence of the appellant's bank transactions as bad character evidence to correct a false impression given by the appellant regarding his financial means. The appellant challenged this admission and the judge’s directions to the jury on this evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of cash payments into the appellant’s bank accounts as bad character evidence under s. 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
2. Whether the evidence of such payments should have been permitted to be used as evidence that the appellant was involved in serious crime.
3. Whether the judge’s legal direction on bad character in the summing-up was erroneous, particularly for failing to instruct the jury that they had to be sure the appellant gave a false impression.
4. Whether the judge failed to direct the jury to disregard any suggestion that the appellant was a drug dealer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The appellant contended that his interview answers did not give a false impression about his financial means and that the words used were equivocal.
• It was argued that the prosecution’s reliance on the bank transactions went beyond correcting a false impression and improperly suggested involvement in serious crime, including drug dealing.
• The appellant submitted that the jury was not properly instructed to apply the criminal standard of proof to the bad character evidence and that this misdirection rendered the conviction unsafe.
• It was also argued that the jury should have been directed to ignore any suggestion that the appellant was a drug dealer.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The prosecution maintained that the appellant gave a false impression by implying he lived solely off his compensation money, whereas the bank evidence showed large unexplained cash deposits inconsistent with that claim.
• The prosecution argued that the evidence was properly admitted under s. 101(1)(f) to correct the false impression and also could have been admitted under s. 101(1)(g) given the appellant’s attack on others’ characters.
• It was submitted that the cross-examination and submissions did not go beyond the scope of correcting the false impression and were legitimate within the judge’s ruling.
• The prosecution accepted that the jury had to be sure on the bad character evidence, and that the judge’s directions, taken as a whole, were sufficient.
• Regarding the drug dealer suggestion, the prosecution noted that no objection was raised during trial, and the judge’s summing-up did not maintain such an allegation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully analysed whether the appellant’s interview answers conveyed an implied assertion that he lived solely on his compensation money and had no other income. It found that the trial judge was entitled to conclude that a false impression was given, justifying admission of the bank transaction evidence under s. 101(1)(f) to correct that impression. The court rejected arguments that the prosecution sought to use the evidence improperly to allege the appellant’s involvement in serious crime beyond correcting the false impression.

The court noted that the judge had declined to rule on admission under s. 101(1)(g) but considered that such admission would have been appropriate given the appellant’s attack on others’ characters. The appellant had an opportunity to withdraw the false impression during evidence but did not do so, instead attempting to justify the transactions.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s refusal to exclude the evidence under s. 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, concluding the judge properly exercised discretion.

Regarding cross-examination and submissions suggesting the appellant’s involvement in serious crime, the court held these were consistent with the judge’s ruling and were not objected to at trial, indicating acceptance of their propriety.

The court addressed the appellant’s complaint about the adequacy of the jury directions on bad character evidence and the standard of proof. It distinguished this case from the Supreme Court decision in Mitchell, noting that the directions, taken as a whole, conveyed that the jury had to be sure of the false impression and the source of the deposits. The court acknowledged that while an explicit direction on the criminal standard of proof might have been preferable, its absence did not render the conviction unsafe.

Finally, the court considered the appellant’s complaint that the jury was not directed to disregard suggestions that he was a drug dealer. It found that the cross-examination was consistent with the judge’s ruling and that no objection was made. The judge’s summing-up did not maintain such an allegation, and the court would not infer otherwise given the absence of a transcript and the appellant’s delay.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal against conviction.

The direct effect is that the appellant’s conviction and sentence remain intact. The court found no legal error in the admission of bad character evidence or in the judge’s directions sufficient to render the conviction unsafe. No new precedent was established; the decision reaffirms established principles regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence under s. 101(1)(f), the proper exercise of discretion under s. 78 of the 1984 Act, and the standard of proof required in jury directions on bad character evidence.