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Gabriel, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 2nd July 2019, following a trial in the Crown Court at Blackfriars before His Honour Judge Hillen and a jury, three appellants, who are monozygotic identical triplets, were convicted of conspiracy to possess a firearm with intent to endanger life and conspiracy to possess ammunition with intent to endanger life. The appellants appealed their convictions on three grounds for which leave was granted: the admissibility of DNA evidence found on the muzzle of one of the guns, the jury directions regarding the DNA evidence, and the judge’s refusal to discharge the entire jury after it was discovered that one juror had conducted internet research on counsel involved in the trial and shared that information with other jurors. The appellants also sought to renew applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence on other grounds previously refused by the single judge.
The prosecution case involved complex evidence including mobile phone usage, cell-site analysis, and DNA evidence. The appellants were alleged to be on the selling side of a conspiracy involving firearms and ammunition, with other individuals on the buying side. The prosecution relied heavily on telephone evidence to attribute specific mobile phone numbers to each appellant and to establish their involvement in the conspiracy. DNA evidence found on the muzzle of a pistol was attributed to at least one of the appellants, but could not distinguish between them due to their identical genetic profiles.
The trial judge ruled to admit the DNA evidence, and gave directions to the jury on how to consider it. During jury deliberations, one juror conducted internet research about a prosecution counsel and shared this information with other jurors, leading to the discharge of that juror but refusal to discharge the entire jury. The appellants challenged these rulings and the safety of their convictions, as well as their sentences, which were determinate terms of 14 years' imprisonment for two of the appellants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge erred in admitting DNA evidence that could not be attributed to any individual appellant but only to the group of identical triplets.
- Whether the jury directions concerning the use and weight of the DNA evidence were adequate and lawful.
- Whether the trial judge should have discharged the entire jury following a juror's unauthorized internet research about counsel and sharing of that information with fellow jurors.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The DNA evidence was of minimal probative value as it could not be linked to any individual appellant and was highly prejudicial, potentially leading to guilt by association.
- The trial judge’s directions to the jury on the DNA evidence were inadequate, confusing, and possibly encouraged speculation or gave undue weight to the DNA evidence.
- The entire jury should have been discharged because the juror’s internet research and sharing of information contaminated the jury, making it impossible to trust their impartiality.
- The judge erred in rejecting submissions of no case to answer and gave insufficient directions on the elements of conspiracy and circumstantial evidence.
- Sentences imposed were argued to be excessive and disproportionate, with some claims of disparity compared to the co-appellant’s sentence.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The DNA evidence was relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence supporting the mobile phone and cell-site evidence.
- The trial judge’s directions to the jury were sufficient and appropriately balanced the limitations and probative value of the DNA evidence.
- The discharge of the single juror was appropriate and there was no basis to discharge the entire jury as the irregularity was minor and managed properly by the judge’s directions.
- The evidence as a whole, including telephone and cell-site analysis, was sufficient to support the convictions.
- The sentences were appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the roles played by the appellants.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v KK and Others [2020] 1 Cr App R 29 | Judicial discretion in managing jury irregularities and when to discharge a jury. | The court applied the principles from this case in assessing whether the entire jury should be discharged after a juror’s internet research, concluding the trial judge acted reasonably in discharging only the individual juror and managing the situation by questioning the remaining jurors collectively. |
| Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 78 | Discretion to exclude evidence if its admission would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. | The trial judge considered and rejected the appellants’ submission to exclude the DNA evidence under this section, ruling that the evidence was relevant and any prejudice could be addressed by jury directions. |
| Criminal Justice Act 2003, Section 114(1)(d) | Admissibility of hearsay evidence. | The court rejected the attempt to admit ambiguous and unclear hearsay evidence from a witness interview, finding no proper basis for its admission under this provision. |
| Galbraith principles | Standards for determining whether there is a case to answer at the close of the prosecution case. | The trial judge applied these principles in ruling there was a case to answer against each appellant, a decision upheld on appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully analyzed the admissibility and treatment of the DNA evidence, emphasizing that while the DNA could not be attributed to any individual appellant due to their identical genetic profiles, it was nevertheless relevant circumstantial evidence when considered alongside the mobile phone and cell-site evidence. The court agreed with the trial judge that the DNA evidence was not sufficient on its own to prove guilt but could support the prosecution case as part of the overall evidence. The judge’s directions to the jury were found to be adequate in explaining the limitations and proper use of the DNA evidence, despite some technical complexity in the defense arguments.
Regarding the jury irregularity, the court held that the trial judge acted reasonably and within his discretion in discharging only the juror who conducted the unauthorized internet research and in giving clear directions to the remaining jurors. The court found no unfairness or contamination requiring discharge of the entire jury, noting that the information imparted was neutral and the judge’s management of the situation was appropriate.
The court also rejected renewed grounds challenging the sufficiency of evidence and adequacy of jury directions on conspiracy and circumstantial evidence, affirming the trial judge’s detailed rulings and directions as legally sound and balanced. The attempts to admit ambiguous hearsay evidence were dismissed for lack of clarity and proper foundation.
Finally, the court considered the sentences imposed on two appellants, finding no arguable error in the judge’s assessment of their roles or in the severity of the sentences. The sentences were consistent with the seriousness of the offences and comparable cases, and any mitigation did not warrant a reduction.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appeals against conviction and refused the renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence.
The direct effect of this decision is that the convictions and sentences of the three appellants are upheld as safe and appropriate. The court found no material error in the trial process, the admission and handling of DNA evidence, or the management of the jury irregularity. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.
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