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Boxall, R. v
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence following refusal by a single judge. The applicant, aged 53, was convicted by a jury in the Crown Court at Kingston-upon-Thames on 8 May 2019 of conspiracy to supply a Class A controlled drug, specifically 33 kilograms of cocaine. A co-defendant had pleaded guilty to the same conspiracy. The cocaine had a wholesale value of approximately £1 million and a street value of around £2.6 million.
On 7 June 2019, the applicant was sentenced to 22 years' imprisonment, with the co-defendant receiving 12 years' imprisonment (with a 25% reduction for the guilty plea, equating to 16 years post-trial). The sentencing judge found that the applicant played a leading role in the conspiracy, whereas the co-defendant played a significant role.
The appeal focuses on two main issues: the admissibility of certain evidence relating to a third party's convictions and the appropriateness of the sentence imposed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a third party’s subsequent convictions under section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and if such admission rendered the conviction unsafe.
- Whether the sentencing judge was correct in categorising the applicant’s role in the conspiracy as a leading role rather than a significant role, thereby justifying the sentence of 22 years.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The admission of evidence relating to the third party’s convictions amounted to impermissible "guilt by association" and unfairly prejudiced the applicant’s defence, rendering the conviction unsafe.
- The trial judge failed to properly analyse the substantial probative value of the third party evidence as required.
- The judge erred in concluding there was no residual discretion to exclude the evidence under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE").
- The time gap between the conspiracy and the third party’s convictions meant the evidence was not relevant to the applicant’s involvement.
- Regarding sentence, the applicant contended that his role was not leading but rather similar to the co-defendant’s significant role, making the 22-year sentence disproportionate.
Respondent's Arguments
- The trial judge applied the correct legal test and properly admitted the evidence under section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
- The evidence had substantial probative value in rebutting the applicant’s innocent explanation and in establishing involvement in the conspiracy.
- The evidence was a small part of an overwhelming circumstantial case, rendering the conviction safe.
- No application was made to exclude the evidence under section 78 of PACE, and even if made, it would not have succeeded given the high probative value.
- The sentencing judge was entitled to find the applicant played a leading role based on the evidence, justifying the sentence imposed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Ahmed [2007] EWCA Crim 1636 | Warning against "guilt by association" and improper use of bad character evidence. | The court found Ahmed distinguishable on its facts and rejected the defence argument that the evidence was mere guilt by association. |
| R v Braithwaite [2010] 2 Cr App R(S) 18 | Clarification that once section 100 conditions are met, no residual discretion remains to refuse admission of evidence. | The court cited Braithwaite to support the admission of evidence under section 100(1)(b), but also noted the possibility of exclusion under section 78 of PACE. |
| R v Rand & Ors [2006] EWCA Crim 3021 | Admissibility of co-conspirators' convictions and association evidence with substantial probative value. | The court upheld admission of evidence relating to co-conspirators’ convictions, emphasizing the need for careful jury directions to avoid unfair prejudice. |
| R v Livesey [2019] EWCA Crim 87 | Admissibility of bad character evidence under section 100(1)(b) related to associates' criminal background. | The court upheld the trial judge's ruling admitting evidence of associates' convictions as having sufficient probative value. |
| R v Twigg [2019] 1 WLR 1533 | Section 78 PACE requires balancing probative value against prejudicial effect to ensure a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. | Cited to explain the evaluative nature of the discretion under section 78 and the requirement of fairness in admitting evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined the admissibility of evidence concerning the third party, who was not part of the conspiracy but was convicted of similar drug offences three months later. The evidence was admitted under section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 because it had substantial probative value on a central issue: whether the applicant was knowingly involved in the conspiracy or was innocently present.
The court noted the prosecution’s reliance on the association between the applicant and the third party, including phone contacts and possession of similar encrypted phones used by organised crime groups. The court rejected the defence’s argument that the evidence amounted to impermissible guilt by association, distinguishing it from precedent cases such as R v Ahmed.
Although the trial judge stated there was no residual discretion to exclude the evidence once admissible under section 100, the court accepted that a defence application under section 78 of PACE could have been made. However, as no such application was made, and given the strong probative value of the evidence, the court concluded that any exclusion under section 78 would have been unlikely to succeed.
The court emphasized the importance of careful jury directions to mitigate any potential prejudice, which were given and approved by counsel. The evidence relating to the third party was only one strand in a strong circumstantial case.
Regarding sentence, the court found the trial judge was entitled to categorise the applicant’s role as leading. This was supported by the high purity of the cocaine indicating closeness to the source, possession and use of an encrypted phone, the presence of coded banknotes and notes indicating the quantity of cocaine, and the applicant’s financial involvement. The court accepted the judge’s assessment that the applicant was involved in organising and possibly directing the drug transaction, justifying the 22-year sentence.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court refused the application for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence. It held that the admission of evidence relating to the third party’s convictions was properly made under section 100(1)(b) and did not render the conviction unsafe. The court found no arguable ground of appeal regarding the exclusion of evidence under section 78 of PACE, given no application was made and such an application would not have succeeded.
On sentence, the court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the applicant played a leading role, confirming that the 22-year sentence was within the appropriate range for the seriousness of the offence. The decision has no broader implications beyond the direct effect on the parties and does not establish new precedent.
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