Hook v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for the retention of a dwelling at a site known as "Hookmeadow", located in the Green Belt outside the settlement boundary in open countryside. The appellant, referred to as the Plaintiff, sought retrospective planning permission for a timber cabin used as a dwelling, described as an occupational worker's dwelling ancillary to horticultural and agricultural use of the land.

The Plaintiff initially acquired the site in 2002 and began living there in a horsebox. Over the years, multiple planning applications were made, some refused, and enforcement action was taken to cease residential use and demolish the dwelling, which was not complied with. The Plaintiff made a further retrospective planning application in 2017, which was refused by the local planning authority, the Defendant council. The Plaintiff appealed to an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, who dismissed the appeal and refused an application for costs against the council.

The Plaintiff then applied for judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, challenging the inspector's decision. Permission to proceed was initially refused in the lower courts but later granted by the appellate court for a statutory review.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the inspector erred in law by concluding that the dwelling was not a building for agriculture and thus constituted inappropriate development in the Green Belt despite the Plaintiff's suggestion of an agricultural occupancy condition.
2. Whether the inspector acted in breach of the rules of natural justice by rejecting the agricultural occupancy condition without giving the Plaintiff a fair opportunity to respond.
3. Whether the inspector failed to provide lawful reasons for rejecting the agricultural occupancy condition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff contended that the dwelling was ancillary to the agricultural use of the land, citing legal authority that a farmhouse and garden area can be treated as used for agriculture.
• The Plaintiff argued that an agricultural occupancy condition restricting use to persons working in agriculture could be imposed, making the dwelling a building for agriculture and thus appropriate development in the Green Belt.
• It was submitted that planning permission was not required for a change of use to agriculture, so an occupancy condition would regulate the use effectively.
• The Plaintiff alleged the inspector failed to consider this condition and did not provide reasons for rejecting it, constituting an error of law.
• It was also argued that the inspector breached natural justice by not allowing the Plaintiff a fair opportunity to address the reasonableness of the condition.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant council opposed the appeal, maintaining that the dwelling was not ancillary to agricultural use and that the occupancy condition was unworkable and unreasonable.
• Evidence from an independent agricultural consultant supported the council's position that the Plaintiff’s horticultural enterprise was small scale and that the horses were kept for leisure, not agriculture.
• The Defendant submitted that the inspector was entitled to assess the reality of the development rather than rely on the description or a suggested condition.
• The Defendant maintained that the inspector’s decision was lawful and that the occupancy condition was irrelevant given the factual findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the inspector's factual findings and legal application regarding the Green Belt policy and the nature of the development. It emphasized that the concepts of "inappropriate development" and "buildings for agriculture" are matters of planning judgment and fact, not strict legal definitions. The inspector had found that the horticultural operation was small scale, comparable to amateur gardening, and that the two horses kept were for recreational use, not agricultural purposes.

Given these findings, the dwelling was the primary development and not ancillary to agriculture, so it did not qualify as a building for agriculture under paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The court agreed that the inspector was entitled to focus on the reality of the development rather than the description or a suggested occupancy condition. The agricultural occupancy condition was irrelevant because the development was not agricultural in nature.

The court further held that the inspector was not required to consider or impose the suggested condition, as it did not fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. The possibility of future change of use to agriculture was speculative and outside the scope of the application before the inspector.

Regarding procedural fairness, the court found that the Plaintiff had ample opportunity to address the occupancy condition at the hearing, and the inspector’s discussion of conditions was proper. There was no breach of natural justice.

Finally, the court held that the inspector provided adequate and intelligible reasons for rejecting the agricultural occupancy condition, both in the appeal decision and in the costs decision, consistent with established legal standards for planning decisions.

Holding and Implications

The application for judicial review is dismissed.

The court upheld the inspector’s decision that the dwelling was not a building for agriculture and thus constituted inappropriate development in the Green Belt. The suggested agricultural occupancy condition was not a material consideration and did not require the inspector’s attention. The Plaintiff’s claims of procedural unfairness and failure to provide reasons were rejected. The decision confirms the importance of assessing the factual reality of development in Green Belt cases and affirms that planning conditions must fairly relate to the permitted development. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling applies the existing planning law and policy to the facts of this case.