Roddis v R.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant has a history of criminal charges over the past 12 years, with involvement from the Criminal Cases Review Commission ("CCRC") and this court at various stages. On 17 July 2008, at the Crown Court in The City before Judge Milford Q.C. and a jury, the Appellant was convicted of placing an article with intent (a hoax bomb) and engaging in the preparation of an act of terrorism. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment on 18 July 2008. The Appellant's initial appeal against conviction, specifically on the preparation of terrorism charge, was refused on 12 March 2009. The CCRC declined to refer the 2008 convictions to the Court of Appeal on 18 March 2011.

In February 2013, the Appellant was acquitted of engaging in the preparation of an act of terrorism at the Central Criminal Court, where the prosecution relied on the 2008 conviction as bad character evidence. The Appellant contended that the 2008 conviction was incorrect and denied terrorist intent. A second application to the CCRC regarding the 2008 conviction was submitted in April 2014, which led to the present appeal.

Subsequent to the 2008 conviction, the Appellant pleaded guilty in May 2016 to possession of a firearm by a convicted person and was sentenced accordingly. A prosecution appeal related to a possession of an explosive substance charge was dismissed, resulting in acquittal. The CCRC made a decision to refer the current appeal on 25 March 2019.

The facts underlying the 2008 offences include the Appellant leaving a hoax bomb on a bus in The City, dressed in disguise, which caused alarm among passengers. Further, he exhibited behaviour involving possession of railway fog signals and imitation bullets, and was found with materials and internet searches related to bomb-making and terrorism. The Appellant denied terrorist intent, claiming his actions were pranks or driven by other interests such as military history and gaming. The prosecution presented evidence of his preparation and intent to commit terrorism, supported by expert testimony and witness accounts.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the post-trial diagnosis of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) affects the safety of the Appellant's 2008 convictions for placing a hoax bomb with intent and preparing an act of terrorism.
2. The admissibility and impact of fresh expert evidence regarding the Appellant’s ASD diagnosis on the appeal.
3. Whether the Appellant’s ASD diagnosis undermines the original jury’s findings on intent and preparation for terrorism.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant relies on a post-trial diagnosis of ASD to challenge the safety of his convictions, arguing that his autism affected his understanding of social cues and the consequences of his actions.
• Expert evidence from Dr Blackwood suggests that the Appellant's behaviour was influenced by deficits in social communication and interaction, leading to misjudgement of others' fears and intentions.
• The Appellant contends his conduct, including the hoax bomb, was a prank and an attempt to seek attention rather than a genuine terrorist act.
• It is argued that the Appellant's narrowed and intense interests, characteristic of ASD, were misunderstood by the jury as ideological conviction or intent to commit terrorism.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent argues that the Appellant's ASD diagnosis does not undermine the jury's findings, as pre-trial expert reports already revealed relevant behavioural traits such as insensitivity to social norms.
• Dr Joseph, the Respondent's psychiatrist, opines that the Appellant had sufficient social understanding to know that placing a hoax bomb would alarm people, and that the diagnosis of ASD does not assist in determining the Appellant's intent at the time of the offences.
• The Respondent emphasizes that the Appellant's defence at trial was inconsistent with the evidence that would be required to rely on the ASD diagnosis, and the Appellant cannot now advance a factual case contradictory to his trial testimony.
• It is submitted that the Appellant’s legal team made a tactical decision not to call expert evidence that might have undermined the defence case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a detailed examination of the expert evidence relating to the Appellant's ASD diagnosis and its potential impact on the convictions. It acknowledged that the diagnosis post-dates the trial but noted that many of the behavioural traits associated with ASD, such as insensitivity to social norms and difficulties in social communication, were already identified in pre-trial expert reports under different diagnoses (personality disorders).

The court emphasized that the Appellant's defence at trial was inconsistent with the expert evidence that would explain his behaviour as a fantasy or prank. Consequently, the Appellant could not now rely on expert evidence that would contradict his sworn testimony. The court also highlighted that the Appellant’s legal team made a tactical decision not to call expert witnesses who might have undermined the defence case.

Regarding the hoax bomb (count 1), the court accepted that the Appellant may not have fully appreciated the impact of his actions on others due to his ASD but concluded that this was already a matter known to the defence and did not render the conviction unsafe. For the preparation of terrorism charge (count 2), the court found that the ASD diagnosis did not materially affect the assessment of intent, given the evidence and the Appellant’s consistent denial of ideological conviction.

The court also noted that the Appellant was fit to plead and that the trial process was fair, with no indication that his ASD impaired his ability to understand or engage with the proceedings. It further observed that the diagnosis did not preclude the possibility that the Appellant could deceive or plan criminal acts.

In applying legal principles, the court relied on established case law restricting appeals based on post-trial factual changes that contradict trial evidence, and it distinguished prior cases allowing appeals on autism grounds as fact-specific and not binding here.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal, holding that the post-trial diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder does not render the Appellant's 2008 convictions unsafe.

The direct effect of this decision is that the convictions for placing a hoax bomb with intent and preparing an act of terrorism remain valid and enforceable. No new precedent was established, and the ruling underscores the principle that post-trial diagnoses must be carefully evaluated in light of the issues at trial and existing evidence. The decision reinforces the importance of consistency between trial testimony and appellate arguments, particularly in cases involving complex psychological assessments.