Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Sharp & Other Claimants Listed in the GLO Register v. Blank & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment follows the trial of specific allegations brought by a group of shareholders of Company A against five former directors of Company A, seeking to hold them personally liable for losses of approximately £385 million related to the reverse takeover of Company B by Company A in 2008 during the financial crisis. The court’s task was limited to these allegations and did not extend to a full investigation of the takeover or its ultimate justification. The shareholders numbered over 5,800 and collectively held no more than 5% of Company A’s shares at the announcement date.
The takeover process involved a series of events beginning with initial discussions in mid-2008, the announcement of a recommended acquisition on 18 September 2008, followed by a recapitalisation weekend in October 2008 during which revised terms were agreed, including a reduced exchange ratio and a government recapitalisation package. Company A’s board unanimously recommended the acquisition, which was approved by shareholders on 19 November 2008.
During the acquisition process, Company B faced severe liquidity and funding difficulties, supported by emergency liquidity assistance ("ELA") from the central bank and a secured interbank facility ("the Repo") provided by Company A. These arrangements were not disclosed in the shareholder circular relating to the acquisition. The claimants contend that the directors breached duties of care and fiduciary duties in recommending the acquisition and failing to disclose material information, leading to shareholder losses due to dilution and overvaluation.
The factual evidence included extensive documentary material, witness statements from directors, shareholders, and experts, as well as detailed expert reports on valuation, banking practice, capital adequacy, and media reaction. The court carefully considered the challenges of retrospective assessment, the extraordinary market conditions, and the roles and responsibilities of the directors and advisers involved.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant directors breached their duty of care and fiduciary duties in recommending the Acquisition of Company B by Company A to shareholders.
- Whether the defendant directors breached their duty of care and equitable duties by failing to disclose material information to shareholders, including the existence and nature of emergency liquidity assistance and interbank funding arrangements.
- Whether the shareholders suffered loss as a result of any such breaches, and if so, the nature and extent of recoverable damages.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants' Arguments
- The Acquisition was a dangerous and value-destroying strategy involving unacceptably risky decisions.
- The defendant directors failed to disclose material information about Company B’s funding crisis, including the emergency liquidity assistance and the secured interbank facility provided by Company A.
- The directors negligently recommended the Acquisition and misled shareholders by omission and misstatement in the shareholder circular and presentations.
- The Acquisition caused shareholder losses by dilution and overpayment for Company B, which was effectively valueless due to liquidity support.
- The directors owed a direct duty of care to individual shareholders to provide accurate advice and complete disclosure in relation to the Acquisition.
- If the information had been properly disclosed, the Acquisition would not have proceeded or would have been rejected by shareholders, avoiding losses.
Defendants' Arguments
- The directors owed their duties to Company A and not directly to individual shareholders; any claim should be derivative.
- The recommendation to shareholders in the circular was made honestly and on reasonable grounds based on extensive due diligence and expert advice.
- The emergency liquidity assistance and interbank facility were properly regarded as ordinary course interbank transactions or closely related to the Acquisition, with no obligation to disclose them specifically.
- The circular and presentations fairly and candidly disclosed the risks inherent in the Acquisition, including capital and liquidity risks, consistent with regulatory requirements.
- The shareholders were adequately informed to make a decision, and the majority voted in favour of the Acquisition on a fully informed basis.
- The claimants have not shown causation or loss, and the alleged losses are too remote or reflective of company losses.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Ll.Rep 403 | Judicial approach to weighing documentary and memory evidence in historical commercial disputes | The court applied guidance on assessing evidence from documents and recollection in a complex, decade-old commercial case. |
| Gestmin SGPS [2013] EWHC 3560 | Evidence assessment and judge’s role as juror | Referenced as part of the court’s approach to weighing evidence fairly without predetermined weighting. |
| Peskin v Anderson [2000] EWCA Civ 326 | Direct fiduciary duties of directors to shareholders | Confirmed no special fiduciary relationship existed here to confer direct duties on directors to individual shareholders. |
| Williams v Natural Life Products [1998] 1 WLR 830 | Distinction between company duties and personal duties of directors | Applied to reject imposition of personal duty of care by directors to shareholders in relation to market announcements. |
| Hall v Cable and Wireless plc [2011] BCC 543 | Liability for misleading statements under FSMA | Distinguished investment-focused disclosures from governance disclosures; no personal liability for directors on governance statements. |
| Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407 | Standard of care and skill expected of directors | Applied to assess directors’ conduct against that of a reasonably competent director with their knowledge and experience. |
| Re Dorman Long & Co Ltd [1934] Ch 635 | Disclosure obligations in shareholder circulars | Held that circulars must contain main facts enabling shareholders to exercise judgment, but not every fact. |
| IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs International [2007] 1 Ll. Rep 264 | Interpretation of disclaimers and assumption of responsibility in pre-contractual statements | Distinguished disclaimers of liability from statements negating assumption of responsibility. |
| JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) | Effect of contractual terms on duty of care | Confirmed that terms defining basis of services may exclude duty of care arising at all. |
| Pilmer v Duke Group Limited [2001] BCLC 733 | Reflective loss principle and shareholder claims | Discussed limits on shareholder recovery for loss suffered by company. |
| Veitch v Avery [2008] PNLR 7 | Loss of chance and causation in shareholder claims | Considered evidential requirements for loss of chance claims. |
| Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602 | Proof of loss of chance | Outlined evidential standard for establishing loss of chance claims. |
| Perry v Raleys [2019] UKSC 5 | Loss of chance in tort claims | Recent Supreme Court authority on loss of chance and causation. |
| Moda International Brands v Gateley [2019] EWHC 1326 (QB) | Loss of chance and causation | Considered evidential approach to loss of chance in commercial context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court acknowledged the extraordinary complexity of the case, the volume of evidence, and the difficulties inherent in retrospective evaluation of commercial decisions made in the context of an unprecedented financial crisis. It emphasized the need to avoid hindsight bias and to assess the directors’ conduct by the standards of reasonably competent directors at the relevant time, taking into account the information and constraints they faced.
Regarding the recommendation case, the court held that the directors owed a duty of care to Company A and not directly to individual shareholders, except in limited circumstances not present here. The directors conceded a duty of care in relation to the shareholder circular, but denied such a duty in relation to the initial announcements and presentations. The court agreed that the announcements and presentations were made on behalf of the company to the market and did not constitute personal advice to shareholders.
The court found that the directors had reasonable grounds, based on extensive due diligence, expert advice, and regulatory input, to conclude that the Acquisition was in the best interests of Company A and its shareholders. The risks identified, including capital and liquidity risks, were disclosed in the circular and presentations, and the directors did not ignore or conceal material risks. The directors’ economic and capital forecasts, though ultimately proven optimistic, were within a range of reasonable judgments at the time.
In relation to the disclosure case, the court held that the directors breached their equitable duty to disclose material information by failing to inform shareholders of (i) the existence and nature of the emergency liquidity assistance provided by the central bank to Company B, and (ii) the secured interbank facility ("the Repo") extended by Company A to Company B pending completion. These facts were known to the directors but were not disclosed in the circular, and the matter was not considered by the board or its advisers in preparing the circular.
The court reasoned that fair, candid and reasonable disclosure would have included reference to these facilities in a manner sufficient to inform shareholders of the liquidity position and funding risks of Company B pending completion, without causing undue alarm or speculation. The failure to disclose was a misstatement of the care exercised in preparing the circular.
However, on causation and loss, the court found that the claimants failed to prove that disclosure of these matters would have caused the Acquisition not to proceed or the shareholders to reject the Acquisition. The directors would not have terminated the transaction on account of such disclosure, and the market reaction to the later leak of the Repo facility was muted. Expert evidence indicated that disclosure would have been seen as incremental information but not one causing a collapse of share price or shareholder vote. The majority of shareholders voted in favour on the basis of the circular as issued, and the claimants failed to establish a real or substantial chance that a sufficient number of other shareholders would have voted differently.
On the pleaded losses, the court held that no damages could be awarded as the claimants had not proved loss. The alleged overpayment for Company B was not established, and any such loss would be reflective loss recoverable only by the company derivatively. The diminution in share value was not properly measurable on the evidence, and the claimants failed to prove any loss causally connected to the breaches pleaded.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court dismissed the claims against the defendant directors. It held that while the directors breached their equitable duty to disclose certain material information about emergency liquidity assistance and interbank funding arrangements, the claimants failed to prove that this breach caused them loss or that the Acquisition would have been rejected or terminated if the information had been disclosed. The directors’ recommendation of the Acquisition was found to be within the range of reasonable judgments, made on the basis of extensive due diligence and expert advice in extraordinary market conditions. No new precedent was set. The direct effect is that the claimants’ action for damages or equitable compensation fails, and the Acquisition stands as approved by the shareholders.
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