Doe v. Armour Pharmaceutical Inc.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Motion before the Court is one of twenty-three similar Motions, with this particular Motion agreed to be treated as a test case for the others. The Plaintiffs, a group of thirty-two individuals, initiated proceedings originally in the United States of America claiming damages against three Defendants, all pharmaceutical companies based in the United States, on the basis that they were haemophiliacs treated with blood products prepared by these Defendants and suffered personal injuries due to alleged negligence. The US proceedings were stayed in favour of litigation in the Irish Courts, where the same three Defendants were named. Subsequently, two additional Defendants were joined on the basis that some Plaintiffs were treated with blood products manufactured by them.

The present Motion is brought by the Third named Defendant seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims against it, relying on procedural rules and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The Third named Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs have no evidence that they were treated with its product in these twenty-three cases and challenges the Plaintiffs to provide such evidence. It further argues that it is impossible that its product was administered to these Plaintiffs, based on detailed examination of product availability, unit counts, and administration dates. The Third named Defendant offers to accept dismissal with a reservation allowing re-joining if future evidence emerges.

The Plaintiffs respond that the data relied upon by the Third named Defendant originates from the Defendant’s own agents and lacks sworn testimony or corroboration. Although the Plaintiffs do not currently have documentary proof of treatment by the Third named Defendant’s product, they assert that oral evidence could be tendered to establish liability on a balance of probabilities. Additional considerations include claims for contribution and indemnity by the first and second Defendants against the Third named Defendant, who argue that striking out the Third named Defendant would prejudice their rights.

The Fourth and Fifth named Defendants, recently joined, have taken minimal steps in the proceedings and urge the Court to refuse dismissal of the Third named Defendant at this stage to avoid procedural complications regarding contribution or indemnity claims.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction and Order 19 Rule 28 to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against the Third named Defendant on the basis that the action discloses no reasonable cause of action.
2. Whether the Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence, documentary or oral, to establish that they were treated with the Third named Defendant’s product so as to justify continuation of the claims.
3. Whether the interests of justice require the Court to defer dismissal to allow for potential evidence and to protect rights of other Defendants to claim contribution or indemnity.
4. Whether the procedural posture and the joinder of additional Defendants affect the appropriateness or timing of dismissal.

Arguments of the Parties

Third Named Defendant's Arguments

• The Plaintiffs have no evidence that they were treated with the Third named Defendant’s product in these twenty-three cases.
• The Defendant has challenged the Plaintiffs to provide such evidence, which has not been forthcoming.
• Detailed examination of product availability, unit counts, and administration dates demonstrates it was impossible for the Plaintiffs to have received the Defendant’s product.
• Counsel has addressed and rebutted criticisms of these conclusions convincingly.
• The Defendant proposes dismissal with reservation to allow re-joining if future evidence arises.
• It is unfair and costly to continue the action against the Defendant without evidence.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

• The data relied upon by the Third named Defendant originates from its own agents and lacks sworn testimony or independent corroboration.
• The Plaintiffs currently lack documentary proof but assert oral evidence may establish liability on a balance of probabilities.
• The Plaintiffs request the opportunity to tender such oral evidence at trial.

First and Second Named Defendants' Arguments

• Not striking out the Third named Defendant is necessary to preserve their rights to claim contribution or indemnity under the Civil Liability Act, 1964.
• They intend to offer evidence at trial to establish the Third named Defendant’s involvement.
• Dismissal would prejudice their ability to pursue these claims.

Fourth and Fifth Named Defendants' Arguments

• They have had limited opportunity to consider their position as recently joined Defendants.
• Dismissing the Third named Defendant now would compel them to apply to join as Third Parties to pursue contribution or indemnity claims, complicating proceedings.
• Therefore, the Order sought should be refused at this stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing the Third named Defendant’s application to dismiss under Order 19 Rule 28 and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction as established in Barry -v- Buckley. The Court acknowledged the Defendant’s detailed submissions and evidence aiming to show it was impossible that its product was administered to the Plaintiffs in these twenty-three cases. However, the Court found that the Plaintiffs and the other Defendants disputed these facts.

The Court emphasized that the jurisdiction to strike out claims at this stage should be exercised only where it is clear beyond doubt that the Plaintiff cannot succeed and where no factual dispute exists. Since there remained factual disputes regarding whether the Plaintiffs were treated with the Third named Defendant’s product, these issues must be resolved at trial.

Furthermore, the Court considered the interests of justice as articulated in Hetherington -v- Ultra Tyre Services Limited, which requires inquiry into co-defendants’ intentions to present evidence against the Defendant seeking dismissal. The first and second Defendants intended to tender evidence implicating the Third named Defendant, and the recently joined Defendants had not yet had a full opportunity to consider their position.

Although the Court acknowledged that, pragmatically, dismissal might avoid expense and inconvenience, and that the Plaintiffs might ultimately fail to prove their case, the Court was bound by the procedural and evidential standards requiring trial of disputed facts. The Court also noted that any arrangement to dismiss with reservation to re-join would require the parties’ consent, which was not forthcoming.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was not open to it to grant the dismissal sought at this stage.

Holding and Implications

The Court refused the relief sought by the Third named Defendant to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims at this stage.

The direct effect of this decision is that the claims against the Third named Defendant will proceed to trial, where disputed factual issues will be resolved. The Court’s refusal preserves the rights of all parties to present evidence, including claims for contribution or indemnity by other Defendants. No new precedent was established; rather, the Court applied established principles requiring caution in striking out claims and the necessity of trial where factual disputes exist.