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C v. Minister for Social Protection & anor
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a sentenced prisoner, applied for the State Pension (Contributory). Section 249(1)(b) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”) automatically disqualified persons “undergoing imprisonment” from receiving that pension. After the Minister refused payment, the Appellant commenced High Court proceedings challenging the provision’s constitutionality. The High Court rejected the claim, but the Supreme Court (Judge MacMenamin delivering the principal 27 July 2017 judgment with all other Justices concurring) held that, because successive statutory amendments and regulations had narrowed the disqualification so that it applied only to convicted prisoners, the measure had become an additional punishment not imposed by a court. The Court therefore found the subsection inconsistent with Articles 34 and 38.1 of the Constitution (judicial‐powers clauses).
Rather than make an immediate order, the Court adjourned the matter to receive submissions on the proper remedy (“remedy hearing”). On 28 November 2018 four judgments were delivered—by Judge O’Donnell (majority), Judge MacMenamin, Judge McKechnie (concurring) and the Chief Justice (concurring)—resolving the form of declaration and the Appellant’s monetary claim.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Court possesses a jurisdiction to defer or suspend a declaration of unconstitutionality and, if so, in what circumstances it should be exercised.
- Whether section 249(1)(b) of the 2005 Act should now be formally declared inconsistent with the Constitution and, if declared invalid, from what date that invalidity operates.
- Whether a person affected by an unconstitutional statute is, without more, entitled to damages or retroactive payment of the benefit withheld.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Section 249(1)(b) is unconstitutional and should be declared wholly void ab initio; immediate invalidity is required by Article 15.4.2.
- Because invalidity dates from enactment, the Appellant is statutorily entitled to back-payments of pension or, alternatively, constitutional damages.
- Suspended or deferred declarations have no footing in the Irish Constitution and, even if available, are inappropriate here.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The Court may, in exceptional cases, delay or suspend declarations to safeguard legal order; this is such a case.
- If invalidity is declared, its temporal effect should be prospective only; otherwise large unquantified liabilities may arise.
- Damages are not automatic; no personal constitutional right of the Appellant was infringed and the Minister merely applied legislation presumed valid.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Murphy v. The Attorney General (1982) IR 241 | Consequences of invalid legislation; limits on restitution; “windfall” avoidance. | Majority used the Murphy approach to cap any monetary relief and emphasised that non-plaintiffs gain no automatic benefit. |
| N.H.V. v. Minister for Justice & Equality [2017] IESC 35 | Adjournment of remedy and exceptional use of suspended declarations. | Cited as recent example where Court deferred an order to allow legislative response. |
| Persona Digital Telephone Ltd. v. Minister for Public Enterprise [2017] IESC 27 | Reference point for adjourned remedies. | Illustrative of tentative Irish use of deferred declarations. |
| Schachter v. Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679 | Canadian criteria for suspended declarations (public safety, rule-of-law, benefits). | Used comparatively to analyse when Irish courts may defer relief. |
| R v. Swain [1991] 1 SCR 933 | Suspending declarations to avoid danger to the public. | Cited as foreign illustration only. |
| Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 SCR 721 | Suspension to protect rule of law when striking down all legislation impossible. | Informative comparative example. |
| O’Donovan v. Attorney General [1961] IR 114 | Early declaration of electoral statute invalid. | Background to later retroactivity debates. |
| McMahon v. Attorney General [1972] IR 69 | Effect of invalid electoral provisions. | Cited in discussion of retrospective consequences. |
| de Burca v. Attorney General [1976] IR 38 | Jury selection invalidity and practical limits on reopening convictions. | Foundation for “legal certainty” reasoning. |
| State (Byrne) v. Frawley [1978] IR 326 | Finality of convictions despite earlier invalidity finding. | Supports non-automatic nullity of past acts. |
| A v. Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45 | Prospectivity; convictions not set aside merely because statute later struck down. | Relied on to deny broad retrospective relief. |
| Blake v. Attorney General [1982] IR 117 | Court delaying effect of declaration to protect tenants. | Cited as Irish instance of de facto suspension. |
| Brennan v. Attorney General [1983] ILRM 449 | Creeping unconstitutionality concept. | Referenced in analysis of temporal effects. |
| Transport Salaried Staff’s Association v. CIE [1965] IR 180 | Scope of declaratory relief. | Background authority. |
| Pine Valley Developments v. Minister for the Environment [1987] IR 23 | Ministerial immunity from damages for void permission. | Cited on damages limits. |
| An Blascaod Mór Teo. v. Commissioner of Public Works (No. 4) [2000] 3 IR 565 | Damages for invalid legislation—exceptional. | Budd J.’s analysis endorsed as restrictive. |
| Redmond v. Minister for Environment (No. 2) [2006] 3 IR 1 | Nominal damages after invalidity. | Discussed but not followed. |
| Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank 308 U.S. 371 (1940) | Past acts under void law may stand for justice. | Quoted to show flexibility on retroactivity. |
| Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425 (1886) | Statement of absolute nullity doctrine. | Cited then qualified by Court. |
| Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil 287 U.S. 358 (1932) | Prospective overruling. | Referenced in discussion of remedies. |
| Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201 | Consequences of unconstitutional dissolution. | Foreign example of limited retroactivity. |
| Simpson v. Attorney General [1955] NZLR 271 | “Manifest public inconvenience” test. | Comparative illustration. |
| Second Apportionment Case (1963) 16 BVerfGE 130 | German handling of electoral invalidity. | Cited for comparative context. |
| Cadder v. HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 | Retroactive effect in non-constitutional system. | Noted as analogous challenge. |
| Judge McMenamin v. Ireland [1996] 3 IR 100 | Admonitory declaration approach. | Example of non-coercive remedy. |
| AC v. Cork University Hospital [2018] IECA 217 | Suspension to protect detainees’ interests. | Modern Irish example. |
| Cox v. Ireland [1992] 2 IR 503 | Unconstitutional forfeiture; damages available. | Distinguished because personal right implicated there. |
| Kennedy v. Ireland [1987] IR 587 | Damages for breach of personal privacy right. | Used to contrast with present case where no personal right breached. |
| Meskell v. CIE [1973] IR 121 | Damages for breach of constitutional right to association. | Again distinguished. |
| Keating v. Crowley [2010] 3 IR 648 | State liability where officials act with mala fides. | Cited to show none such existed here. |
| Kearney v. Minister for Justice [1986] IR 116 | Nominal damages where letters withheld in prison. | Shows damages require direct breach of personal right. |
| Cosgrove v. Ireland [1982] ILRM 48; Hayes v. Ireland [1987] ILRM 651; Conway v. INTO [1991] 2 IR 305 | Examples of constitutional tort with personal right infringement. | Used to contrast with appellant’s position. |
| DPP v. Kavanagh [2012] IECCA 65 | Prospective effect of invalidity in criminal sphere. | Cited approvingly. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Jurisdiction to defer or suspend declarations. All judges agreed that Irish courts possess a limited power to postpone or suspend the operative effect of a declaration of unconstitutionality. The power is exceptional and justified only where immediate invalidation would gravely disturb legal order, public safety, or the separation of powers. Comparative jurisprudence (especially Canadian) was used illustratively but the power was grounded in Articles 34 and 15.4.2 as interpreted in Irish case-law.
2. Form and timing of the declaration. The Court unanimously declared that the words “is undergoing imprisonment” in s. 249(1)(b) are inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid. A majority (Judge O’Donnell, the Chief Justice, Judge McKechnie and Judge O’Malley) treated the subsection as void from the point at which its scope became confined to convicted prisoners; Judge MacMenamin considered invalidity to operate only prospectively from the date of judgment.
3. Damages/arrears claim. All judges rejected the notion that damages flow automatically from a finding of invalidity. The majority held that:
- The Appellant had no personal constitutional property right in the pension—only a statutory expectancy.
- The Minister’s application of the statute, presumed constitutional until struck down, was not a tort or wrong.
- By analogy with Murphy, broad restitution would confer an undeserved windfall and disrupt public finances.
- Nonetheless, justice required a modest ex-gratia payment limited to approximately the period of the litigation; the Court fixed €10,000, acknowledging €7,500 already paid.
Judge MacMenamin would have awarded no monetary relief, emphasising the absence of direct loss and the purely prospective nature of the declaration he favoured.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Section 249(1)(b) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 is declared inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid.
Implications: The disqualification of prisoners from contributory pensions ceases immediately; the Oireachtas must redesign the regime if it wishes to regulate payments to detainees. The decision confirms—though restricts—the Court’s power to defer or suspend declarations, clarifies that damages are not automatic after a finding of unconstitutionality, and signals that windfall restitution will be limited in line with Murphy-type considerations. No broader constitutional right to social-welfare payments was recognised, and no new damages doctrine was created.
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