Good Concrete v CRH Plc, Roadstone Wood Ltd., & anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff (a concrete supplier) issued High Court proceedings against three competitor companies—hereafter “Company A,” “Company B,” and “Company C.” During case-management the assigned trial judge, Judge [Cooke], disclosed that a “very small” number of Company A shares featured in his pension fund. No objection was taken and the litigation proceeded.

Between January 2011 and May 2012 Judge [Cooke] delivered three written judgments:

• 20 January 2011: refusal of interlocutory injunctive relief and a costs order against the Plaintiff.
• 21 March 2012: orders directing the Plaintiff to provide phased security for costs.
• 15 May 2012: quantification of security (€110,000 in favour of Companies A & B and €85,000 in favour of Company C).

After these rulings, the Plaintiff learned that Judge [Cooke] had acquired additional Company A shares (totalling c. 8,966 shares worth approx. €135,000) on 9 December 2010—after his initial disclosure—and had continued to receive dividends. The Plaintiff wrote to the judge, who directed that any issue be raised in open court. On 13 November 2012 Judge [Cooke] placed the full details of his shareholdings on the record and recused himself.

The Plaintiff appealed the three High Court orders to the Supreme Court, alleging objective bias arising from the judge’s undisclosed and significant shareholding.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does Irish law recognise an automatic rule of disqualification where a judge holds a pecuniary interest in a party, or is the correct standard the objective “reasonable person” test for apparent bias?
2. Applying the correct standard, did Judge [Cooke]’s shareholding give rise to objective bias requiring that his three High Court judgments be set aside?
3. Could any alleged bias have been waived by the Plaintiff in light of the limited disclosure made on 26 November 2010?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• Any direct pecuniary interest mandates automatic disqualification; alternatively, the reasonable observer would apprehend bias here because the shareholding was substantial and only partially disclosed.
• No de minimis exception applies on these facts.
• The Plaintiff could not and did not waive the right to an impartial tribunal because full details were never revealed.
• Late acquisition of further shares and dividends compounded the appearance of bias.

Respondents' Arguments

• Irish law applies the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test, not automatic disqualification.
• A shareholding alone is insufficient; it must be shown that the judge’s decision could realistically affect the share price—no such evidence was offered.
• Judge [Cooke] candidly disclosed his holding; it was small relative to Company A’s market capitalisation and held within a pension context.
• The Plaintiff waived any objection by expressly accepting the judge after disclosure and only raised bias once substantive applications were lost.
• Even if bias were possible, the doctrine of waiver or estoppel should bar the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court (per Judge [Denham]) reaffirmed that Irish law employs the objective “reasonable person” standard for determining apparent bias, not an automatic rule of disqualification. Reviewing Irish, UK, Australian and South African authorities, the Court concluded that automatic disqualification is neither required nor desirable in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, the Court emphasised that a reasonable observer would generally question impartiality if a judge personally holds shares—outside a blind fund—in a litigant company. In such cases the judge must:

• Make complete inquiries into the extent of the holding;
• Disclose the holding in full to the parties; and
• Recuse himself or herself unless the interest is trivial, insubstantial or absurd.

Applying those principles, the Court found:

1. Judge [Cooke]’s shareholding (approx. €135,000) was neither trivial nor held through an unmanaged fund; it was a direct, personal asset.
2. The initial disclosure (“a very small number of shares”) was incomplete; later acquisitions and dividends were unknown to the parties and to the judge at the time but should have been ascertained.
3. Because full facts were not available, no informed waiver could occur; therefore waiver was inapplicable.
4. The combination of direct pecuniary interest and inadequate disclosure would lead the reasonable, informed observer to apprehend bias.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED; the three High Court judgments were quashed and all matters remitted to the High Court for rehearing before a different judge.

Immediate effect: the Plaintiff regains the opportunity to pursue interlocutory relief and will face fresh security-for-costs applications before a new judge. Broader implications: the Supreme Court clarified that while Ireland rejects automatic disqualification, judges must recuse themselves where a direct shareholding in a party is more than trivial. The judgment reinforces rigorous disclosure duties and strengthens public confidence in judicial impartiality without altering the underlying objective-bias standard.