Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
See more information ...
Click here to read the full judgment
Fleming v. Ireland & ors
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, a 59-year-old individual with advanced multiple sclerosis, is almost completely paralysed, endures severe pain and wishes to end life peacefully with assistance from a Partner. Because section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 criminalises anyone who “aids, abets, counsels or procures” a suicide, the Plaintiff commenced High Court proceedings seeking declarations that the provision is unconstitutional and incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), or, alternatively, an order compelling the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue prosecution-guidelines. A three-judge divisional High Court dismissed all claims on 10 January 2013. The Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging only the findings on constitutionality and Convention compatibility. The Irish Human Rights Commission appeared as Amicus. Judgment was delivered on 29 April 2013.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 violates the Constitution by infringing an alleged right to assisted suicide and/or by discriminating against persons who cannot end their own lives unaided.
- Whether the same provision is incompatible with Ireland’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Constitution and the Convention protect personal autonomy, bodily integrity and self-determination, which include a limited right for competent, terminally ill adults to obtain assistance to end their lives.
- Section 2(2) is disproportionate because Parliament could craft narrow, safeguard-laden exceptions that protect vulnerable persons while permitting assisted suicide in exceptional cases.
- The ban indirectly discriminates against severely disabled persons, contrary to Article 40.1 of the Constitution, because able-bodied individuals can commit suicide unaided while the Plaintiff cannot.
Respondents' Arguments
- There is a strong presumption of constitutionality; assisted suicide has always been prohibited and has never been recognised as a right in Irish law.
- No constitutional right to be killed or to receive assistance in suicide exists; the Plaintiff failed to identify any specific right infringed by section 2(2).
- The blanket ban pursues legitimate objectives—protecting vulnerable persons and upholding the sanctity of life—and is therefore proportionate. International and domestic jurisprudence (e.g., Pretty, Rodriguez) support a total prohibition.
Amicus Curiae's Arguments
- A narrowly tailored constitutional right to assisted suicide should be recognised in “stringently limited circumstances,” subject to strict safeguards.
- The High Court blurred the distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia, misapplied proportionality and failed to appreciate discriminatory impact on persons with disabilities.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|
| MD (a minor) v. Ireland [2012] IESC 10 |
Deference to Oireachtas on complex social policy; equality analysis |
Supported presumption that s. 2(2) represents permissible social-policy choice |
| Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 |
No Convention right to assisted suicide; broad margin of appreciation |
Relied on to reject Convention challenge |
| Heaney v. Ireland [1996] 1 I.R. 580 |
Proportionality test in constitutional review |
Set the analytical framework, though no right was ultimately found |
| Rock v. Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 484 |
Further articulation of proportionality |
Cited in Respondents’ submissions; Court found proportionality analysis unnecessary after finding no right |
| In Re a Ward of Court (No. 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 |
Right to refuse life-sustaining treatment does not equal right to be killed |
Distinguished: case about natural death, not assisted suicide |
| Rodriguez v. British Columbia [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 |
Canadian Supreme Court upholding ban on assisted suicide |
Persuasive authority supporting constitutionality of blanket prohibition |
| Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702 |
U.S. Supreme Court: no due-process right to assisted suicide |
Illustrated international consensus favouring prohibition |
| R (Pretty) v. DPP [2001] UKHL 61 |
House of Lords upholding U.K. ban; autonomy under Article 8 limited |
Cited as comparable statutory framework and reasoning |
| Carter v. Canada [2012] BCSC 886 |
Trial-level decision striking Canadian ban |
Considered but given little weight: under appeal, different constitutional text |
| Norris v. Attorney General [1984] I.R. 36 |
Method for identifying unenumerated rights |
Used to examine whether autonomy extends to assisted suicide |
| Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269 |
Rules on locus standi to challenge statutes |
Applied to hold Plaintiff had standing despite hypothetical nature |
| Curtin v. Dáil Éireann [2006] IESC 14 |
Strength of presumption of constitutionality |
Quoted to underscore legislative deference |
| Pigs Marketing Board v. Donnelly [1939] I.R. 413 |
Early articulation of presumption of constitutionality |
Re-affirmed |
| In re Article 26 and the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill [1940] I.R. 470 |
Standard for implied constitutional prohibitions |
Cited in discussion of presumption |
| Buckley (Sinn Féin) v. Attorney General [1950] I.R. 67 |
Respect owed by judiciary to legislature |
Used to justify deference |
| McGee v. Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284 |
Recognition of marital privacy; methodology for unenumerated rights |
Provided analytical template but distinguished |
| Quinn's Supermarket v. Attorney General [1972] I.R. 1 |
Meaning of equality “as human persons” |
Guided Article 40.1 analysis |
| An Blascaod Mór Teo v. Commissioners of Public Works [2000] 1 I.R. 6 |
Scrutiny of suspect classifications |
Cited in equality discussion |
| de Burca and Anderson v. Attorney General [1976] I.R. 38 |
Gender discrimination under Article 40.1 |
Referenced for equality principles |
| Brennan v. Attorney General [1983] I.L.R.M. 449 |
Indirect discrimination concept |
Discussed but distinguished |
| Haas v. Switzerland (App. No. 31322/07) |
ECtHR: margin of appreciation in assisted-suicide regulation |
Confirmed compatibility of prescription safeguards with Article 8 |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first confirmed the Plaintiff’s locus standi; although no prosecution was imminent, requiring a person to risk criminal liability before challenging a statute would be unjust.
Applying the presumption of constitutionality, the Court analysed whether any constitutional right encompassed assisted suicide. It held:
- No express constitutional right to die exists, and the Article 40.3 right to life imposes a duty on the State to protect life, not its termination.
- Unenumerated rights doctrine does not support a right to be killed or to receive assistance in dying; such a sweeping entitlement would contradict the Constitution’s protection of life and the social order it envisages.
- Because no relevant right exists, proportionality scrutiny is unnecessary.
On equality (Article 40.1), the Court found section 2(2) facially neutral and that any differential impact flows from the Plaintiff’s medical condition, not from legislative discrimination. The Constitution does not oblige the Oireachtas to create special exemptions.
Turning to Convention arguments, the Court relied heavily on Pretty and Haas. Even accepting that Article 8 is engaged, the blanket ban pursues legitimate aims (protecting the vulnerable, preserving life) and lies within the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States. Consequently, section 2(2) is Convention-compliant.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 remains valid and fully enforceable; no constitutional or Convention right to assisted suicide was recognised. The decision confirms legislative discretion to maintain a blanket prohibition and signals that any relaxation of the ban is for Parliament, not the courts. No new cause of action or precedent in favour of assisted suicide was created.
Click here to read the full judgment