Donegan v Dublin City Council & anor and Dublin City Council v Gallagher

Factual and Procedural Background

Two joined appeals concerned the interaction between Section 62(3) of the Housing Act 1966 (“the 1966 Act”) and Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). In both cases Company A—the local housing authority—sought possession of dwellings occupied under weekly tenancies that contained identical anti-social-behaviour clauses.

• Plaintiff (Appeal 265/08): A long-standing tenant whose adult son was alleged by police to be “preparing and packing heroin for street sale.” After several meetings the authority served a notice to quit and issued summary possession proceedings under s.62. The High Court (Judge Laffoy) declared s.62(3) incompatible with the Convention.
• Defendant (Appeal 34/09 et al.): Sought to succeed to his deceased mother’s tenancy. The authority refused because (a) it believed he had not resided in the dwelling for the two years before her death and (b) his name had not appeared on the rent account during that period. Possession proceedings followed. A District Judge stated a case to the High Court; the High Court (Judge O’Neill) also declared s.62(3) incompatible.

The Attorney General and Company A appealed; the Supreme Court (Judge McKechnie delivering judgment) heard the appeals together.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether s.62(3) of the 1966 Act, which obliges the District Court to grant a possession warrant once formal proofs are met, provides sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy Article 8 of the Convention when a person’s “home” is at stake.
2. Whether, by virtue of Section 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s.62(3) can be interpreted so as to permit the District Court to examine the merits or proportionality of the eviction.
3. Whether judicial review supplies an effective domestic remedy for resolving factual disputes and assessing proportionality under Articles 6, 8 and 13.
4. Whether Articles 6, 13 or 14 of the Convention are independently breached by the statutory scheme.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments (Company A & Defendant)

• Section 62 provides a necessary, swift mechanism for estate management; requiring a merits hearing would cripple public-housing administration.
• The statutory framework, together with judicial review, affords adequate protection; any procedural failings lie in individual decisions, not in s.62 itself.
• The High Court’s declarations would generate “gridlock” and financial strain; private tenants enjoy fewer procedural rights than public-housing tenants.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments (Plaintiff & Defendant)

• The interference is the eviction itself; because the District Court cannot examine facts or proportionality, s.62 violates Article 8.
• Judicial review cannot resolve primary factual disputes (e.g., whether a son is a drug dealer or whether a successor resided for two years).
• Article 8 jurisprudence (Connors, McCann) requires an independent tribunal to assess proportionality before eviction from a home.
• Section 2 of the 2003 Act cannot be stretched to create such a tribunal without breaching ordinary rules of interpretation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge McKechnie held that eviction pursuant to s.62(3) is unquestionably an interference with a “home” under Article 8. The warrant is “in accordance with law” and pursues legitimate aims (estate management, rights of neighbours), leaving the question of necessity and proportionality.

Key steps in the analysis:

1. The District Court’s role is confined to four “formal proofs.” It cannot entertain factual defences or weigh proportionality. This interpretation is settled by domestic precedent and is unaffected by s.2 of the 2003 Act or by any implicit incorporation of Deasy’s Act.
2. Article 8 procedural requirements demand an opportunity for an independent tribunal to resolve material factual disputes and assess proportionality (Connors; McCann).
3. Judicial review, while powerful, cannot resolve credibility disputes or substitute factual findings; therefore it is not an adequate safeguard where core facts (drug dealing; residence) are contested.
4. In Plaintiff’s case the dispute—whether his son was a drug dealer or a recovering addict—is central to proportionality. No independent mechanism existed to resolve it. Accordingly the statutory scheme fails Article 8.
5. In Defendant’s case, although residence was disputed, a second statutory criterion (appearance on the rent account) was indisputably unmet; thus resolution of the factual issue could not alter the outcome, and Article 8 rights were not engaged to the same degree.
6. Articles 6, 13 and 14 added nothing material; any fair-trial concerns were subsumed within the Article 8 analysis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court declared s.62(3) of the Housing Act 1966 incompatible with the Convention in so far as it mandates eviction without an independent merits review where material facts are in dispute (Plaintiff’s appeal). The Defendant’s appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed; the answers to the case-stated questions were “Yes, No, No, No.”

Implications: Company A cannot rely on s.62(3) for summary eviction where factual and proportionality issues arise unless a separate independent procedure is provided. The declaration does not invalidate the statute but obliges the legislature to consider amendments or to create an alternative review mechanism. No damages were awarded; broader constitutional questions were left untouched.