MJELR v Sas

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns a single European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) issued by a judicial authority in Poland seeking the surrender of Appellant for four separate offences committed in The City between 2002 and 2005. The High Court (Judge Geoghegan) ordered surrender on the third and fourth offences (threats to kill and cycling while intoxicated) but refused surrender on the first two offences (serial petrol thefts and theft from a vehicle) on the basis of lack of correspondence with Irish offences. Respondent (the Minister) cross-appealed the refusal, while the Appellant challenged the order for surrender on the remaining offences. The Supreme Court heard both the appeal and cross-appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the factual descriptions in the EAW provided sufficient detail to establish “correspondence” between the Polish offences and offences under Irish law as required by s.5 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended).
2. Whether additional information supplied by the issuing judicial authority after the EAW was admissible when assessing correspondence.
3. Whether a composite sentence imposed in Poland for multiple offences offended the “minimum gravity” requirement where Irish surrender was sought only for some, but not all, of those offences.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The EAW lacked precise particulars (dates, method, location) for the third offence (threat to kill), making it impossible to find correspondence with s.5 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.
• Supplementary information supplied post-warrant should not be considered; only the face of the warrant could be examined.
• A composite Polish sentence breached the “minimum gravity” rule because the Irish court could not discern how much of the sentence related to each individual offence.

Respondent's Arguments

• The EAW, read with the supplementary letter, contained adequate particulars to match an Irish s.5 “threat to kill” offence and a s.51(1)(b) Road Traffic Act 1961 offence (cycling while intoxicated).
• The additional information was admissible under ss.20(1)–(2) of the 2003 Act and had not been objected to at the High Court hearing.
• The composite sentence raised no difficulty once all four offences met the correspondence test; the length of the sentence alone satisfies the Framework Decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Correspondence for Offences 3 & 4 (Threat to Kill; Cycling While Intoxicated)
Judge Geoghegan affirmed the High Court’s finding that, when read with the supplementary letter, the description “abused his mother … threatening her life by mutilation and burning out” evinced all elements of an Irish s.5 threat-to-kill offence—namely, a threat “by any means” and an intention that the victim believe it would be carried out. Cycling while intoxicated plainly corresponded to s.51(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1961. The belated challenge to the admissibility of the supplementary letter was rejected: (a) it had not been raised below, (b) ss.20(1)–(2) of the 2003 Act permit such clarification, and (c) no cogent evidence disputed its accuracy.

2. Correspondence for Offences 1 & 2 (Serial Petrol Theft; Theft from Vehicle)
The Supreme Court held the High Court erred by requiring technical Irish statutory ingredients rather than the ordinary meaning of “stole.” Guided by Attorney General v. Dyer, the Court ruled that “stole” unequivocally encompassed both the actus reus and mens rea of Irish theft under s.4(1) of the 2001 Act. Phrases such as “realising his deliberate intention” and “to the detriment of Company A” reinforced the requisite dishonest intent. Section 8 (making off without payment) was unnecessary; simple theft was sufficient.

3. Composite Sentence and Minimum Gravity
Distinguishing Ferenca, the Court noted that surrender was now ordered for all offences; hence, no apportionment of the composite Polish sentence was required. Endorsing the House of Lords decision in Pilecki, the Court concluded that the sentence’s length alone met the Framework Decision’s minimum gravity threshold.

Holding and Implications

APPELLANT’S APPEAL DISMISSED; RESPONDENT’S CROSS-APPEAL ALLOWED.

The Court ordered the surrender of the Appellant to Poland in respect of all four offences listed in the EAW.

Implications: The decision clarifies that (1) ordinary language in an EAW (“stole”) suffices for correspondence without reciting every statutory element; (2) supplementary information supplied through the Central Authority is admissible absent timely objection; and (3) where surrender is granted for every offence forming part of a composite sentence, Irish courts need not parse the sentence’s internal allocation. No new precedent was set, but existing principles on correspondence and composite sentences were reinforced.