Clinton v An Bord Pleanala & ors.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant sought to quash a compulsory purchase order affecting commercial property in The City. The High Court (Judge Finnegan) dismissed the challenge on 15 March 2005 and, on 19 August 2005, certified one question of “exceptional public importance” under section 50(4)(f) of the Planning and Development Act 2000. The Appellant filed a notice of appeal containing that certified question plus nine additional grounds. Respondent Board served a Notice to Vary and contended that the appeal was limited to the certified question. Before hearing the substantive appeal, the Supreme Court (Judges Denham, Hardiman, Geoghegan, Fennelly and Macken) listed this preliminary issue for determination.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, on an appeal governed by section 50(4)(f) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, an appellant is confined to the single point of law certified by the High Court or may also argue further grounds contained in the notice of appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Constitution confers a general right of appeal from all High Court decisions; any statutory restriction must be strictly construed.
• Section 50(4)(f) does not clearly or unambiguously confine the appeal to the certified point; once leave is granted, the Supreme Court hears an appeal “against the decision,” not merely the certified point.
• Pre-1937 case law (notably People v Giles) and subsequent authorities have consistently interpreted identical wording as permitting broader appeals; the same construction should apply.

Respondent Board's Arguments

• The legislative purpose of section 50(4)(f) is to restrict appeals and ensure finality; permitting uncertified grounds would undermine that purpose.
• The Appellant’s notice of appeal exceeds the parameters of the certified question; accordingly the additional grounds (2-10) should be struck out.
• Although the wording is ambiguous, a purposive interpretation supports confinement to the certified issue.

Respondent Council's Arguments

• Took a neutral stance, submitting that it was for the Court to decide whether the appeal’s scope is limited to the certified question.

Respondent AG's Submissions

• Provided assistance on the constitutional framework without adopting a definitive position on the outcome.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Denham (for the majority) held that:

• The constitutional right of appeal under Article 34.4.3 is fundamental; any statutory restriction must be “clear and unambiguous.”
• Section 50(4)(f) employs wording identical to section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 and section 19 of the 1992 Act; longstanding case law (Giles and its progeny) interprets that wording as opening the “gate” to a full appeal once a certificate issues.
• Legislative history shows frequent re-use of the same formula without alteration, evidencing parliamentary acceptance of the judicial construction.
• While a 2006 amendment expressly confines future appeals to certified points, that statute does not apply retrospectively and cannot be used to reinterpret the 2000 Act.
• Any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the Appellant, preserving the broader scope of appeal.

Judge Fennelly, delivering a concurring judgment, reiterated the constitutional backdrop and emphasised that the wording of section 50(4)(f) does not expressly curtail uncertified grounds. He noted that the “Barras principle” supports continuity of meaning when Parliament re-enacts language with an established judicial interpretation.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Appellant is not confined to the certified point of law and may advance all additional grounds set out in the notice of appeal.

Implications: The Supreme Court will proceed to hear the full appeal on all grounds. The decision re-affirms the long-standing interpretation of certification provisions, confirming that, under the 2000 Act as originally enacted, certification opens rather than narrows the scope of appeal. No new precedent is created, but pre-existing jurisprudence is solidified pending the operation of the 2006 statutory amendments for future cases.