Construction Industry Federation v Dublin City Council

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, an unincorporated trade association representing companies engaged in construction, sought judicial review to quash the Respondent’s decision of 1 December 2003 to adopt a Development Contribution Scheme under section 48 of the Planning and Development Act 2000. In the High Court, Judge Gilligan refused the substantive relief but held that the Appellant had standing to bring the proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court (Judge McCracken delivering judgment, with Judge Murray C.J. and Judge Fennelly concurring) permitted the Respondent, despite having filed no cross-appeal, to argue the preliminary issue of locus standi. The merits of the underlying planning dispute were not before the Supreme Court; only the Appellant’s entitlement to initiate the proceedings was considered.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant possessed a “sufficient interest” under Order 84 r.20(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts to challenge the Respondent’s Development Contribution Scheme.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The Development Contribution Scheme affects all, or almost all, of its members operating within the Respondent’s functional area.
• Because the Appellant shares a common interest with those members, it should be permitted to litigate on their behalf.

Respondent’s Arguments

• The Appellant lacks a direct, personal interest; it neither applies for planning permission nor pays development contributions.
• Any affected member company could itself bring proceedings, so there is no practical necessity for a representative challenge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began with Order 84 r. 20(4), requiring a judicial-review applicant to demonstrate a “sufficient interest.” Drawing heavily on Cahill v. Sutton, the Court reaffirmed that, as a matter of practice, litigation should normally be carried by those personally affected, unless “weighty contravening considerations” warrant a departure.

While acknowledging that representative or public-interest challenges can be permitted—illustrated by decisions such as Greenpeace—the Court noted that such exceptions usually arise where:

• those directly affected are unable or unlikely to litigate, or
• special expertise of the representative body is essential.

In this case, the Appellant neither pays development contributions nor applies for planning permission; any of its member companies could readily bring proceedings and possess the requisite factual context. The Court saw no evidence that the impugned scheme would otherwise escape scrutiny. Treating the matter in abstract, without linkage to a specific planning application, would involve the Court in adjudicating a hypothetical dispute, something the jurisprudence seeks to avoid.

Having considered the English authority in Inland Revenue Commissioners and the policy concerns extracted from Mulcreevy, the Court concluded that there was no “transcendent need” to relax the standing requirement. Consequently, the Appellant failed the “sufficient interest” test.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Appellant lacks locus standi; therefore, the substantive challenge to the Development Contribution Scheme was not entertained.

Implications: The judgment reinforces the principle that representative trade associations cannot invoke judicial review merely because their members are affected; a concrete, personal interest remains the default gateway. Although the decision reiterates discretion to relax standing in suitable cases, it clarifies that such discretion will not be exercised where direct stakeholders are well able to litigate in their own names and the court would otherwise be dealing with hypotheticals. No new precedent was created, but existing standing principles were reaffirmed.