Breslin v. Corcoran

Factual and Procedural Background

The Defendant parked his motor car on a public street in The City, leaving it unlocked and with the keys in the ignition while he briefly entered a coffee shop. An unknown individual (“the thief”) drove the vehicle away and struck the Plaintiff, who was crossing the adjoining lane, causing personal injuries.

The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for negligence and joined Company A (the Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland) pursuant to an indemnity agreement covering injuries caused by uninsured drivers. The High Court (Judge Butler) found no negligence on the part of the Defendant, held Company A fully liable for the agreed damages of €65,000, and awarded costs against Company A. Company A appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the Defendant’s conduct was negligent and that his negligence, not the thief’s driving, caused the Plaintiff’s injuries.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether leaving a motor vehicle unattended, unlocked, and with keys in the ignition creates a duty of care owed to third-party road users who may later be injured by a thief’s negligent driving.
2. Whether the thief’s driving constituted a novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation between the Defendant’s alleged negligence and the Plaintiff’s injuries.
3. Consequently, whether Company A is liable under its indemnity agreement when no negligence is established against the insured vehicle owner.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s (Company A’s) Arguments

• Leaving a car unlocked with keys in the ignition on a public street is an obvious act of carelessness.
• The theft of such a car is reasonably foreseeable, and it is likewise foreseeable that a thief is likely to drive dangerously and injure others.
• Accordingly, the Defendant’s “admitted negligence” was the effective cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries, and the chain of causation was not broken.

Defendant’s Arguments

• The thief’s criminal act constituted a novus actus interveniens that severed any causal link between the Defendant’s conduct and the Plaintiff’s injuries.
• The Defendant cannot control or be held responsible for the manner in which a thief drives the stolen vehicle and should not be treated as authorising that driving.
• Vicarious liability principles do not extend to the independent criminal acts of third parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Fennelly framed the inquiry around duty of care and causation. Drawing on Glencar, the Court emphasized that foreseeability alone is insufficient; liability requires proximity and that it be “fair, just and reasonable.”

The Court accepted that theft of an unlocked, unattended car is reasonably foreseeable and likely. However, it distinguished between foreseeable theft and the further question of whether negligent driving by the thief was also a likely, “very kind of thing” that the Defendant should have guarded against.

Reviewing authorities such as Dorset Yacht and Littlewoods, the Court concluded that liability for third-party wrongdoing arises only when that wrongdoing is highly probable in the circumstances. No evidence suggested that cars stolen from the location were routinely driven recklessly. Therefore, while the Defendant’s conduct was careless toward his own property, it did not satisfy the probability threshold for imposing a duty to protect road users from the thief’s negligent driving.

The statutory regulation requiring drivers to lock unattended vehicles (Regulation 87 of the 1963 Construction, Use and Equipment Regulations) was noted but treated as contextual rather than determinative; no statutory-duty claim had been pleaded.

Accordingly, the thief’s driving constituted a novus actus interveniens that broke the chain of causation. Because no negligence was established against the Defendant, Company A remained liable under its indemnity agreement.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The High Court’s decree against Company A for the full amount of damages and costs stands.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that owners who leave vehicles insecure may not be liable for injuries caused by a subsequent thief unless it is probable—not merely possible—that the thief would drive negligently. The ruling clarifies the Irish approach to intervening criminal acts and preserves the protective scope of uninsured-driver indemnity agreements without expanding owners’ tort liability. No new precedent was set, but existing doctrines on foreseeability and causation were consolidated.