Martin v. Moy Contractors Ltd.

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment consolidates two related appeals arising out of personal-injury proceedings commenced by Plaintiff following a workplace accident on 11 August 1988 at premises owned by Defendant B. The action originally named eight defendants, including Defendant A (consulting engineers) and Defendant B (premises owner).

Plaintiff issued a plenary summons on 30 July 1991, only days before the limitation period expired. Service was effected on Defendant A in January 1992, but no further meaningful step occurred for years. After prolonged inactivity, Defendant A moved in February 1998 to have the claim against it dismissed for want of prosecution; the High Court (Judge [Last Name 1]) granted that relief on 30 March 1998.

Separately, Plaintiff never served the 1991 summons on Defendant B. In November 1997—more than six years after agreeing to accept service—Plaintiff obtained an ex parte renewal of the summons. Defendant B applied to set that renewal aside; the High Court (Judge [Last Name 2]) refused on 8 May 1998.

The current Supreme Court judgment addresses (i) Plaintiff’s appeal against dismissal of the claim as against Defendant A and (ii) Defendant B’s appeal against refusal to set aside renewal of the summons.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the High Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant A for want of prosecution in light of alleged inordinate and inexcusable delay and prejudice.
2. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to set aside the renewal of the plenary summons so that service could be effected on Defendant B, given the six-year oversight and alleged prejudice.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff’s Arguments (Appeal 1)

• Defendant A acquiesced in delay by taking no motion to compel replies to particulars.
• Other partners or employees could address any factual issues occasioned by the death of Individual A, so no concrete prejudice existed.

Defendant A’s Arguments (Appeal 1)

• Plaintiff waited until the limitation period almost expired and then failed to prosecute the claim for years, triggering an onus to act expeditiously.
• The prolonged delay, coupled with the death of Individual A, rendered a fair trial impossible and justified dismissal.

Defendant B’s Arguments (Appeal 2)

• No “reasonable effort” was made to serve the summons; therefore renewal could only be justified by “other good reason,” which mere inadvertence or the expiry of the limitation period cannot supply.
• The long lapse of time presumptively prejudices the defence.

Plaintiff’s Arguments (Appeal 2)

• Defendant B showed no specific prejudice; it had early notice of the claim and copies of medical reports.
• The combination of early notice, absence of concrete prejudice, and inadvertent oversight constituted “other good reason” for renewal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Appeal 1 – Claim against Defendant A

• The Court found “inordinate and inexcusable” delay: (a) almost three-year gap before issuing proceedings; (b) 18-month silence after appearance; (c) nearly four-year silence in replying to particulars.
• Prejudice was not merely presumed; it was concrete because Individual A, the engineer with direct knowledge of the project, died during the period of inactivity.
• High Court exercised a discretionary power to dismiss; the Supreme Court held that discretion was reasonably exercised and should not be disturbed.
• The Court modified the form of order to a dismissal (instead of a strike-out) to reflect finality.

Appeal 2 – Renewal of Summons on Defendant B

• Order 8, Rule 1 permits renewal if reasonable efforts to serve were made or for “other good reason.” Reasonable efforts were absent, so the focus was on “other good reason.”
• The oversight was candidly admitted. Defendant B adduced only generalized assertions of prejudice, none linked to specific lost evidence or witnesses.
• Defendant B had early written notice of the claim and Plaintiff’s medical reports; site-meeting minutes could still be obtained.
• Given the lack of demonstrated prejudice and the High Court's discretion, the Supreme Court upheld the renewal, emphasizing that dismissal at this stage would, in effect, defeat the claim against Defendant B.

Holding and Implications

Appeal 1: The Supreme Court DISMISSED Plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed the High Court order; Plaintiff’s action against Defendant A is finally dismissed for want of prosecution.

Appeal 2: The Supreme Court DISMISSED Defendant B’s appeal and upheld renewal of the plenary summons, allowing service to proceed.

Implications: The judgment reiterates (i) the high threshold for overturning a discretionary dismissal where delay and actual prejudice coincide, and (ii) that a summons may be renewed, even after significant delay, where the moving party shows oversight, early notice to the defendant, and absence of specific prejudice. No new legal principle was created, but the decision underscores the importance of concrete prejudice evidence when opposing renewal and the deference appellate courts afford to discretionary case-management decisions.