McIntyre v. Lewis

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, a long-distance lorry driver, alleged that on 16 September 1983 he was subjected to an unprovoked assault and false imprisonment by two members of The Police Service (“the first and second Defendants”) in The Town. The Defendants subsequently charged the Plaintiff with assaulting a police officer. After a criminal trial in The Capital City in January 1985, a jury acquitted the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff instituted a civil action in the High Court against the first and second Defendants and against The State and The Attorney General (the third and fourth Defendants) claiming damages for assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. A High Court jury found for the Plaintiff on all three torts, awarding £5,000 for assault and false imprisonment and £61,787.50 for malicious prosecution (including agreed special damages of £1,787.50).

All Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The first and second Defendants challenged only the malicious-prosecution findings and the quantum of damages. The third and fourth Defendants contested vicarious liability and the award of exemplary damages. The Supreme Court delivered the opinion summarised below.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff had proved the absence of reasonable and probable cause, an essential element of malicious prosecution.
2. Whether the trial judge erred by refusing to permit a jury verdict based on an 8–3 majority.
3. Whether exemplary (punitive) damages can be awarded when they were not expressly pleaded and, if so, whether the amount awarded was excessive.
4. Whether The State was vicariously liable for the torts committed by the first and second Defendants when those officers fabricated charges against the Plaintiff.
5. Whether section 14(4) of the Civil Liability Act 1961 precludes an award of exemplary damages against a vicariously liable defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The Plaintiff failed to establish lack of reasonable and probable cause for his prosecution, warranting dismissal of the malicious-prosecution claim.
• The jury should have been permitted to return a non-unanimous 8–3 verdict; the trial judge’s direction to continue deliberating was erroneous.
• Because exemplary damages were not pleaded, the jury had no jurisdiction to award them; alternatively, £60,000 was grossly excessive.
• Fabrication of evidence took the first and second Defendants outside the scope of their employment, relieving The State of vicarious liability.
• Under section 14(4) of the Civil Liability Act 1961, punitive damages cannot be imposed on an employer whose liability is purely vicarious.

Respondent's Arguments

• The jury’s acceptance of the Plaintiff’s version of events necessarily established the absence of reasonable and probable cause.
• The trial judge acted within discretion in encouraging unanimity; no authority requires a judge to accept an 8–3 split.
• Exemplary damages need not be specifically pleaded under court rules, and the amount reflected the gravity of the abuse of power.
• The torts flowed directly from acts committed in the course of duty; therefore, vicarious liability attached to The State.
• Section 14(4) was neither pleaded nor argued at trial and, in any event, does not apply where the employer’s liability is vicarious.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Reasonable and probable cause. The Court held that once the jury accepted that the Defendants, not the Plaintiff, committed the assault, the absence of reasonable and probable cause was inevitable. The issue had not been renewed at the close of evidence or by requisition, and the trial judge’s direction accurately stated the law.

Jury disagreement. No authority supports a right for a civil jury to return an 8–3 verdict when unanimity (or a statutory majority) is required. The judge properly encouraged further deliberation.

Exemplary damages. Court rules do not require exemplary damages to be pleaded expressly. The trial judge’s supplemental charge, together with counsel’s submissions, put the issue before the jury. Exemplary damages are justified where State agents engage in oppressive, unconstitutional conduct.

Quantum of damages. While £5,000 for assault and false imprisonment was left undisturbed, the majority considered the £60,000 award for malicious prosecution disproportionate. The Court reasoned that compensatory damages (including aggravated elements) should approximate £5,000; exemplary damages, though warranted, must bear a reasonable relation to compensatory awards. Accordingly, the Court substituted exemplary damages of £20,000, maintaining the agreed £1,787.50 special damages, for a total malicious-prosecution award of £26,787.50.

Vicarious liability. The Court found that the wrongful acts were so closely connected to the officers’ duties that liability attached to The State. This argument had not been raised at trial, and the evidence did not show the officers acting on a personal frolic.

Civil Liability Act 1961. Section 14(4) was neither pleaded nor argued below; the Court declined to consider it but indicated that, in any event, it would not preclude exemplary damages against a vicariously liable State.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on liability, affirmed the Plaintiff’s success on all torts, and reduced the malicious-prosecution award to £26,787.50 (comprising £1,787.50 special, £5,000 general, and £20,000 exemplary damages). The £5,000 award for assault and false imprisonment remained intact.

Implications: The decision re-affirms (1) the availability of exemplary damages in Ireland for oppressive conduct by State agents, even when not expressly pleaded; (2) the breadth of vicarious liability where wrongful acts are closely connected with official duties; and (3) the Court’s willingness to supervise jury awards to ensure proportionality between compensatory and exemplary components. No new precedent was created, but existing principles were clarified and applied.