Regina v Challen

Factual and Procedural Background

On 14 August 2010, the Appellant killed her husband of 31 years by inflicting 20 or more blows with a hammer. She was charged with murder. Although she pleaded guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility, this plea was not accepted. At trial, the judge allowed the jury to consider both diminished responsibility and provocation as partial defences, despite the defence not arguing provocation. On 23 June 2011, the Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 22 years, later reduced to 18 years on 24 November 2011.

The Appellant appeals her conviction based on fresh evidence, including new psychiatric diagnoses of two previously undiagnosed disorders and fresh evidence of alleged coercive control by the deceased. The fresh evidence comprises reports from expert witnesses including a sociologist forensic social worker, two psychiatrists, and a report on coercive control developments. The Crown relies on a post-conviction report from the psychiatrist who gave evidence at trial.

The background facts include a long, troubled marriage marked by the deceased's infidelity, the Appellant's distress, and eventual separation in 2009. The Appellant exhibited obsessive behaviours such as monitoring the deceased's communications. The couple attempted reconciliation under terms unfavourable to the Appellant shortly before the killing. On the day of the killing, the Appellant took a hammer to the former matrimonial home and fatally attacked the deceased. She left notes expressing love and remorse, and later attempted suicide at a cliff edge, where she was arrested after police intervention.

At trial, the prosecution argued the killing was premeditated, driven by jealousy and obsession. The defence relied on diminished responsibility due to depression. Witnesses described the marital difficulties, the deceased's controlling behaviour, and the Appellant's mental state. The Appellant and family members gave evidence about her distress, depression, and suspicions of infidelity in the years leading up to the killing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the fresh evidence, including new psychiatric diagnoses and expert evidence on coercive control, establishes that the Appellant was suffering from an abnormality of mind at the time of the killing sufficient to support diminished responsibility.
2. Whether the fresh evidence supports a defence of provocation based on the deceased's alleged coercive and controlling behaviour.
3. Whether it is in the interests of justice to admit the fresh evidence and allow the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The fresh expert evidence on coercive control and new psychiatric diagnoses show the Appellant suffered from a personality disorder and a severe mood disorder, probably bipolar affective disorder, at the time of the killing.
• The theory of coercive control, which was not well understood at the time of trial, would have provided important context for the jury to understand the Appellant's mental state and the impact of the deceased's controlling behaviour.
• The partial defences of diminished responsibility and provocation were not properly advanced at trial due to lack of available expert evidence on coercive control and the Appellant's mental disorders.
• The fresh evidence undermines the narrative of the Appellant as merely an obsessively jealous woman and may have led the jury to a different conclusion.
• The Appellant has served nearly ten years in custody, is not a danger to the public, and a retrial would not be in the public interest.
• The Appellant opposes reporting restrictions, arguing that extensive information is already public and restrictions would be unnecessary.

Crown's Arguments

• The fresh evidence does not amount to new support that the Appellant was suffering from an abnormality of mind or was provoked within the meaning of the Homicide Act at the time of the killing.
• The issues were comprehensively presented to the jury at trial, including detailed medical and social history, and expert psychiatric evidence.
• The new psychiatric diagnosis was made several years after the killing and is less reliable than the opinion of the psychiatrist who assessed the Appellant near the time of the offence.
• The Appellant was functioning normally socially and at work prior to the killing, which undermines the diagnosis of a personality or mood disorder at that time.
• The defence counsel at trial did not pursue provocation for good reason, given the evidence of premeditation and the Appellant's admissions.
• Reporting restrictions should remain in place to avoid prejudicing the retrial due to significant press interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully considered whether the fresh evidence should be admitted under s.23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, applying the criteria of credibility, relevance to the appeal, admissibility, and explanation for non-adduction at trial.

The court acknowledged the importance of expert evidence on coercive control as a relatively recent development in understanding domestic abuse, which was not well known at the time of trial. It recognized that coercive control is not a standalone defence but is relevant contextually to partial defences of diminished responsibility and provocation.

The court found that the new psychiatric diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and a severe mood disorder, probably bipolar affective disorder, was credible, supported by contemporaneous material, and not merely the result of expert shopping. The diagnosis explained why the disorders were not identified at trial, as symptoms were masked while the Appellant lived under alleged coercive control.

The court rejected the evidence of the sociologist expert and one of the psychiatrists who gave evidence post-conviction, finding that the psychiatrist who made the new diagnosis (Dr Adshead) provided the most compelling and relevant opinion.

The court emphasized that the issues of whether the Appellant was subject to coercive control, the extent of its impact, and the ultimate effect on her responsibility are matters for the retrial jury, not the Court of Appeal.

Given the above, the court concluded that the fresh evidence undermines the safety of the conviction and that the interests of justice require a retrial rather than substitution of a verdict.

Holding and Implications

The Court of Appeal QUASHED the Appellant's conviction for murder and ORDERED A RETRIAL on the murder count.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Appellant's conviction is set aside and she will face a new trial. The court did not substitute a verdict of manslaughter, leaving the factual and legal issues related to diminished responsibility and provocation to be determined anew by the retrial jury.

No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles concerning fresh evidence and the recognition of coercive control's relevance in such cases. The court also invited submissions on reporting restrictions to ensure the retrial is not prejudiced, reflecting the high public interest in the case.