Williams v The Trustees of Swansea University Pension & Assurance Scheme & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was employed by The University from June 2000 until he retired on ill-health grounds with effect from 30 June 2013 at the age of 38. He suffers from Tourette’s syndrome and other conditions accepted as disabilities under section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. After ten years of full-time work he progressively reduced his hours, ultimately working half-time (17.5 hours per week). Each reduction was agreed as a reasonable adjustment linked to his disabilities.

The Appellant was a member of the university’s pension scheme (“the Scheme”). On medical advice he applied for, and was granted, ill-health early retirement (“IHR”). Under the Scheme he received:

• a lump sum and annuity based on accrued benefits, calculated using his actual (full-time or part-time) salary; and
• an enhanced lump sum and annuity calculated by projecting his service to normal pension age (67) but using his part-time salary then in force.

The dispute concerns only the enhanced element. The Appellant argued that basing that element on his part-time salary amounted to discrimination “arising from disability” under section 15(1) of the Equality Act 2010.

The Employment Tribunal upheld the claim. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) allowed the Respondents’ appeal and remitted the case. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Tribunal and dismissed the claim outright. The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. What is the correct interpretation of the phrase “treats [the claimant] unfavourably” in section 15(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010?
2. Does calculating the enhanced element of the Appellant’s ill-health pension by reference to his part-time salary constitute unfavourable treatment arising in consequence of his disability?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The use of his part-time salary to calculate the enhanced pension was unfavourable because he worked part-time only due to his disabilities; had he not been disabled he would have continued full-time and received a larger enhancement.
• Terms such as “unfavourably”, “disadvantage” and “detriment” are used interchangeably in equality legislation; therefore any financial shortfall constitutes unfavourable treatment.
• The Equality and Human Rights Commission Code of Practice and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities support a broad, employee-focused interpretation that allows regard to the claimant’s reasonable perception of disadvantage.

Respondents’ Arguments

• The correct test is objective: treatment is unfavourable only if, viewed against normal experience, it places a hurdle or disadvantage in the claimant’s way.
• The Appellant was not put at a disadvantage; without disability he would have received no immediate pension at all. The award was therefore advantageous, not unfavourable.
• Section 15 does not convert a benefit into unfavourable treatment merely because it could have been even more beneficial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court, adopting the Court of Appeal’s approach, emphasised that section 15 poses two factual questions: (1) what was the relevant treatment, and (2) was that treatment unfavourable? The treatment in issue was the award of an ill-health pension. That award was neither intrinsically adverse nor disadvantageous; indeed, it was only available because of the Appellant’s disabilities.

The Appellant’s argument artificially isolated the method of calculation from the overall benefit. When viewed in its entirety, the pension placed the Appellant in a substantially better position than a non-disabled employee of the same age, who would have received no pension until normal retirement age. Consequently, the treatment could not reasonably be characterised as unfavourable under any objective or mixed test.

The Court noted that comparisons with hypothetical employees suffering different medical conditions re-introduced comparator analysis that section 15 was designed to avoid. The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Code of Practice supports a low threshold for establishing disadvantage, but does not require courts to label advantageous treatment as unfavourable merely because it could have been more generous.

Because no unfavourable treatment was identified, the justification defence under section 15(1)(b) did not arise.

Holding and Implications

Appeal DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court held that the calculation of the enhanced pension on the basis of the Appellant’s part-time salary did not constitute “unfavourable treatment” within section 15(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010. The decision leaves standing the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the claim, with no remittal to the Employment Tribunal.

Implications are confined to clarifying that advantageous benefits linked to disability will not be re-characterised as unfavourable solely because a different method of calculation might have produced an even greater benefit. The judgment therefore reinforces an objective assessment of “unfavourable treatment” and provides guidance for employers and pension schemes when structuring disability-related benefits.