AM (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) dated 25 January 2017, concerning the deportation of the Respondent, an Iranian national born in 1980, to Iran. The Respondent entered the United Kingdom in January 2006 and sought asylum, which was refused. Subsequent applications for residence and appeals were also refused.

In August 2013, the Respondent was convicted of rape and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with indefinite registration on the sex offenders register, and was released in August 2015. The Secretary of State issued a deportation order in July 2015 on grounds of public policy, citing the Respondent as a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat to the public.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Respondent’s appeal against deportation under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and upheld a certificate excluding him from refugee protection due to a particularly serious crime. The Respondent appealed to the Upper Tribunal, which allowed the appeal in September 2016 and remade the decision in January 2017, concluding that deportation would violate Article 3 rights due to risk of ill-treatment.

The Secretary of State now appeals from the Upper Tribunal’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Upper Tribunal erred in concluding that deportation of the Respondent to Iran would violate his rights under Article 3 of the ECHR due to a real risk of ill-treatment.
2. Whether the Upper Tribunal failed to properly consider relevant and binding Country Guidance cases concerning the risk to Christian converts in Iran.
3. Whether the Upper Tribunal erred in assessing the risk posed by the Respondent’s Twitter activity and failed to consider the possibility that such material could have been deleted.
4. Whether the Secretary of State could withdraw a concession made before the Upper Tribunal regarding the risk to Christian converts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Upper Tribunal failed to consider the most recent and applicable Country Guidance cases FS and others (2004) and SZ and JM (2008), which provide that ordinary Christian converts in Iran do not face a real risk of persecution breaching Article 3.
• The Secretary of State contended that the concession made by the Upper Tribunal that the Respondent would face a real risk of ill-treatment if thought to be a Christian convert was mistaken and should be withdrawn.
• The Upper Tribunal erred by relying on non-Country Guidance decisions such as AB and others (2015) concerning internet activity, which was not directly applicable to the Respondent’s Twitter posts.
• The Upper Tribunal failed to consider the obvious point that the Respondent could have deleted his Twitter account, which would reduce or eliminate the risk posed by the content.
• The Home Office argued that the Iranian authorities would likely view the Respondent as an economic migrant and not genuinely a Christian convert, and that his tweets were merely Bible quotations without genuine anti-Islamic content.

Appellee's Arguments

• The Respondent argued that the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on the lack of genuine conversion did not address the real risk posed by his illegal exit and the content of his Twitter activity, which would attract adverse attention from Iranian authorities.
• The Respondent submitted that even if the authorities did not believe he was a genuine convert, his Twitter activity would still be regarded as anti-Islamic conduct, placing him at real risk of ill-treatment under Article 3.
• The Respondent contended that deletion of the Twitter account was not a guaranteed or sufficient safeguard, as posts may remain accessible through internet searches or retweets.
• He opposed the withdrawal of the Secretary of State’s concession, arguing that it should be binding and that the concession was made knowingly by an experienced presenting officer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the appeal focusing primarily on the proper application of Country Guidance concerning the risk to Christian converts in Iran. It identified that the Upper Tribunal failed to consider the binding guidance in FS and others (2004) and SZ and JM (2008), which establish that ordinary Christian converts do not face a real risk of persecution breaching Article 3. This omission was a legal error.

The Court noted that the concession by the Secretary of State before the Upper Tribunal—that if the Respondent were thought to be a Christian convert, he would face a real risk of ill-treatment—was inconsistent with the authoritative Country Guidance. Although concessions can be withdrawn, the Court emphasised that such withdrawal must be justified promptly and fairly, which was not the case here. Nonetheless, the Court permitted withdrawal in the interest of justice, given the circumstances.

The Court further held that the Upper Tribunal’s reliance on the AB and others (2015) decision concerning internet activity was misplaced because it was not Country Guidance and did not specifically address Twitter posts. Moreover, the Tribunal failed to consider whether the Respondent could have deleted his Twitter account, a common-sense consideration relevant to the risk assessment.

Accordingly, the Court found that the appeal should be allowed and the matter remitted to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration, requiring a fresh assessment of the risk in light of the proper Country Guidance and the Twitter issue, including evidence and submissions on whether the Twitter posts still posed a risk.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and remitted the case to the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Respondent’s appeal against deportation is to be re-examined with proper regard to authoritative Country Guidance and a thorough assessment of the risk arising from his Twitter activity, including the possibility of deletion of posts. The Secretary of State is permitted to clarify and potentially withdraw the concession regarding the risk to Christian converts.

No new legal precedent was established; the decision reinforces the requirement for tribunals to apply binding Country Guidance consistently and to consider common-sense factors in risk assessments. It also underscores the procedural importance and fairness considerations surrounding concessions made before tribunals.