Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
- Peter Kelson QC and Danielle Cooper (instructed by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for Daniels, Davies and Neale
- Iain Goldrein QC (instructed by BH Mohamed Solicitors) for Martin
Judges
- MR JUSTICE GRIFFITH WILLIAMS
- HIS HONOUR JUDGE ROOK QC
- LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS
See more information ...
Click here to read the full judgment
R v. Daniels & Ors
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
On 5 August 2009, the Appellants were convicted at Bradford Crown Court of murder and conspiracy to rob following two trials. A co-defendant had previously entered into a statutory agreement under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 ("SOCPA"), pleaded guilty to manslaughter and conspiracy to rob, and gave evidence for the Crown. The victim’s body was found with extensive injuries indicating a violent death. Multiple defendants were charged; some were convicted and sentenced at the first trial, while others, including the Appellants, were retried in 2009. The retrial involved the same co-defendant’s evidence, which was central to the prosecution’s case. The appeals primarily concerned whether the use of that co-defendant’s evidence was an abuse of process or should have been excluded under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE").
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether it was an abuse of process for the prosecution to proceed on the basis of evidence given by a co-defendant who had entered into a SOCPA agreement and pleaded guilty to lesser offences.
- Whether the co-defendant’s evidence should have been excluded under section 78 of PACE due to concerns about its reliability and the circumstances of its procurement.
- Whether the prosecution was obliged to require the co-defendant to waive legal professional privilege in relation to his solicitors' files, and if failure to do so rendered the evidence unfair or an abuse.
- Whether the sentence imposed on one Appellant was manifestly excessive.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The co-defendant’s plea to manslaughter lacked a proper factual basis and conflicted with the Crown’s case of murder, undermining his credibility.
- The prosecution’s acceptance and reliance on the co-defendant’s evidence amounted to an abuse of process and unfairness.
- The timing and circumstances of the co-defendant implicating a particular Appellant raised suspicion of inducement or improper police conduct.
- The co-defendant’s evidence should have been excluded under section 78 of PACE due to its prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.
- The co-defendant should have been required to waive legal professional privilege to allow disclosure of his solicitors’ files, which might have contained material affecting his credibility and the fairness of the trial.
- The minimum term of 35 years imposed on one Appellant was excessive, involving double counting of aggravating factors and failure to properly consider mitigating circumstances.
Respondent's Arguments
- The SOCPA statutory framework contemplates and permits the admission of evidence from defendants who have entered into assistance agreements, even if they have pleaded guilty to lesser offences.
- The jury is the proper arbiter of the reliability of such evidence, supported by appropriate judicial directions regarding the witness’s self-interest and inconsistencies.
- The prosecution’s acceptance of the plea was a pragmatic decision consistent with the statutory regime and public interest in prosecuting major criminals.
- There was no evidence of improper pressure or inducement affecting the co-defendant’s account.
- The prosecution was not required to compel a waiver of legal professional privilege, and no failure to investigate or disclose material amounted to an abuse or unfairness.
- The sentencing judge correctly assessed aggravating and mitigating factors and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Blackburn [2007] EWCA Crim 2290 |
Statutory framework for SOCPA agreements; public interest in prosecuting major criminals despite deals with co-defendants. |
Confirmed that evidence from defendants under SOCPA agreements is admissible; pragmatic acceptance of pleas; jury directions are key safeguards. |
| R v Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 38 |
Prosecution discretion to call a witness whose evidence may be partially unreliable but partly credible. |
Supported the view that partial unreliability does not mandate exclusion of evidence, but requires careful jury consideration. |
| R v George & Others [2010] EWCA Crim 1148 |
Disclosure obligations in leniency/immunity agreements; requirement to seek waiver of privilege to ensure full cooperation. |
Distinguished from SOCPA context; noted that in that case waiver was necessary and prosecution should press for it, but not directly applicable here. |
| R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B [1996] 1 Cr App R 385 |
Fundamental importance of legal professional privilege in criminal proceedings. |
Affirmed that privilege cannot be overridden absent express statutory provision or clear implication. |
| R (Kelly) v Warley Magistrates' Court [2008] 1 Cr App R 14 |
Reinforcement of principles protecting legal professional privilege. |
Supported the view that privilege is a strong protection unless expressly waived or overridden. |
| R v Seaton [2010] EWCA Crim 1980 |
Legal professional privilege considerations in criminal disclosure. |
Reiterated importance of privilege and the limits on compelled waiver. |
| Benedetto v The Queen [2003] 1 WLR 1545 |
Dangers of evidence from accomplices; need for careful assessment of reliability. |
Underlined the prosecution’s heavy burden to investigate reliability of accomplice evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by examining the statutory regime under SOCPA, highlighting that it contemplates and permits the admission of evidence from defendants who have entered into assistance agreements, including those who have pleaded guilty to lesser offences. The court emphasized the public interest in prosecuting major criminals, even if it requires pragmatic deals with co-defendants. It noted that the risk of self-interested testimony is a well-recognized danger traditionally addressed by appropriate jury directions rather than exclusion of evidence.
The judge’s ruling rejecting the abuse of process and exclusion submissions was upheld. The court found no coherent legal basis to exclude the co-defendant’s evidence despite inconsistencies and the late implication of another defendant, as there was no evidence of inducement or improper police conduct. The jury had been properly directed on how to assess the witness’s credibility, including the self-interest inherent in the SOCPA agreement.
Regarding legal professional privilege, the court acknowledged its fundamental importance and expressed doubt that the SOCPA agreement in this case imposed a requirement to waive privilege. Even assuming such a power existed, the prosecution had not applied to obtain the privileged material or a waiver. The court found no failure on the prosecution’s part amounting to abuse or unfairness, as the jury was fully informed of the relevant circumstances and had sufficient material to assess the witness’s reliability.
On sentencing, the court found the judge had properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the Appellant’s role, prior convictions, and the nature of the offence. The minimum term of 35 years was not manifestly excessive, especially in light of the judge’s experience of the case and the rejection of a similar appeal by a co-defendant.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED all appeals against conviction and sentence.
The direct effect is that the convictions and sentences stand as determined by the Crown Court. The ruling confirms the admissibility of evidence from defendants under SOCPA agreements, provided proper jury directions are given, and affirms the high threshold for excluding such evidence as an abuse of process or under section 78 of PACE. It also clarifies that legal professional privilege remains a significant protection, and absent explicit requirements or applications, the prosecution is not obliged to compel its waiver in this context. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles and applying them to the facts of this case.
Click here to read the full judgment