Muse v London Borough of Brent

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the question of whether a housing authority's duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 ("the 1996 Act") to provide housing for a homeless person is discharged if the person declines an offer of alternative temporary accommodation. The housing authority accepted it owed a duty to provide accommodation to the Respondent and her family and initially secured temporary accommodation. However, as the Respondent's family grew, the accommodation became overcrowded. The housing authority offered alternative accommodation, which the Respondent declined, preferring to remain in the overcrowded premises. The housing authority contended that under section 193 its duty was discharged by this refusal. The county court had held to the contrary, but this appeal challenges that decision.

The housing authority involved is the London Borough of Brent ("Brent"). Brent secured a tenancy for the Respondent with a registered social landlord, referred to as SHA. After the arrival of additional children, SHA notified Brent that the accommodation was overcrowded and requested reallocation to a higher priority band. Brent offered alternative temporary accommodation, which the Respondent refused. Brent then concluded its duty was discharged and initiated eviction proceedings through the landlord. The Respondent sought a review of this decision, which upheld the termination of duty. The Respondent appealed to the county court, which allowed the appeal on the basis that Brent erred in law. Brent now appeals to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a housing authority's duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 to provide accommodation to a homeless person is discharged when the person refuses an offer of alternative suitable temporary accommodation.
2. Whether the housing authority was obliged to give the Respondent the choice of remaining in unsuitable existing accommodation or accepting alternative accommodation.
3. Whether procedural fairness required the housing authority to inform the Respondent of the full consequences of refusing the alternative accommodation offer.
4. Whether there was any waiver by the Respondent of the housing authority's duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The duty under section 193 continues until it ceases by statutory provision and does not become dormant or suspended.
• The housing authority can require the applicant to move to alternative suitable accommodation and can instruct a private landlord to seek possession if necessary, subject to reasonable notice.
• The duty is discharged once the housing authority offers suitable accommodation under section 193(5) which the applicant refuses.
• The judge's interpretation leads to absurd results, including that the duty was discharged at the time of the initial offer of temporary accommodation.
• Brent followed statutory safeguards and the refusal by the Respondent to accept the alternative accommodation validly discharged the duty.
• The letter threatening eviction was misleading but Brent had no legal right to instruct possession; this was a practical communication about housing benefit changes.

Respondent's Arguments

• Section 193(5) does not apply because the Respondent was already in an assured shorthold tenancy that had not been terminated, so she was not homeless and no duty was owed at the time of the transfer application.
• The duty was not discharged by refusal to move as the existing accommodation was still available.
• There was procedural unfairness because the Respondent was not informed that refusal of alternative accommodation could lead to loss of existing accommodation.
• The housing authority should have been transparent about the consequences to allow an informed choice.
• The letter threatening possession was a serious and incorrect statement causing distress.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996, particularly subsection (5), which provides that a housing authority ceases to owe a duty if the applicant refuses an offer of suitable accommodation after being informed of the consequences.

The court accepted that the duty is discharged by the provision of suitable temporary accommodation, consistent with the precedent set in R (Awua) v Brent London Borough Council. The duty revives if the accommodation becomes unsuitable, which occurred here when the Respondent’s accommodation became overcrowded.

Brent complied with the statutory safeguards by offering alternative suitable accommodation and informing the Respondent of the consequences of refusal. The Respondent declined the offer, thereby discharging Brent's duty under section 193(5).

The court rejected the Respondent’s argument that she was not homeless at the time of refusal because she occupied a tenancy, holding that the duty arises and ceases according to the suitability of accommodation rather than mere occupancy.

Regarding procedural fairness, the court found no statutory obligation to provide the detailed explanation the Respondent sought about the consequences of refusal prior to the offer. The Respondent was advised by solicitors and was aware that the existing accommodation was unsuitable. The court did not find that Brent acted unfairly by not offering a choice to remain in the unsuitable accommodation.

The court also considered the possibility of waiver of the duty by the Respondent but found no evidence that such waiver had occurred.

The court criticised Brent’s letter threatening eviction as legally incorrect and potentially distressing but noted that it did not affect the validity of the statutory duty or its discharge.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED the appeal and set aside the county court’s decision.

The holding confirms that a housing authority’s duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 is discharged when a homeless person refuses an offer of suitable alternative accommodation after being properly informed of the consequences. The duty does not continue indefinitely and is contingent on the suitability of accommodation provided.

The direct effect of this decision is that the housing authority, Brent, is no longer under a duty to provide accommodation to the Respondent following her refusal of suitable alternative temporary accommodation. No new precedent was established beyond the correct application of existing statutory provisions and case law.