Factual and Procedural Background
On 28 April 2004, at the Central Criminal Court, the Appellant was convicted of the murder of the deceased. The indictment contained two counts: Count 1 charged the Appellant and a co-defendant with murder, while Count 2 charged the co-defendant alone with perverting the course of justice. The co-defendant was acquitted of Count 1 at the close of the prosecution case, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count 2.
The prosecution alleged that the Appellant murdered the deceased at his home, with assistance from a friend and the co-defendant, who helped in disposing of the body and cleaning the crime scene. The deceased was a crack cocaine dealer and former friend of the Appellant, who was a cannabis dealer. The prosecution case was supported by telephone records, cell site analysis, CCTV footage, forensic evidence, fingerprint evidence, and witness testimony from individuals who pleaded guilty to perverting the course of justice.
The Appellant denied involvement in the murder and presented a defence that the co-defendant and another individual controlled the situation. The co-defendant relied on a defence of duress, claiming she was forced to assist the Appellant under threat. Both defendants ran mutually inconsistent defences, each blaming the other.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the evidence of the Appellant's bad character adduced or given by the co-defendant.
- Whether the jury should have been directed to ignore the bad character evidence when considering the Appellant's case.
- Whether a propensity direction should be given to the jury to assist them in making use of the bad character evidence.
- Whether the direction given by the trial judge was fair and did not needlessly perplex the jury in a joint "cut-throat" trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The trial judge misdirected the jury by allowing them to consider the Appellant's bad character evidence elicited by the co-defendant when deciding the Appellant's guilt.
- The jury should have been directed to disregard the bad character evidence when considering the Appellant's case.
- The jury should have been instructed that the bad character evidence was relevant only to credibility and not to propensity.
- A direction similar to those in Mertens and Murrell was necessary to prevent prejudice.
- The jury should have been told they must be sure of the truth of any disputed bad character allegations before using them against the Appellant.
- The direction given by the trial judge caused unfairness and potential confusion.
Respondent's Arguments
- The trial judge's direction was appropriate, allowing the jury to consider all evidence, including bad character evidence, with proper caution.
- The direction that the jury consider the case against each defendant separately but on all evidence was correct and consistent with legal authority.
- Giving a direction to ignore bad character evidence would have caused unnecessary confusion and mental gymnastics for the jury.
- The legal authorities, particularly Randall and Price, support the approach taken by the trial judge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Randall [2003] UKHL 69 |
Where evidence of propensity of a co-accused is relevant to a fact in issue between the Crown and another accused, the jury need not be directed to ignore that evidence when considering the case against the co-accused. |
The court endorsed Lord Steyn’s obiter dictum that such a direction is unnecessary and would perplex juries; this principle guided the court’s view on the admissibility and use of bad character evidence in joint trials. |
| Price [2004] EWCA Crim 1359 |
Confirmed the application of Randall’s paragraph 35 regarding the admissibility and use of co-accused’s bad character evidence in joint trials. |
The court held that the trial judge’s direction allowing the jury to consider all evidence, including bad character evidence, was not a misdirection and was binding precedent. |
| Mertens [2005] Crim. L.R. 301; [2004] EWCA Crim 2252 |
Explored the limits of jury directions concerning bad character evidence of co-accused and the fairness required in joint trials. |
The court approved trial judges directing juries to ignore inadmissible bad character evidence when appropriate but recognized the complexity in joint trials; distinguished from Price but did not overrule it. |
| Murrell [2005] EWCA Crim 382 |
Addressed the admission of bad character evidence in joint trials and proper jury directions to minimize prejudice. |
The Court of Appeal approved directions instructing juries to disregard bad character evidence inadmissible against a particular defendant, emphasizing fairness and avoiding jury confusion. |
| Clive B [2004] EWCA Crim 1254; [2004] 2 Cr App R 34 |
Analyzed Randall and confirmed its application to joint trials involving bad character evidence of co-defendants. |
Supported the approach that propensity evidence admitted for one defendant may be considered when relevant to another co-defendant’s case. |
| Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824 |
Provided standard directions regarding the use of bad character evidence to assist juries in assessing credibility and propensity. |
The court noted that standard directions should be given when bad character evidence is admissible at the prosecution’s behest; no such direction was necessary here as the evidence was admitted at the co-defendant’s behest. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined the nature of the evidence of the Appellant's bad character elicited by the co-defendant in a joint "cut-throat" trial where both defendants blamed each other. The trial judge had directed the jury that they could consider all evidence, including the co-defendant’s evidence of the Appellant’s bad character, when assessing the case against the Appellant, subject only to limitations on the use of prior convictions for propensity.
The Appellant contended this was a misdirection and that the jury should have been told to ignore the bad character evidence when considering his guilt. The court acknowledged the practical difficulties and potential confusion such a direction would cause, requiring the jury to engage in complex mental distinctions between evidence relevant to credibility, propensity, and the separate cases of co-defendants.
The court relied heavily on the House of Lords decision in Randall and the Court of Appeal decision in Price, which held that where bad character evidence of one defendant is relevant to a fact in issue with another defendant, it is not necessary to direct the jury to ignore it. The court recognized that while other cases (Mertens and Murrell) approved directions to disregard inadmissible bad character evidence, these did not overrule Price and that the trial judge must balance fairness with avoiding jury confusion.
The court concluded that the trial judge’s direction was fair, did not mislead the jury, and did not cause unfair prejudice to the Appellant. The absence of objection by experienced counsel at trial further supported this conclusion. The court also rejected the Appellant’s submissions that the jury should have been required to be sure of the truth of specific bad character allegations before using them, affirming the settled law that the jury must be sure of the ingredients of the offence, not every piece of evidence individually.
Finally, the court emphasized the importance of judges tailoring directions to the circumstances of joint trials and the desirability of avoiding directions that would needlessly perplex juries.
Holding and Implications
The appeal was DISMISSED.
The court held that the trial judge’s direction allowing the jury to consider the Appellant’s bad character evidence elicited by the co-defendant was not a misdirection and was consistent with binding authority. The court certified a point of law regarding the admissibility and jury directions relating to co-accused propensity evidence in joint trials.
The direct effect is that the Appellant’s conviction stands. No new precedent was established beyond the certification of the legal question for potential further appeal. The decision reinforces the principle that trial judges must balance fairness with practical jury comprehension in joint trials involving bad character evidence.