Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Stewart v. Secretary of State For Scotland (Scotland)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was appointed as a Sheriff Substitute in October 1962. Between 1976 and 1991 the two most senior Scottish judges (“the Senior Judges”) conducted three separate statutory investigations into complaints about the Appellant’s courtroom conduct. In their third report (1991) they concluded that an underlying defect of character severely prejudiced the Appellant’s judicial functions and rendered him “unfit for office by reason of inability” under section 12(1) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971. Acting on that report, the Respondent issued the Sheriff (Removal from Office) Order 1992, removing the Appellant from office.
The Appellant sought judicial review of the removal order. The Lord Ordinary dismissed the petition (1994) and an Extra Division refused a reclaiming motion (1996). The Appellant then appealed to the House of Lords. The only live issue was the proper construction of the word “inability” in section 12(1) of the 1971 Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the term “inability” in section 12(1) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 is confined to physical or mental infirmity, as contended by the Appellant, or whether it embraces any incapacity that renders a sheriff unable to perform the judicial function, as argued by the Respondent.
- Whether, assuming the broader meaning of “inability,” the Senior Judges’ investigative process offended principles of natural justice (raised only tangentially at the appeal hearing).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- “Inability” in section 12(1) must be read narrowly as referring only to physical or mental illness. A wider reading threatens judicial independence by permitting removal for subjective assessments of character.
- Historical statutes guaranteed sheriffs tenure ad vitam aut culpam; Parliament therefore did not intend removal for shortcomings short of illness, neglect of duty, or proven misbehaviour.
- The broader construction produces anomalies in earlier pension legislation, suggesting Parliament could not have intended it.
- International materials, such as United Nations Basic Principle 18 (1985), support a limited ground of removal based on “incapacity” or serious “behaviour.”
Respondent's Arguments
- The ordinary dictionary meaning of “inability” is “lack of ability” and is not restricted to illness; it encompasses any incapacity that prevents proper judicial performance.
- A narrow reading would force the Senior Judges to certify a sheriff as “fit” even where manifest personality defects made judicial service impossible—a result Parliament cannot have intended.
- Legislative history shows Parliament used different language (“infirmity of mind or body”) when it wished to confine a provision to illness; its choice of the broader word “inability” in section 12(1) must therefore be given effect.
- Judicial independence is safeguarded because only the two Senior Judges can trigger removal; the Executive cannot act unilaterally.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Stewart v. Secretary of State for Scotland (Inner House) 1996 S.L.T. 1203 | Proposition that “inability” requires incapacity to perform judicial functions, not mere inefficiency. | Quoted with approval to illustrate that removal should be reserved for cases where the sheriff “is not really capable of performing the proper function of a judge at all.” |
R. v. Owen (1850) 19 L.J.Q.B. 490 | Early authority indicating that “inability” justifying removal can arise from circumstances preventing performance of office. | Cited to demonstrate that the term historically bore a broad meaning, not confined to illness. |
Ex parte Ramshay (1852) 18 Q.B. 173 | Recognition that lack of self-command undermining judicial performance constituted “inability.” | Relied on to show that personal qualities (e.g., deficient self-control) can amount to inability warranting removal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Delivering the principal speech, Judge Jauncey undertook a detailed textual and historical examination of section 12(1).
- Ordinary meaning: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines “inability” as a lack of power, capacity, or means. Nothing in the text signalled an intention to confine the term to bodily or mental infirmity.
- Statutory history: Earlier Scottish statutes dealing with removal of sheriffs distinguished between “inability” and “infirmity.” Where Parliament meant illness it used explicit words such as “infirmity of mind or body” (e.g., the Sheriffs’ Pensions (Scotland) Act 1961). The deliberate retention of the wider term in 1971 pointed to a comprehensive ground of removal.
- Purpose of the provision: Section 12 exists to protect the public interest in a competent judiciary, not to confer personal benefits on individual sheriffs. The provision forces the Senior Judges to choose between a finding of fitness or unfitness; a narrow view could compel them to declare a manifestly unsuitable judge “fit,” an absurd outcome.
- Independence of the judiciary: Fears of executive encroachment are unfounded because removal can only follow an adverse report by the Senior Judges, and the resulting order is subject to parliamentary control. Thus, the broader construction does not jeopardise judicial independence.
- Application to the facts: The Appellant’s repeated, unjustified courtroom outbursts and underlying character defect demonstrated an incapacity to perform judicial functions. This satisfied the broader meaning of “inability.”
- Procedural fairness: Although not part of the agreed issue, the House noted that allegations of unfairness in the Senior Judges’ inquiry had been fully addressed below and found no breach of natural justice.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
The House of Lords affirmed that “inability” in section 12(1) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 extends beyond physical or mental infirmity to encompass any incapacity—whether stemming from personality, character, or other causes—that renders a sheriff incapable of properly performing judicial duties. The removal order therefore lawfully stood.
Implications are chiefly practical rather than precedential: the decision confirms the breadth of section 12 and leaves the primary safeguard of judicial independence in the hands of the Senior Judges. No new doctrinal test was created, but the ruling clarifies that mere inefficiency is unlikely to qualify; the incapacity must negate the ability to fulfil the judicial role.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.
Comments