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Skanska Construction Ltd v. Egger [Barony] Ltd

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decision by His Honour Judge Harvey QC dated 25th May 2001 concerning the interpretation of a contract made in April 1997 between the Appellant and the Respondent. The contract involved the Respondent agreeing to design, manage, and construct a wood chipboard factory for the Appellant at Auchinleck, Strathclyde.

During construction, defects appeared in the floor slab of the warehouse, including cracking, breaking up under vehicle loads, curling, and crazing. The Appellant counterclaimed damages for defective design, materials, or workmanship. Both parties agreed, for the preliminary issues, that the floor slab was defective as alleged and that the damage was caused or contributed to by breaches of contract by the Respondent.

The preliminary issues focused on whether the Appellant was contractually obliged to obtain insurance in joint names covering loss from such damage. The Appellant had obtained insurance excluding cover for such defects, raising the question of breach of contract.

The contract was a guaranteed maximum price contract, custom-made for the factory’s design and construction. Key contractual terms imposed design and workmanship standards on the Respondent, with clauses addressing liability for defects, obligations to repair defects at the Respondent’s cost during a defects liability period, and indemnity provisions. Clause 22 detailed responsibilities for care of the works, insurance obligations, and indemnities, including the requirement for insurance in joint names covering loss or damage for which the Respondent was responsible under the contract.

The insurance policy obtained by the Appellant excluded loss or damage caused by defects in design, workmanship, or materials.

Following the discovery of defects in the floor slab shortly after completion, temporary repairs were made, but the slab ultimately required replacement. The Appellant’s counterclaim alleged breaches by the Respondent, particularly failure to cure the concrete properly, with damages exceeding one million pounds.

The two preliminary issues were:

1. Whether Clause 22 obliged the Appellant to procure joint names insurance including indemnity for the Respondent’s liability for damages to the floor slab caused by breaches of contract.

2. Whether the Appellant was in breach of contract by procuring insurance excluding cover for such defects.

Evidence was heard on the availability of insurance policies at the relevant time. The judge accepted that policies covering defects were available but at substantially higher deductibles and premiums. The policy actually obtained excluded damage from defects.

The judge initially held the insurance obligation included loss or damage caused by breaches of contract but excluded "rectification" of defects themselves. After further submissions, the judge clarified that "repair" meant repair of damage but excluded rectification of defective design or workmanship, and costs of improvements were not covered.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Did Clause 22 of the contract require the Appellant to obtain joint names insurance covering damages to the works caused by breaches of contract by the Respondent, including defects in design or workmanship?
  2. Was the Appellant in breach of contract by procuring insurance excluding cover for loss or damage caused by defects, errors, or omissions in design, workmanship, or materials?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The obligation under Clause 22(2)(a) was limited to insuring events envisaged in Clause 22(1)(a) and (b), which dealt with loss or damage occurring during construction and the defects liability period.
  • The insurance was not intended to indemnify the Respondent from its primary contractual duties under Clauses 2, 7, and 16A relating to design, materials, and workmanship.
  • Clear and unambiguous language would be required to show an intention to relieve the Respondent of these obligations by insurance.
  • The wider construction urged by the Respondent would produce absurd outcomes, such as no loss or damage occurring if a defect was latent before manifesting.
  • The judge was correct to consider insurance market evidence, which showed that insurance covering defects was not available at the deductible stipulated by the contract.
  • The parties must be taken to have intended the insurance cover actually obtained.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The phrase "all loss or damage from whatever cause arising for which the contractor is responsible under the terms of the contract" should be construed broadly to include liability for defects.
  • The clause provides a limited period indemnity encouraging the Respondent to complete repairs properly and on time, and offers protection in case of Respondent’s insolvency.
  • The insurance obligation does not absolve the Respondent from primary liabilities but covers loss or damage during the stipulated period.
  • The judge was wrong to exclude the words "or rectification" from his answers; costs of rectification should be included in the insurance obligation.
  • Expert evidence confirmed insurance covering rectification was available, albeit at a higher deductible.
  • The deductible stipulated in the contract does not diminish the plain meaning of the insurance obligation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed construction of the contract, focusing on Clause 22 and its relationship with other clauses governing design, workmanship, defects, and insurance. The court distinguished between the Respondent’s primary obligations to perform the contract to specified standards (Clauses 2, 7, and 16A) and the responsibilities for care of the works and insurance during construction and the defects liability period (Clauses 20 and 22).

The court found that Clause 22’s insurance obligation was intended to cover physical loss or damage occurring during the contractor’s responsibility for care, including accidental damage or external perils, regardless of fault. However, it was not intended to cover the mere manifestation of defects in design or workmanship that the Respondent was contractually obliged to remedy.

The phrase "responsible under the terms of the contract" was interpreted as referring primarily to the custodial responsibility in Clause 22(1), not the broader primary liabilities for design and construction defects. The court rejected the Respondent’s argument that the insurance obligation should include rectification of defects.

The court also found no persuasive evidence that the parties considered insurance availability or deductibles when drafting the contract, thus market evidence was not decisive.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the insurance obligation did not extend to covering loss or damage consisting solely of the manifestation of defective design or workmanship.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to ALLOW THE APPEAL and answer the first preliminary issue in the negative, holding that Clause 22 did not oblige the Appellant to procure insurance covering loss or damage caused by defects in design or workmanship.

Consequently, it was unnecessary to decide the second preliminary issue concerning breach of contract for procuring insurance excluding such cover.

The orders of the lower court were set aside, permission to appeal was granted, and the Respondent was ordered to pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal and related proceedings.

The decision clarifies the distinction between contractual obligations to remedy defects and insurance obligations for physical loss or damage during construction, limiting insurance coverage to custodial risks rather than primary liability for defective design or workmanship. No new precedent beyond the interpretation of the specific contract terms was established.

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Skanska Construction Ltd v Egger [Barony] Ltd

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Skanska Construction Ltd v Egger [Barony] Ltd
(Mar 13, 2002)