Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from an appeal heard by the Court of Appeal concerning the conduct of a litigant who persistently brought multiple unmeritorious applications and appeals, thereby burdening the court's resources. The litigant had made several applications for permission to appeal, all of which were dismissed as totally devoid of merit. The Court of Appeal directed the convening of a three-judge panel to consider appropriate injunctions or orders to control the litigant’s future activities. The respondents, five barristers who had only previously appeared successfully against the litigant, applied for an extended civil restraint order. The court considered the broader problem posed by vexatious litigants who abuse court processes by making repeated meritless applications, often without means to pay costs, thereby causing significant resource drain and disruption to the justice system.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court has the inherent jurisdiction to protect its processes from abuse by vexatious litigants.
- The appropriate range of remedies available to the court to restrain litigants who persistently bring totally unmeritorious applications or proceedings.
- The proportionality and legality of restricting a litigant’s right of access to the courts, including restrictions on the right to appeal.
- The conditions and procedural safeguards applicable to making civil restraint orders, extended civil restraint orders, and general civil restraint orders.
- The application of Strasbourg jurisprudence principles to regulation of access to courts in the context of vexatious litigation.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents, five barristers, sought an extended civil restraint order against the litigant to prevent further vexatious applications or proceedings against them.
- They submitted that the litigant had threatened further groundless claims against them and other barristers.
- The respondents argued that the litigant’s conduct imposed a significant nuisance and resource drain on the courts and themselves.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant appeared in person and attempted to argue that he had a right to petition to appeal to the highest court despite previous refusals of permission.
- He did not address the court’s concerns regarding the meritlessness of his applications and instead sought to identify the addresses of the respondents for further legal actions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Cocker v Tempest (1840-41) 7 M&W 501 |
Inherent power of courts over their own process to prevent abuse |
Established the foundational principle that courts have unlimited power over their own processes to prevent injustice through abuse. |
| Attorney-General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 |
Definition and characteristics of vexatious litigation |
Used to define "habitually and persistently" vexatious conduct and the court’s power to restrain such conduct. |
| Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484 |
Development of inherent jurisdiction and use of civil restraint orders |
Guided the court in approving extended civil restraint orders and the inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process. |
| Attorney-General v Ebert [2001] EWHC Admin 695 |
Scope of court’s supervisory role and injunctions to restrain obsessive litigation |
Supported the court’s authority to restrain litigants from wasting court resources and disturbing orderly conduct. |
| Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90 |
Creation of new procedures for reopening court decisions and inherent jurisdiction |
Affirmed inherent jurisdiction to protect court processes and regulate vexatious litigants, including all-paper procedures. |
| Golder v UK (A/18) 1 EHRR 524 |
Right of access to court subject to legitimate and proportionate limitations |
Provided Strasbourg jurisprudence framework for limiting access without impairing the essence of the right. |
| Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909 |
Inherent powers and jurisdiction of courts |
Clarified the nature and scope of inherent jurisdiction to maintain the court’s character and suppress abuses. |
| Attorney-General v Vernazza [1960] AC 965 |
Inherent power to prevent abuse of legal machinery |
Confirmed courts’ control over their own procedure and that no litigant has a vested right to abuse process. |
| Attorney-General v Covey; Attorney-General v Matthews [2001] EWCA Civ 254 |
Variation of civil proceedings orders in light of new conditions |
Recognized courts’ ability to vary restraint orders when circumstances change. |
| Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 |
Injunctions to restrain interference with administration of justice |
Supported the principle that courts may grant injunctions to prevent contemptuous interference with justice. |
| H v UK (1985) 45 D&R 281 |
Legitimacy of regulating access to courts under Convention rights |
Confirmed that regulation of access to courts pursues a legitimate aim and is compatible with human rights. |
| Ebert v Official Receiver [2001] EWCA Civ 340 |
Convention compliance of statutory procedures restricting vexatious litigants |
Supported the legitimacy of limiting appeal rights for litigants abusing court processes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by acknowledging the serious problem vexatious litigants pose to the efficient administration of justice, particularly when they persistently bring applications and proceedings devoid of merit. It emphasized the court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect its processes from abuse, a power long established and necessary to prevent injustice and misuse of judicial resources.
The court reviewed the nature of vexatious litigation, citing authoritative definitions and the increasing judicial awareness of the drain such conduct imposes on court resources. It examined the available protective measures, including statutory civil proceedings orders under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, and inherent jurisdiction orders such as Grepe v Loam orders (civil restraint orders), extended civil restraint orders, and general civil restraint orders.
Applying Strasbourg jurisprudence, the court recognized that while access to courts is a fundamental right, it may be subject to proportionate regulation to prevent abuse. The court detailed the features and procedural safeguards of each type of restraint order, emphasizing the need for proportionality and for orders to be limited in duration, typically not exceeding two years.
The court reasoned that a graduated approach to restraining vexatious litigants is appropriate, starting with striking out meritless applications, then civil restraint orders within particular proceedings, extended restraint orders covering related litigation, and ultimately general restraint orders covering all proceedings in a court.
Regarding the litigant’s right of appeal, the court recognized that persistent abuse may justify limiting the right to appeal refusals of permission, making such refusals final unless permission to appeal is granted by the judge who made the refusal.
In the present case, the court found the grounds for an extended civil restraint order against the litigant to be clearly established. The order would be policed initially by a master, with appeals to a High Court judge, and would prevent the litigant from making further applications or proceedings against the respondents without prior permission. The court balanced the litigant’s rights with the necessity to protect judicial resources and the respondents from further harassment.
Holding and Implications
The Court of Appeal made an extended civil restraint order against the appellant for a period of two years.
The order prohibits the appellant from making any further applications or taking any steps in the Court of Appeal, the High Court, or any County Court against the five named respondents or their legal representatives without prior written permission obtained on paper from a designated master. Permission to appeal refusals of such applications is also restricted and must be sought through a specified procedure. Any breach of the order constitutes contempt of court, and unauthorized applications will be dismissed without hearing.
This decision directly restrains the appellant’s ability to abuse court processes in relation to these respondents and related matters, providing a flexible but firm mechanism to protect the courts and parties from vexatious litigation. The court emphasized that such orders are to be proportionate, time-limited (not exceeding two years), and subject to judicial oversight. No new precedent was set beyond the modern restatement and application of established principles and remedies for vexatious litigants.