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Page v. Sheerness Steel Company Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion consolidates three personal-injury appeals: (1) a part-time nurse (“Plaintiff 1”) catastrophically injured in a road collision; (2) a six-year-old child (“Plaintiff 2”) who sustained cerebral palsy because of negligent obstetric treatment; and (3) a 24-year-old steel-mill employee (“Plaintiff 3”) who suffered penetrating brain injuries at work. Liability was admitted in every case.
At first instance each trial judge calculated lump-sum damages for future earnings and lifelong care by adopting a discount rate based on Index-Linked Government Stock (“ILGS”). The Court of Appeal reversed that approach, substituted a conventional 4.5 % discount rate tied to equity returns, and correspondingly reduced the awards. All three plaintiffs appealed to the House of Lords (“the Court”).
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the proper method for selecting the discount rate when converting future pecuniary loss into a lump-sum award—should the court assume investment in ILGS or in a mixed portfolio weighted towards equities?
- Whether (and in what circumstances) courts may depart from previously accepted “conventional” rates of 4–5 % established in earlier case law.
- Case-specific issues: correct multipliers, life-expectancy findings, future housing-cost methodology, and deductions for insurance or pension payments.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs’ Arguments
- The goal is full compensation; risk of under-compensation must be minimised.
- ILGS provide an inflation-proof, virtually risk-free vehicle that precisely matches the notional annuity courts assume when fixing damages.
- Gravely injured plaintiffs cannot tolerate equity-market volatility because annual care costs are inflexible and immediate.
- Modern actuarial material (e.g., Ogden Tables) and Law Commission research support an ILGS-based rate of about 3 % net.
Defendants’ Arguments
- Courts should assume plaintiffs will behave as “ordinary prudent investors,” i.e., hold approximately 70 % equities and 30 % gilts, giving a net real return of roughly 4–5 %.
- Plaintiffs owe a duty to mitigate loss, which entails pursuing higher-yield equity investment.
- The Court of Protection typically invests substantial damages in diversified equity portfolios, indicating that approach is prudent.
- ILGS are not entirely risk-free (limited maturities, market price fluctuations, nursing-cost inflation outstripping RPI).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878 | Method for awarding additional housing costs | Upholds use of a “foregone use of money” rate; Court adjusts rate from 2 % to 3 % in line with new discount rate. |
| Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 498 | Annuity approach to future loss | Cited favourably as clear exposition of multiplier/multiplicand method. |
| Taylor v O'Connor [1971] AC 115 | Purpose of damages & effect of inflation | Re-examined; Court prefers updated ILGS solution over earlier equity assumption. |
| Hodgson v Trapp [1989] AC 807 | Need for accurate actuarial calculation | Supports using actuarial tables as starting point rather than a check. |
| Smith v Manchester (Principle) | Allowance for reduced labour-market prospects | Referenced as distinct from future-loss calculation under appeal. |
| Wright v British Railways Board [1983] AC 773 | Use of ILGS to gauge real interest rates; guidelines not rules of law | Relied on to justify revising conventional rates without invoking the 1966 Practice Statement. |
| Birkett v Hayes [1982] 1 WLR 816 | 2 % interest on general damages | Historical context for “conventional” rates; distinction drawn. |
| Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556 | 4–5 % discount as rough allowance for inflation | Held no longer apt because ILGS provide a better tool. |
| Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166 | Uncertainty & need for rough justice | Court stresses that modern data reduces need for broad approximations. |
| Lim Poh Choo v Camden AHA [1980] AC 174 | Reluctance to adjust for future inflation | Distinguished on grounds that ILGS were then unavailable. |
| Auty v National Coal Board [1985] 1 WLR 784 | Discounts on pension loss | Judge’s 10 % discount restored; CA’s 15 % overturned. |
| Janardan v East Berkshire HA [1990] 2 Med LR 1 | Judicial discount from actuarial multiplier | Court disapproves such arbitrary reductions. |
| Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350 | Multiplier adjustments | Clarifies when contingencies justify variance. |
| Cunningham v Camberwell HA [1990] 2 Med LR 49 | Comparative figure for PSLA | Used by Defendants; Court finds award possibly high. |
| Croke v Wiseman [1982] 1 WLR 71 | Discount on life-expectancy multipliers | Considered but not followed. |
| George v Pinnock [1973] 1 WLR 118 | Appellate interference threshold | Reaffirmed; CA exceeded that threshold. |
| Every v Miles [1964] CA Trans 261 | “Outside the bracket” test | Applied when reviewing pain-and-suffering awards. |
| Pickett v BREL [1980] AC 136 | Error-of-law ground for appellate revision | Guide to when awards may be altered. |
| Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App Cas 25 | Full-compensation principle | Forms the underlying rationale for adopting ILGS. |
| Admiralty Commissioners v S.S. Valeria [1922] 2 AC 242 | Pecuniary restitution standard | Quoted in minority reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by reaffirming that damages must offer “as nearly as possible” 100 % compensation. It analysed the multiplier/multiplicand model and concluded that historic reliance on a 4–5 % discount rate was a pragmatic response to the absence of reliable inflation-proof investments. Since ILGS became widely available (1981), that rationale no longer holds.
Key analytical steps:
- Risk Profile. Equity markets are volatile; seriously injured plaintiffs cannot defer selling in a slump because their annual care costs are non-negotiable. Early capital depletion may never recover.
- ILGS as Benchmark. ILGS provide virtually risk-free, inflation-indexed capital and income. Therefore they are the best proxy for the “risk-free real return” assumed by the annuity model.
- Fairness between Parties. Defendants argued a plaintiff must invest like an “ordinary” investor, but the Court held that the plaintiffs’ constrained position justifies a more cautious assumption.
- Guideline v. Rule. Discount rates are guidelines, not rigid rules; courts may update them without invoking the 1966 Practice Statement.
- Net Rate Selection. Average ILGS yields over the preceding 6–12 months hovered near 3.0–3.3 % gross. After an indicative 14–15 % tax allowance, a round figure of 3 % net best balances simplicity and accuracy.
- Consistency. For ease of settlement and to avoid expert battles, a single figure (3 %) should apply generally unless the Lord Chancellor prescribes otherwise under the Damages Act 1996.
- Case-specific Adjustments. The Court reinstated original multipliers, life-expectancy findings and care costs save for minor corrections (e.g., pain-and-suffering award for Plaintiff 1 reduced to the Court of Appeal’s £100,000; housing-cost calculation in Plaintiff 2 retained at 3 % rate).
Holding and Implications
HELD: All three appeals allowed. The appropriate discount rate for future-loss calculations is 3 % net, derived from ILGS yields. First-instance awards were largely restored, subject to recalculation where necessary on the 3 % basis.
Implications: damages in serious personal-injury cases will rise significantly; insurers and public-sector defendants must re-price liabilities; expert evidence on equity returns is generally unnecessary; the Lord Chancellor may prescribe new rates under the Damages Act 1996, but until then courts should apply the 3 % guideline.
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