Wickford Development Company Ltd. v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, whereby the Plaintiff (referred to as Wickford) seeks an order quashing the decision of the first Defendant, the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, who dismissed Wickford's appeal against the second Defendant, the Local Planning Authority, Uttlesford District Council's non-determination of Wickford's application for planning permission. The application related to the construction of 300 dwellings and associated works as part of Sector 3 of a larger development known as Woodlands Park at Great Dunmow, Essex. The appeal was heard at a public local inquiry before an Inspector, who recommended dismissal of the appeal. The Secretary of State accepted the Inspector's conclusions and dismissed the appeal accordingly. Wickford contended that if the Inspector erred in law, the Secretary of State’s decision was similarly flawed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Secretary of State erred in law by making factual or policy errors in his decision to dismiss Wickford’s appeal.
2. Whether any such errors affected the outcome of the balancing exercise between the benefits of the proposed development and the planning objections.
3. Whether the cumulative effect of any errors justified quashing the Secretary of State’s decision.
4. Whether the Secretary of State properly applied relevant planning policies, including national guidance on housing density, affordable housing, and the need for an agreed Master Plan.
5. Whether procedural fairness was observed in the consideration of material facts and arguments during the inquiry and decision-making process.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Plaintiff argued that the Inspector and Secretary of State made several errors of fact and policy amounting to errors of law that undermined the decision to dismiss the appeal.
• They contended that the Secretary of State contradicted himself regarding the weight to be given to the emerging Local Plan and failed to consider the implications of changes to the Area of Special Landscape Value designation.
• The Plaintiff submitted that the housing density applied was inappropriate, with the Inspector failing to properly consider the wider context as required by national policy guidance (PPG3).
• They argued that the Inspector misunderstood or failed to take into account material evidence regarding local housing need, particularly the contents of an email from a planning director at a local airport indicating demand for low-density housing and unsustainable travel distances.
• The Plaintiff claimed the Inspector and Secretary of State misunderstood the proposals for affordable housing, including the type, location, and extent of affordable units offered, amounting to a fundamental error.
• They argued that the Inspector’s refusal to accept a suggested planning condition to secure affordable housing was erroneous and that the absence of an agreed Master Plan should not have been a valid planning objection.
• The Plaintiff contended the Inspector made an error in assessing the benefits of the development, specifically the period by which the relief road construction would be advanced.
• They claimed procedural unfairness arose from the Inspector relying on a “cherry picking” argument not raised during the inquiry, denying the Plaintiff an opportunity to respond.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Secretary of State accepted that the Inspector may have misunderstood some aspects of the affordable housing proposals but submitted that this misunderstanding did not prejudice the Plaintiff, as the proposals would have been rejected on rational grounds regardless.
• The Defendant contended that the Secretary of State and Inspector properly applied the relevant planning policies and guidance, including PPG3 on housing density and Circular 6/98 on affordable housing.
• They argued that the Inspector’s conclusions on housing need and sustainability were rational and based on the evidence before him, including proper consideration of the email from the airport planning director.
• The Defendant maintained that the absence of an agreed Master Plan was a valid planning objection, supported by adequate reasoning and consistent with local plan policies.
• They submitted that the approximation of the relief road completion period (8 years versus 10 years) was not a material error and would not have affected the decision.
• Regarding procedural fairness, the Defendant explained that the “cherry picking” remark was the Inspector’s own observation and did not cause prejudice, as the overall decision would have remained the same.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully reviewed each ground of challenge raised by the Plaintiff against the decision of the Secretary of State to dismiss the appeal. The court began by summarizing relevant legal principles, emphasizing the importance of correct factual understanding, proper application and clear explanation of relevant policies, and the necessity for decision-makers to consider all relevant material without taking into account irrelevant factors.

The court then addressed the individual grounds of challenge in turn. It found that the Plaintiff had abandoned certain grounds, such as objections related to prematurity of the development and failure to consider emerging Local Plan changes, due to lack of evidence that these matters were brought to the decision-makers’ attention.

Regarding housing density, the court accepted the Defendant’s submission that the Inspector and Secretary of State had properly considered the wider context and applied national policy guidance rationally. The court rejected the Plaintiff’s contention that the wider context was improperly limited or that relevant adjoining areas were ignored.

On housing need, the court found the Inspector had reasonably interpreted evidence, including the airport planning director’s email, and had rationally concluded that the main demand did not relate to airport employees requiring low-density housing. The court accepted the Defendant’s explanation that the Inspector’s omission of specific reference to unsustainable travel distances reflected a lack of persuasion as to its materiality.

The court found that the Inspector had misunderstood the Plaintiff’s affordable housing proposals in some respects but agreed with the Defendant that this misunderstanding did not prejudice the Plaintiff because the proposals would have been rejected on rational grounds regardless. The court accepted the reasoning that the proposed low cost market housing was not suitable to meet local needs and that the proposed grouping of affordable housing was contrary to national advice.

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that failure to consider a suggested planning condition was an error, noting that the Inspector had considered the condition expressly proposed by the Plaintiff and that no suitable alternative condition was on offer. It also found that imposing a different condition without reopening the inquiry could cause procedural unfairness.

With respect to the absence of an agreed Master Plan, the court found the Inspector and Secretary of State’s reliance on the relevant Local Plan policies to be rational and adequately reasoned.

The court did not find the alleged error in estimating the period by which the relief road construction would be advanced to be material or significant, viewing the Inspector’s approximation as reasonable.

Finally, the court held that the Inspector’s “cherry picking” comment was an expression of his own view and did not amount to procedural unfairness, especially as the overall decision would have remained unchanged.

Overall, the court concluded that none of the grounds of challenge had sufficient merit to justify quashing the Secretary of State’s decision.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision is DISMISSED.

The application to quash the Secretary of State’s decision dismissing the appeal was rejected. The court found no substantial legal errors or procedural unfairness warranting interference. The decision confirms the rationality and lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s approach to balancing planning considerations in this case. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling primarily affirms the proper application of established principles governing planning appeals and judicial review of administrative decisions.