M (A Minor) v. Secretary of State For Social Security

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant is a severely disabled child who was brought from The Country to The County in 1993. In September 1993 the Appellant claimed Disability Living Allowance (“DLA”) and, after satisfying the residence and presence conditions then in force, received a fixed-term award from 27 September 1993 to 26 September 1996.

Regulation 4 of the Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 1996 (“the amending regulations”) came into force on 5 February 1996 and introduced an additional eligibility requirement based on immigration status. The Appellant, who had overstayed her leave to remain, did not satisfy this new condition.

Anticipating expiry of the original award, the Appellant made a renewal claim on 7 June 1996. An adjudication officer refused the claim on 16 August 1996 because the immigration condition was unmet; a subsequent review on 31 October 1996 affirmed that refusal.

A Social Security Appeal Tribunal (by majority) allowed the Appellant’s appeal, but a Social Security Commissioner—bound by the Court of Appeal decision in R v Chief Adjudication Officer, ex p B—reversed the tribunal and restored the adjudication officer’s decision. The Court of Appeal then dismissed the Appellant’s further appeal. The present judgment is the Appellant’s appeal to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether regulation 12(3) of the amending regulations disapplies the new immigration condition only in respect of accrued rights under an existing award, or also in relation to a new or repeat claim made after the amending regulations came into force.
2. Consequently, whether the Appellant remained entitled to DLA for the period 27 September 1996 – 18 July 2000 despite not satisfying the immigration condition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The natural meaning of regulation 12(3) is that, having been in receipt of DLA immediately before the amending regulations commenced, the Appellant continues to be assessed under the principal regulations in their unamended form until a statutory review occurs.
• The pre-condition in regulation 12(3) (“is receiving DLA”) is met; no review has taken place; therefore the operative words disapply regulation 4 to the Appellant’s renewal claim.
• Reading the regulation otherwise would render the transitional protection illusory and produce arbitrary results.

Respondent's Arguments

• Regulation 12(3) is a transitional “saving” provision intended solely to preserve accrued rights under existing awards; it does not create new rights or extend awards beyond their original term.
• The phrase “entitlement to that benefit” in the cessation clause refers to the specific award in force immediately before the amending regulations; once that award expires, regulation 4 applies to any new claim.
• Extending transitional relief to repeat claims would be inconsistent with the language and purpose of regulation 12(3) and with general drafting practice for transitional measures.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

All members of the appellate panel agreed with the lead opinion delivered by Judge Millett. The Court approached regulation 12(3) in three segments: the pre-condition, the operative words, and the cessation clause.

• Purpose of Regulation 12. Headed “Saving,” the regulation preserves—but does not enlarge—rights that had accrued immediately before the amending regulations commenced.
• Pre-condition. The Appellant satisfied the pre-condition because she was receiving DLA immediately before 5 February 1996.
• Operative words. Although broadly phrased, they must be confined by context to disapply regulation 4 only in respect of the particular award already in payment. They do not govern future or repeat claims.
• Cessation clause. The phrase “entitlement to that benefit” refers to the specific award in force prior to the amendments. Consequently, protection ends either on statutory review of that award or, by necessary implication, when the fixed-term award expires.
• No anomaly. The Court rejected the notion that differing outcomes between life-time awards and fixed-term awards rendered the construction anomalous; transitional provisions typically mirror the scope of accrued rights.
• Administrative logic. The design allows benefits staff to process changes progressively and avoids the administrative burden of reassessing all recipients simultaneously.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal’s interpretation that regulation 12(3) safeguards only the existing fixed-term award in force before 5 February 1996. Because the Appellant’s award expired on 26 September 1996 and no review occurred before that date, her subsequent claim had to satisfy the new immigration condition. The decision confirms that transitional provisions do not extend to repeat claims and leaves undisturbed the earlier precedent, but it does not establish a broader doctrinal innovation beyond construing this specific savings clause.