| Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (1873) | Core witness immunity covers statements made in court. | Cited as historical foundation of absolute immunity. |
| Munster v. Lamb (1883) | Public-policy rationale for protecting honest witnesses from vexation. | Quoted to illustrate first policy limb underpinning immunity. |
| Roy v. Prior [1971] | Immunity prevents multiplicity of actions reopening trial issues. | Used to delineate limits of “core” immunity. |
| Watson v. McEwan [1905] | Immunity extends to proofs of evidence given to solicitors. | Accepted but distinguished from fabrication of evidence. |
| Evans v. London Hospital Medical College [1981] | Suggested immunity for preparatory statements “part of the process of investigating a crime.” | Endorsed for honest preparatory statements; not for fabricated acts. |
| Silcott v. Commissioner of Police [1996] | Advocated immunity for investigatory and preparatory conduct, even evidence-planting. | House of Lords held Silcott went “too far” and declined to follow it. |
| Taylor v. Serious Fraud Office [1999] | Communications integral to investigation enjoy immunity. | Applied but confined to truthful investigative communications. |
| X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire CC [1995] | Expert investigations closely linked to court proceedings may be immune. | Accepted as consistent with limiting immunity to truthful preparatory work. |
| Stanton v. Callaghan [2000] | Immunity survives even where a trial never occurs. | Referenced to show breadth of existing core immunity. |
| Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] | No duty of care owed by police in investigation for negligence purposes. | Distinguished from absolute-immunity question. |
| Elguzouli-Daf v. Commissioner of Police [1995] | Similar absence of negligence duty for prosecutors. | Used to separate negligence duties from immunity doctrine. |
| Bennett v. Commissioner of Police [1997] | Immunity does not bar all tort claims against police (e.g., assault). | Relied on to show immunity is exceptional, not general. |
| Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office [1970] | Public officials expected to endure litigation; immunity exceptional. | Supports narrow construction of immunity. |
| Marrinan v. Vibart [1963] | Immunity bars conspiracy actions where cause of action is false testimony. | Accepted but distinguished because fabrication precedes testimony. |
| Cabassi v. Vila [1940] | Australian authority extending immunity to conspiracies to give false evidence. | Cited but ultimately limited in scope. |
| Three Rivers DC v. Bank of England [2000] | Explains malice requirement for misfeasance in public office. | Mentioned when contrasting with present tort claims. |
| Osman v. United Kingdom (ECHR, 1998) | Critique of “blanket immunities” for police. | Used to reinforce the need for access to a remedy. |
| Imbler v. Pachtman (US, 1976) | Functional test for prosecutorial immunity. | Provided comparative support for limiting immunity to advocacy functions. |
| Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (US, 1993) | No absolute immunity for fabrication of evidence. | Comparative precedent favouring Appellants’ position. |
| Spurlock v. Satterfield (US, 1999) | Non-testimonial fabrication not protected by witness immunity. | Quoted with approval. |
| Lincoln v. Daniels [1962] | Privilege should not be extended beyond what is “strictly necessary.” | Cited as caution against over-extension. |
| Rees v. Sinclair [1974] | Immunities given only where “absolutely necessary.” | Used to justify narrow interpretation. |
| Mann v. O'Neill (AUS, 1997) | Courts “view with jealous suspicion” proposals to widen absolute privilege. | Adopted as guiding principle. |
| Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] | Collateral attack on concluded criminal findings barred. | Distinguished; no concluded trial here. |
| In re McC (A Minor) [1985] | Limits of judicial immunity. | Referenced to keep doctrinal boundaries clear. |