Republic of India and Others v. India Steamship Company Ltd

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1987 the Respondent’s vessel loaded munitions in a European port for carriage to the Appellants in Asia. A fire in one hold led to jettisoning part of the cargo and alleged heat-damage to the remainder. Two claims were notified to the Respondent: (1) a small “short-delivery” claim for the jettisoned items and (2) a substantially larger claim for total loss of the entire hold’s cargo.

On 1 September 1988 the Appellants issued proceedings in the Subordinate Judge’s Court in The City limited to the short-delivery claim and obtained judgment (sterling equivalent ≈ £7,200); an appeal remains pending.

Before that judgment, on 25 August 1989 the Appellants issued an in rem writ in the Admiralty Court in England. The writ was served on a sister ship on 4 May 1990; the vessel was released after the Respondent’s P&I Club provided security. The English statement of claim (≈ £2.6 million) covered the entire cargo loss.

The Respondent applied to strike out relying on section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (“CJJA 1982”). Judge [Sheen] held the statutory bar absolute and struck out the claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed. In a 1993 House of Lords decision the matter was remitted to decide (a) whether an in rem action is “between the same parties” for section 34 and (b) whether estoppel, waiver or agreement defeated the bar.

Judge [Clarke] later found in favour of the Appellants on estoppel and on the “different parties” point. The Court of Appeal reversed on all issues. The present appeal to the House of Lords is against that reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether an Admiralty action in rem is an action “between the same parties” as an earlier foreign judgment in personam for the purposes of section 34 CJJA 1982.
2. If so, whether the Respondent is precluded by estoppel (by convention or by acquiescence) from invoking section 34.
3. If neither section 34 nor estoppel disposes of the matter, whether the doctrine in Henderson v. Henderson operates to bar the English proceedings as an abuse of process.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

• The defendant in an in rem action is the ship itself; therefore the parties are different and section 34 cannot apply.
• Even if section 34 is prima facie applicable, the Respondent is estopped (by agreement, waiver, or a shared assumption) from relying on it.
• The historic ability to bring sequential in rem and in personam actions without mutual bar demonstrates that Parliament could not have intended section 34 to bite.

Respondent’s Arguments

• An in rem action has long been treated, in substance, as an action against the owner; hence the parties are identical and section 34 applies.
• No estoppel arises: there was no common assumption that a judgment in The City would not be relied on, and no conduct amounting to acquiescence.
• Alternatively, the English proceedings are an abuse of process under Henderson v. Henderson.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House undertook an extensive historical review of Admiralty practice. It concluded that the nineteenth-century personification theory (treating the ship as defendant) was a legal fiction now superseded by the procedural theory: once a writ is served or acknowledged the owner is, in substance, the defendant. Modern authority, including sovereign-immunity cases and decisions on the Brussels Convention, confirmed this approach.

On that basis the English in rem action and the earlier judgment in The City were between “the same parties” for section 34 CJJA 1982. The legislative purpose of section 34—preventing relitigation of the same cause of action after a foreign judgment—would be thwarted if in rem proceedings could proceed notwithstanding a foreign judgment in personam.

The Appellants’ reliance on The Nordglimt and on nineteenth-century dicta was rejected as inconsistent with subsequent authority and with the objective of section 34.

Turning to estoppel, the House confirmed the requirements for (a) estoppel by convention and (b) estoppel by acquiescence. It held that:

• No shared assumption existed that the Respondent would refrain from relying on section 34, nor any conduct amounting to acquiescence.
• Therefore neither form of estoppel arose, and the statutory bar remained operative.

Because section 34 applied and estoppel did not, the alternative argument based on Henderson v. Henderson was academic and left undecided.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed.

The English Admiralty action in rem is barred by section 34 CJJA 1982 because it involves the same cause of action between the same parties as the earlier foreign judgment. No estoppel defeated the statutory bar. The decision clarifies that, from commencement, an Admiralty action in rem is deemed to be against the owner for res judicata purposes, thereby closing a potential jurisdictional loophole and reinforcing the finality of foreign judgments recognised in England.