Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns three separate sentence cases involving prisoners serving indeterminate sentences who committed further offences. The court was asked to consider the sentencing difficulties arising when an existing indeterminate sentence prisoner is sentenced for additional offences. The applicants in these cases were all prisoners serving indeterminate sentences but differed in their status regarding the minimum term: one committed offences during the minimum term, another committed offences prior to the indeterminate sentence, and the third committed offences after serving the minimum term but while still in custody.
The court granted leave to appeal in all three cases and considered the appropriate application of sentencing principles, particularly in light of previous case law addressing the interaction of indeterminate and determinate sentences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a court can lawfully impose a sentence that commences after the expiration of the minimum term of an existing indeterminate sentence, effectively extending the period before the offender may be considered for parole.
- How to appropriately structure sentences when an offender commits further offences either before or during the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence.
- Whether the length and nature of the sentences imposed in the individual cases were appropriate and lawful.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant Hills' Arguments
- It was argued that it was unlawful in principle for the sentencing judge to impose a sentence deferred to commence after the end of the minimum term of the existing indeterminate sentence.
- Alternatively, if such a deferred sentence was lawful, the three-year sentence imposed was excessive in all the circumstances.
Appellant Davies' Arguments
- The appellant’s counsel did not dispute the judge’s approach to sentencing but contended that the resulting total sentence was manifestly excessive, arguing that the judge had in mind a notional total sentence of 27 years before credit for guilty pleas.
Appellant Pomfret's Arguments
- The appellant accepted that imprisonment for public protection was not wrong in principle but submitted that the minimum term imposed was excessive, especially considering his plea and reports suggesting a real possibility of future progress and rehabilitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v O'Brien [2006] EWCA Crim 1741 |
Guidance on constructing sentences when indeterminate, extended, and determinate sentences must be combined. |
The court applied O'Brien to determine how to structure sentences for offenders serving indeterminate sentences who commit further offences before serving the minimum term. |
| R v C [2007] EWCA Crim 680 |
Further consideration of sentencing principles involving indeterminate sentences and subsequent offences. |
Referenced for its reaffirmation of principles relating to sentencing offenders serving indeterminate sentences. |
| R v Ashes [2007] EWCA Crim 1848 |
Recent consideration of sentencing issues involving indeterminate sentences. |
Used to support the court’s approach to sentencing in these complex cases. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court recognized that sentencing offenders who are serving indeterminate sentences and commit further offences presents unique challenges, particularly regarding the timing and length of any additional sentence imposed. It affirmed that where the minimum term has been served, sentencing is straightforward. However, complexity arises when offences are committed during the minimum term.
In the case where the offender committed offences during the minimum term (Hills), the court considered whether a sentence could be structured to commence after the minimum term, effectively extending the period before parole consideration. The court found no legal principle or statutory provision prohibiting such a deferred sentence. Section 154 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 was interpreted as allowing the court to direct that a sentence commence at a date other than the day it was imposed.
The court rejected older authorities that conflicted with this view, noting that the current sentencing regime, especially under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, allows precise identification of minimum term expiry dates, enabling courts to impose consecutive sentences that extend the parole eligibility date.
Regarding the length and nature of sentences, the court examined the facts and aggravating features in each case. It found the sentences imposed were justified by the seriousness of the offences and the offenders’ backgrounds, and not manifestly excessive. The court did note a technical correction in the Hills case that the sentence should have been one of detention in a Young Offender Institution due to the age of the offender, but this was academic as the appellant had since turned 21.
In the case of Davies, the court corrected the sentence on certain counts where the maximum available sentence was lower than originally imposed. It concluded that the overall approach to sentencing was appropriate and the total sentence was not manifestly excessive.
For Pomfret, the court acknowledged reports indicating potential for rehabilitation but emphasized the seriousness of the violent offence committed while in custody. It upheld the substantial sentence imposed, finding it justified and not manifestly excessive.
Holding and Implications
The court granted leave to appeal in all three cases but ultimately dismissed the appeals except for a reduction in sentence on certain counts in the Davies case.
The court held that it is lawful and appropriate for a sentencing court to impose a sentence that commences after the expiry of the minimum term of an existing indeterminate sentence, thereby extending the period before parole consideration. This approach resolves a previously unclear area in sentencing law and provides clarity for similar future cases.
The direct effect is that the sentences imposed on the appellants stand, subject to the minor adjustment in Davies' case. No new precedent beyond the clarification of sentencing structure was established, but the decision confirms and applies existing statutory frameworks and prior case law.