Swain v Hillman & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decision by His Honour Judge Graham Jones, an additional judge of the High Court, concerning a personal injury claim brought by the Plaintiff against two Defendants, who are builders. The accident occurred on 8 March 1989, and the claim involves complications due to a subsequent traffic accident in 1992 for which the Defendants admitted liability, raising potential causation issues. The case had experienced significant delay, with the Plaintiff’s current legal representatives only becoming involved in the spring of the year of the hearing. The judge was addressing an application for summary disposal of the claim during a case management conference held on 17 June 1999 at a court in The City.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the claim should be disposed of summarily under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), specifically whether the Plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the Defendants have no real prospect of successfully defending it.
2. The correct interpretation and application of the summary judgment provisions under CPR Part 24, including the relationship with CPR Rule 3.4 and the relevant Practice Direction.
3. Whether the judge erred in law by applying an incorrect standard of certainty in deciding whether to grant summary judgment.
4. Whether the evidence presented establishes a real prospect of success sufficient to require the claim to proceed to trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff’s claim should be summarily dismissed as having no real prospect of success.
• They contended that the Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient, particularly regarding the circumstances of how a plank of wood, which had been standing upright against a fence for three days, fell on the Plaintiff without explanation.
• The Defendants disputed their occupation of the site where the accident occurred, suggesting this was a controversial fact requiring trial investigation.
• The Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff should provide more than an assertion that the Defendants were responsible for the plank’s insecure position and should explain how the accident occurred without their negligence.
• They relied on the absence of any pleading or evidence that someone for whom the Defendants were responsible negligently displaced the plank.
• The Defendants suggested alternative explanations for the plank falling, such as a puff of wind or dislodgement by an unidentified person, which they argued were unlikely but raised doubts about causation.

Appellee's Arguments

• The Plaintiff argued that the Defendants were responsible as main contractors for the site’s condition and that the plank should not have been left standing upright for several days.
• The Plaintiff relied on witness testimony indicating the plank’s position and the state of the site, including evidence that the work was near completion and that rubble was present.
• The Plaintiff contended that the Defendants had a responsibility to explain how the plank came to fall and that this responsibility extended to acts of others for whom the Defendants were responsible.
• The Plaintiff maintained that there was a real prospect of success, making summary dismissal inappropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework governing summary judgment under CPR Part 24, particularly rule 24.2, which permits summary judgment where there is no real prospect of success for one party and no other reason to proceed to trial. The court distinguished this from the narrower grounds under CPR Rule 3.4 for striking out a statement of case. It emphasised the meaning of "no real prospect," interpreting it as a realistic, not fanciful, prospect of success.

The court noted that the original Practice Direction provisions (paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2) had been deleted due to conflict with Part 24, as they implied a higher standard of certainty than intended. The judge below was found to have applied the wrong standard, expecting a certainty that the claim was bound to fail before granting summary judgment.

Despite this error in approach, the court concluded the judge reached the correct outcome in denying summary judgment because there was a real prospect that the Plaintiff’s claim could succeed. The factual issues, including the circumstances of the plank falling and the Defendants’ control of the site, were deemed appropriately resolved only at trial, not on a summary application.

The court further explained that summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial where factual disputes require investigation. The Plaintiff’s evidence, including witness testimony and the nature of the site, supported the existence of genuine issues for trial. The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff must provide a detailed explanation of how the accident occurred at this stage.

Both the Master of the Rolls and the other Lord Justices concurred that the appeal should be dismissed, affirming the judge’s decision to allow the claim to proceed to trial.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, thereby upholding the decision of the lower court to refuse summary judgment in favour of the Defendants.

The direct effect is that the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim will proceed to trial for a full examination of the factual and legal issues. No new legal precedent was established beyond clarification of the correct application of summary judgment principles under CPR Part 24. The decision reinforces the principle that summary judgment should only be granted where there is no realistic prospect of success, preserving the right to trial where genuine factual disputes exist.