Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte A, R v.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent, then aged 15, was arrested on 29 October 1998 for handling stolen goods and held overnight in police custody. On 30 October 1998 he appeared before a Youth Court, was refused bail, and was remanded to local authority accommodation under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (“the 1969 Act”). The Youth Court imposed three conditions: a 7 pm–7 am curfew, non-contact with prosecution witnesses, and a prohibition on residing with his mother.

The local authority placed the Respondent in a registered children’s home that was not approved by the Secretary of State as “secure accommodation.” The Respondent later pleaded guilty and, on 18 January 1999, received a four-month sentence of detention in a young offender institution.

Upon admission, the institution’s Governor credited one day for police detention but refused to credit the time spent in the children’s home. The Respondent obtained judicial review before Judge Collins, who felt bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Reg. v. Collins and ordered that the remand period be credited. The Appellant (Secretary of State) appealed directly to the House of Lords.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does time spent by a young offender on remand in non-secure local authority accommodation qualify as a “relevant period” under section 67(1A)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (“the 1967 Act”) and therefore attract an automatic deduction from sentence?
2. Should the earlier Court of Appeal authority Reg. v. Collins be upheld or overruled?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Section 67(1A)(c) requires that the remand be “in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty,” which refers exclusively to accommodation approved by the Secretary of State as “secure accommodation.”
• Practical certainty is essential; Governors can easily verify secure accommodation status but cannot evaluate ad-hoc restrictions imposed in ordinary children’s homes.
• The policy of section 67 is to grant automatic credit only for periods equivalent to custody. Non-secure placements resemble conditional bail and should be left to judicial discretion at sentencing, not automatic deduction.
• Reg. v. Collins was wrongly decided and creates administrative difficulties and inconsistency.

Respondent's Arguments

• The statutory phrase “accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty” should be construed broadly; actual restrictions (e.g., a court-ordered curfew) bring the placement within the provision even if the home lacks formal “secure” approval.
• Criminal legislation should be interpreted in favour of liberty; any substantial restriction should trigger credit.
• The local authority can and does supply Governors with reliable information about restrictions, so administrability is not a problem.
• Parliament could have used the term “secure accommodation” but chose broader language, indicating a wider scope.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Delivering separate but concurring opinions, Judge Hope and Judge Clyde undertook a detailed textual, historical, and policy analysis:

• The conjunction “and” in section 67(1A)(c) establishes two cumulative requirements: (1) remand to local authority accommodation, and (2) that such accommodation be “provided for the purpose of restricting liberty.” The phrase focuses on the nature of the accommodation, not merely on conditions imposed on the individual.
• Legislative history: From 1969 onward, Parliament consistently distinguished between (a) ordinary local authority accommodation and (b) “secure accommodation” approved by the Secretary of State. When section 67(1A)(c) was inserted in 1988, that established phraseology was used; the later 1991 amendments merely formalised the definition without altering meaning.
• Policy considerations: Section 67 creates an automatic, administrative deduction akin to custody. Granting credit for non-secure placements—where residents may abscond and staff lack detention powers—would extend the provision beyond custodial equivalents.
• Practicality and fairness: Limiting credit to approved secure accommodation provides a clear, objective test, avoiding subjective assessments by prison governors and ensuring consistency among offenders.
• Comparative analysis: Non-secure remand with conditions parallels conditional bail, which never attracts automatic credit; any hardship can be considered judicially at sentencing, as recognised in Fairhurst.
• Precedent reconsideration: Collins was decided without the benefit of full legislative history and misinterpreted the statutory language. It therefore had to be overruled.