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Morgan v. Associated Newspapers Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a libel claim brought by Plaintiff against Defendant, the publishers of a newspaper, over an article published in print and online on 24 August 2017 under the headline: "Building tycoons using staff discounts to snap up homes meant for families" ("the Article").
On 28 June 2018, the court heard and determined two preliminary issues in the libel claim: (1) the meaning of the Article; and (2) whether the allegations made were fact or opinion, delivering an extempore judgment on these matters.
The court found the meaning of the Article to be that (i) Plaintiff was able to purchase six houses built by his company intended as affordable homes for less-well off buyers after his company secured changes to local authority planning rules; (ii) Plaintiff purchased these six properties at a substantial discount, paying £860,000 against a market value of £2.1 million, standing to make a large personal gain; and (iii) Plaintiff exploited his position in a greedy, unethical, and morally unacceptable way.
The court determined that elements (i) and (ii) were factual and not defamatory, while element (iii) was an expression of opinion based on the conduct described. Overall, the Article was found to be defamatory of Plaintiff at common law, an admission made by Defendant.
The procedural context includes an order dated 19 June 2018 directing trial of the preliminary issues and a concurrent determination of whether the meaning conveyed a serious defamatory imputation pursuant to section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013. Defendant initially admitted the serious harm threshold was met but later sought to amend its Defence to deny this.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the natural and ordinary meaning of the Article?
- Are the allegations made in the Article statements of fact or expressions of opinion?
- Does the Article meet the threshold of causing or likely causing serious harm to Plaintiff’s reputation under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013?
- Whether Defendant may amend its Defence to withdraw an admission of serious harm.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff’s submissions)
- The Article’s expressions of opinion are clearly stated upon non-defamatory factual allegations.
- The defamatory opinions are attributed to identified individuals described as experts and public figures, whose views readers would respect and consider seriously.
- The opinion criticises Plaintiff for behaviour described as greedy, unethical, and morally unacceptable, but these adjectives do not ascribe the most reprehensible behaviour violating established societal norms.
- Objectively, the opinions expressed are not likely to cause serious harm to Plaintiff’s reputation under the statutory threshold.
Appellee's Arguments (Defendant’s submissions)
- The Article conveys a seriously defamatory meaning depicting Plaintiff as morally unacceptable and a "fat cat" exploiting less well-off individuals.
- The quoted individuals are authoritative figures (experts, an MP, and a former councillor), lending weight to their condemnation of Plaintiff.
- The newspaper fully adopts and endorses the criticism, as seen in both the Article’s headline and the accompanying Comment section, inviting readers to agree with the condemnation.
- The serious defamatory meaning is dependent on the factual allegations and likely to cause serious harm to Plaintiff’s reputation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lachaux -v- Independent Print Ltd [2018] QB 594 | Serious harm threshold under s.1 Defamation Act 2013 and approach to meaning and serious harm. | Applied to assess whether the Article’s meaning conveyed serious defamatory imputation and to draw inference of serious harm. |
| Sube -v- News Group Newspapers [2018] EWHC 1234 | Interrelation of common law defamation test and serious harm under s.1(1) Defamation Act 2013. | Guided the court’s analysis of serious harm in relation to expressions of opinion. |
| Thornton -v- Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1985 | Common law threshold of seriousness for defamatory meaning. | Used to assess whether the defamatory meaning was sufficiently serious to affect reputation adversely. |
| Yeo -v- Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 971 | Case management in defamation claims and timing of determination of meaning. | Referenced to support early resolution of meaning before pleading full defence. |
| Singh -v- British Chiropractic Association [2011] 1 WLR 133 | Defamatory comment and serious harm from denunciation in defamation. | Supported the proposition that defamatory opinion may cause serious harm. |
| Slim -v- Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB 157 | Requirement that facts underlying comment must be true for fair comment defence. | Referred to in discussion of the common law basis for fair comment/honest opinion defence. |
| London Artists Ltd -v- Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 | Requirement of sufficient factual basis for comment to be fair. | Used to illustrate strict proof requirements for facts underlying opinion. |
| Christie -v- Robertson (1889) 10 NSWLR 157 | Limits on misrepresenting facts in fair comment defence. | Referenced to show that fair comment must be based on accurate facts. |
| Sutherland -v- Stopes [1925] AC 47 | Strict proof of truth of all factual allegations underlying comment. | Used to demonstrate the rigorous common law approach prior to statutory reform. |
| Kemsley -v- Foot [1952] AC 345 | Requirement of truth of all underlying facts for fair comment. | Reversed by statute but cited for historical context on fair comment defence. |
| Joseph -v- Spiller [2011] 1 AC 852 | Modern statutory defence of honest opinion and its conditions. | Applied to explain current legal framework replacing common law fair comment. |
| Peter Walker & Son Ltd -v- Hodgson [1909] 1 KB 239 | Nature of fair comment as a defence and its relationship to defamatory meaning. | Used to clarify that fair comment denies defamatory meaning rather than being a form of privilege. |
| Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275 | Early doctrine on fair comment and privileged occasion. | Discussed as part of historical development of fair comment defence. |
| Broadway Approvals -v- Odhams Press [1964] 2 QB 683 | Requirement that facts underlying opinion must not be defamatory for honest opinion defence. | Referenced to illustrate limits on honest opinion defence when based on defamatory facts. |
| Leech -v- Leader Publishing Co. Ltd (1926) 20 Sask LR 337 | Fair comment presupposes defamatory language but excuses it when fair. | Cited to support the principle that fair comment does not negate defamation but provides a defence. |
| Gardiner -v- Fairfax (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 | Acceptance that strong denunciatory language may cause harm and be defamatory. | Used to support the proposition that harsh criticism may be defamatory and cause harm. |
| Bukovsky -v- Crown Prosecution Service [2018] EMLR 5 | Contextual approach to defamatory meaning and serious harm. | Referenced in relation to considering context and source of opinion in serious harm analysis. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the Article, concluding it conveyed a defamatory meaning that Plaintiff exploited his position unethically for personal gain. The court distinguished between factual allegations, which were not defamatory, and expressions of opinion, which were defamatory.
Regarding serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, the court considered the statutory threshold higher than the common law standard, referencing the Court of Appeal's decision in Lachaux. Defendant initially admitted serious harm but later sought to withdraw this admission, necessitating consideration of whether the Article's meaning was seriously defamatory.
The court analyzed the nature of the opinions expressed, the authority of the individuals quoted, and the newspaper’s endorsement of the criticism, including the Comment section that reinforced the Article’s condemnation of Plaintiff. The court found the defamatory meaning to be serious, likely to provoke outrage in reasonable readers and bring Plaintiff into contempt of right-thinking persons.
The court rejected the argument that the opinion’s recognition as such mitigated serious harm, explaining that defamatory opinion can still cause serious reputational damage. The court discussed the historical and statutory framework for fair comment/honest opinion, emphasizing the requirement that opinions be based on true facts and that defamatory opinions can cause serious harm.
Finally, the court addressed the procedural issue of Defendant’s application to amend its Defence to withdraw the admission of serious harm. The court decided to determine the serious harm issue first and found the Article met the serious harm threshold, rendering the amendment application unnecessary and dismissing it.
Holding and Implications
The court held that the Article conveyed a meaning that was seriously defamatory of Plaintiff and that the publication was likely to cause serious harm to Plaintiff’s reputation under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013.
The court dismissed Defendant’s application to amend its Defence to withdraw the admission of serious harm, as such an amendment would serve no purpose in light of the court’s findings.
The decision directly affects the parties by confirming the serious harm threshold is met, allowing the claim to proceed on that basis. The court made no determination on the merits of the honest opinion defence, which remains to be addressed later. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing legal principles to the facts of this case.
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