Ian McFerran v IC (Freedom of Information Act 2000)

Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2010, two junior staff members from the Housing Services team of Company A were present at a tenanted property during a police search. The Appellant raised concerns about the conduct of the search and the information provided to justify it, linked to wider allegations under investigation elsewhere. On 22 September 2010, the Appellant submitted a Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOIA") request to Company A seeking the names of these two individuals and the name of their superior. Company A initially failed to respond but later confirmed the individuals’ roles without disclosing their names, citing FOIA section 40(2) (third party personal data) as the basis for withholding the names. The Appellant complained to the Information Commissioner, who decided that Company A was entitled to withhold the names of the two junior staff but ordered disclosure of the superior's name. The Appellant appealed the refusal to disclose the two junior staff members' names to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was decided on the papers without an oral hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the names of the two junior staff members fall within the exemption under FOIA section 40(2) as third party personal data whose disclosure would contravene data protection principles.
2. Whether disclosure of the names was necessary for a legitimate purpose and whether such disclosure would cause unwarranted interference with the individuals’ rights and freedoms under the Data Protection Act 1998.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant expressed concerns about the circumstances surrounding the police search and argued against the withholding of the individuals’ names under FOIA.
• He emphasized that he was not necessarily making a complaint against the individuals themselves but against Company A.
• The Appellant contended that disclosure would allow the individuals to explain their roles and demonstrate that no blame should attach to them.
• He asserted that Company A had an obligation to provide the officers’ details so they could be approached.

Respondent's Arguments (Information Commissioner)

• The Information Commissioner concluded that the requested names constituted personal data protected under FOIA section 40(2) and the Data Protection Act 1998.
• He acknowledged the public interest in transparency but found insufficient evidence to support the Appellant's allegations or to justify disclosure of the names.
• The Commissioner considered that disclosure would likely cause distress and possible harassment to the two junior staff, who had reasonable expectations of privacy.
• He determined that disclosure would be unfair and breach the first data protection principle.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by confirming that the requested names constituted personal data under the Data Protection Act 1998 and were therefore subject to protection under FOIA section 40(2). The central question was whether disclosure was necessary for a legitimate purpose without causing unwarranted interference with the individuals' rights.

The court considered the first data protection principle, which requires personal data to be processed fairly and lawfully, and the relevant condition under Schedule 2 paragraph 6(1) of the DPA concerning legitimate interests. The court noted that "necessary" implies a pressing social need, citing the precedent from the Corporate Officer case.

In weighing the interests, the court acknowledged the public interest in transparency and accountability, especially given the Appellant's concerns about the legality of the police search. However, it found no cogent evidence supporting the Appellant's allegations or showing that disclosure of the names would materially assist any investigation or public interest.

The court also weighed the potential harm to the individuals, noting that they were junior staff with limited public roles and reasonable expectations of privacy. Disclosure was likely to cause distress and possible harassment, thus breaching the first data protection principle.

Ultimately, the court agreed with the Information Commissioner that the exemption under FOIA section 40(2) applied and that the refusal to disclose the names was justified.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Appellant's appeal against the refusal to disclose the names of the two junior staff members.

The direct effect of this decision is that the names of the two individuals remain protected under FOIA section 40(2) and are not subject to disclosure. The court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed the application of existing data protection principles in balancing public interest against individual privacy rights in the context of FOIA requests.