Lauzika, R (On The Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Factual and Procedural Background

This claim for judicial review concerns the legality of the executive immigration detention of the Plaintiff by the Secretary of State during a three-month period from 27 January 2015 until 29 April 2015, when the Plaintiff was released on bail by order of the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT). The Plaintiff subsequently returned voluntarily to his country of origin to visit a hospitalised relative and later returned for a deportation appeal, which succeeded based on evidence as of the hearing date. The immigration detention was analysed in four distinct stages, each corresponding to specific contemporaneous documents and decisions by immigration officers (IOs) acting for the Secretary of State.

Stage 1 began on 27 January 2015 with the Plaintiff’s detention following notification of a 14-month prison sentence for possession of an imitation firearm, with immediate release from custody based on time served. No reasons for detention were provided at this stage. Stage 2 started on 28 January 2015, involving a detention proposal referencing the Plaintiff's conviction and sentence, describing the offence as serious, and assessing risks of absconding and reoffending without detailed individualised information. Stage 3 commenced on 25 February 2015 with the first monthly detention review, incorporating fuller information including a probation report and social services input, and continued detention was authorised. Stage 4 began on 11 March 2015 following legal challenges to deportation and certification decisions, with removal directions cancelled and detention reviewed further, including consideration of bail and accommodation issues. The Plaintiff was ultimately granted bail on 29 April 2015.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether there is an EU law based test of individualised proportionality and necessity applicable to immigration detention decisions.
2. When a public law flaw in a distinct decision by the Secretary of State renders immigration detention unlawful.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff argued that under EU law, specifically Article 27.2 of Directive 2004/38/EC (the Citizens Directive), immigration detention decisions must be individually justified by proportionality and necessity standards, requiring that detention be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual and that less restrictive measures be considered.
• The Plaintiff contended that the detention at stages 1 and 2 was unlawful because it was based on the fact of conviction and general prevention considerations rather than individualised assessment of conduct and threat.
• It was submitted that public law breaches in distinct decisions, such as certification and refusal of accommodation, bore on the detention and rendered it unlawful.
• The Plaintiff argued that the Secretary of State failed to comply with the Hardial Singh Principles, particularly the requirement that detention not exceed a reasonable period if removal cannot be effected.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Secretary of State contended that the Article 27.2 standards do not apply directly to detention decisions but regulate the existence of the power to detain, not its exercise in individual cases.
• It was submitted that the domestic Hardial Singh Principles and ECHR Article 5(1)(f) provide the applicable legal framework, which does not impose individualised proportionality or necessity tests on detention decisions.
• The Secretary of State argued that detention decisions at stages 1 and 2 were based on the Plaintiff’s conduct constituting the offence and the risks posed, and that fuller individualised information was not practically available at that time.
• Regarding public law breaches in distinct decisions, it was contended that only serious breaches such as irrationality or bad faith could render detention unlawful.
• The Secretary of State maintained that the misdirection in the certification decision was not material, as lawful certification would inevitably have been reached on correct legal grounds.
• It was further submitted that the refusal of accommodation did not materially affect the detention decision and that the continued detention during judicial review proceedings complied with Hardial Singh principles.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by affirming the applicability of EU law Article 27.2 standards to immigration detention decisions, requiring individualised proportionality and necessity, and rejecting the Secretary of State’s argument that these standards apply only to the existence of the detention power rather than its exercise. The Court analysed the four stages of detention:

• Stage 1: Although no reasons were provided, the Court found the detention lawful on the basis that the urgent circumstances justified a precautionary approach with limited information, provided that fuller individualised information was obtained with imperative urgency.
• Stage 2: The Court held the detention unlawful for breach of Article 27.2 standards due to absence of adequate individualised information and reasons, noting the failure to urgently obtain available reports such as the pre-sentence report (PSR) which contained relevant conduct and risk assessments.
• Stages 3 and 4: Detention was lawful at stage 3 and lawful at the beginning of stage 4, as fuller individualised information including the PSR, probation reports, and social services input had been considered, and risk assessments were justifiable. The Court found that alternatives to detention had been considered and properly rejected based on assessed medium to high risks of absconding, reoffending, and harm.
• Hardial Singh Principles: The Court found no breach of Hardial Singh Principle No.2 (reasonable period) at stages 2 and 3, but found a breach of Principle No.3 at stage 4 from 9 April 2015 due to failure to secure expedition of judicial review proceedings which barred removal, making removal within a reasonable time impossible.
• Public Law Breaches in Distinct Decisions: The Court applied the What-Breach Principle, holding that a material public law breach in a distinct decision renders detention unlawful if it bears on and is relevant to detention. The Court found that the misdirection in the certification decision was not material because lawful certification would inevitably have been reached. The unlawful refusal of accommodation under section 4 was not a material cause of continued detention, as the refusal of temporary release was not based solely on absence of an address and would have been the same regardless.

The Court emphasised that the legality of detention is assessed on the material before the Secretary of State at the time of the decision, rejecting the Secretary of State’s invitation to consider later obtained material or subsequent detention decisions when assessing legality at earlier stages.

Holding and Implications

The Court granted declarations as follows:

• The Plaintiff's detention from 27 January 2015 to 28 January 2015 was unlawful due to absence of reasons, but only nominal damages are recoverable.
• The Plaintiff's detention from 28 January 2015 to 25 February 2015 was unlawful for breach of EU Directive 2004/38/EC Article 27.2 standards, with compensatory damages recoverable.
• The Plaintiff's detention from 25 February 2015 to 9 April 2015 was lawful.
• The Plaintiff's detention from 9 April 2015 to 29 April 2015 was unlawful for breach of Hardial Singh Principle No.3, with compensatory damages recoverable.

The direct effect of this decision is to confirm the unlawfulness of certain periods of the Plaintiff's detention, entitling him to compensatory damages for those periods. The Court clarified the legal standards applicable to immigration detention, particularly affirming the applicability of EU individualised proportionality and necessity standards to detention decisions and the circumstances in which public law breaches in distinct decisions render detention unlawful. No new binding precedent was established beyond the application and synthesis of existing authorities.