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Inniss v. The Attorney General of Saint Christopher & Nevis (Saint Christopher & Nevis)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a barrister and solicitor admitted in 1988, entered public service on 1 June 1996 as Registrar of the High Court and as an Additional Magistrate. Her two-year contract was executed with the Governor-General on behalf of The Government. Clause 8(1) permitted early termination on three-months’ notice or one month’s salary in lieu.
On 20 February 1998 the Permanent Secretary gave the Appellant immediate notice of termination and one month’s pay, relying solely on Clause 8(1). No recommendation from the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (“JLSC”), as required by section 83(3) of the Constitution of St Christopher and Nevis, preceded the dismissal.
The Appellant notified the Defendant (the Attorney-General) that the dismissal breached section 83(3) and indicated her intention to sue. On 20 July 1998 she filed a constitutional motion seeking, inter alia, a declaration of unconstitutionality and damages.
At first instance, Judge Moore held that the dismissal violated section 83(3) and awarded EC $100,000 in damages. The Court of Appeal (per Judge Redhead, Judge Archibald (Ag) and Judge Bruce-Lyle (Ag)) reversed that decision, treating the matter as a simple contractual breach and limiting recovery to EC $19,351.20. The Appellant appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“the Board”).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Executive’s reliance on Clause 8(1) of the contract, absent a JLSC recommendation, contravened section 83(3) of the Constitution.
- If such a contravention occurred, what remedies—particularly damages—are available in addition to contractual compensation.
- The appropriate quantum and methodology for assessing (a) contractual damages and (b) constitutional damages designed to vindicate the breached right.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The termination letter was unconstitutional because section 83(3) vests removal power in the Governor-General acting on a JLSC recommendation, which was absent.
- Consequently, invoking Clause 8(1) was impermissible; the dismissal was void.
- She was entitled to damages for (a) the balance of the contract and (b) breach of her constitutional right, including exemplary or vindicatory damages.
Defendant's Arguments
- The matter was a mere contractual dispute; the Appellant’s rights under section 83 were not fundamentally breached.
- Any constitutional relief should be confined to a declaration; if damages were awarded, they should be nominal and exclude exemplary elements.
- The proper contractual damages did not exceed EC $19,351.20.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 | Distinction between security of tenure for higher and lower judiciary under constitutional frameworks. | Used by the Court of Appeal (now overruled) to justify treating Registrars and Magistrates as holding lesser constitutional protection. |
| Horace Fraser v Judicial and Legal Services Commission [2008] UKPC 25 | Contractual provisions affecting judicial officers fall under constitutional protection; dismissal requires adherence to constitutional procedures. | The Board relied on Fraser to conclude that the Court of Appeal’s approach was wrong and that section 83 protection prevailed over the contract. |
| Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop [2006] 1 AC 328 | Purpose and scope of constitutional damages: vindication of rights, possible deterrence, not punishment. | Guided the Board’s assessment of appropriate constitutional damages. |
| Merson v Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38; [2006] 3 LRC 264 | Vindicatory damages aim to affirm the right breached rather than punish the Executive. | Cited to clarify that exemplary terminology should be avoided; focus on vindication. |
| Taunoa v Attorney General [2007] 5 LRC 680 | Framework for assessing public-law damages where parallel private-law remedies exist; emphasis on adequacy and deterrence. | Referred to in evaluating the scale of damages necessary to vindicate the breach alongside contractual compensation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Constitutional breach. Section 83(3) exclusively governs removal of holders of specified legal offices. Because no JLSC recommendation existed, the Executive lacked authority to terminate the Appellant. Any contractual clause purporting to permit unilateral dismissal must yield to the Constitution.
2. Invalidity of Court of Appeal approach. The Board accepted that Fraser had already discredited the appellate court’s reasoning. The Defendant conceded the constitutional violation, narrowing the dispute to damages.
3. Contractual damages. The Court of Appeal’s figure contained mathematical and legal errors: it excluded gratuity, unpaid leave, social-security credits, and short-paid salary. Corrected calculations showed EC $51,025.40 was due; for convenience, the Board awarded a rounded EC $50,000.
4. Constitutional (vindicatory) damages. Relying on Ramanoop, Merson and Taunoa, the Board stressed that damages must vindicate the right, deter similar breaches, and reflect gravity—not punish. Factors justifying a “relatively substantial” award included:
- The Executive’s deliberate bypass of constitutional safeguards to remove a “turbulent” Registrar swiftly;
- Potential reputational harm and distress to the Appellant;
- Need to deter future executive disregard of section 83.
Balancing these factors, the Board fixed constitutional damages at EC $50,000.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeal is allowed; the Court of Appeal’s order is set aside; the first-instance declarations and total damages award of EC $100,000 (EC $50,000 contractual + EC $50,000 constitutional) are restored.
Implications: The decision reaffirms that contractual provisions cannot circumvent constitutional protections for judicial and quasi-judicial officers. It clarifies the methodology for calculating vindicatory damages where constitutional rights, other than fundamental Chapter II rights, are breached. While setting no new legal test, the judgment strengthens deterrence against executive encroachment on constitutionally safeguarded appointments.
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