R v Rejmanski

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns applications for leave to appeal against convictions for murder by two appellants, hereinafter referred to as Appellant One and Appellant Two, and an application for leave to appeal against sentence by Appellant Two and a co-defendant, Appellant Three. The appeals raise the legal issue of the extent to which a mental disorder can be relevant to the assessment of "the circumstances of the defendant" in relation to the partial defence of loss of control under section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ("the CAJA 2009"). Both appellants contend that the trial judge's directions effectively deprived them of the defence of loss of control.

Appellant One's case involved an incident at a shared residence resulting in the death of the deceased. The prosecution alleged that Appellant One, fuelled by alcohol and anger, attacked the deceased intending to cause serious harm. The defence argued that Appellant One suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was relevant to the loss of control defence.

Appellant Two and Appellant Three were involved in a separate incident resulting in the death of another deceased. Appellant Two was diagnosed with Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (EUPD) and had a history of trauma and substance dependency. The prosecution alleged intent to cause serious harm or kill, supported by threats and actions leading to the stabbing. The defence relied on EUPD and loss of control as partial defences.

The court received submissions from counsel for all parties and an amicus curiae appointed by the Attorney General. The cases were heard together due to the common legal question regarding mental disorder and the loss of control defence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. To what extent can a mental disorder be relevant to the assessment of "the circumstances of the defendant" under section 54(1)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 when considering the partial defence of loss of control?
2. Whether the trial judge's directions deprived the appellants of the partial defence of loss of control by failing to properly instruct the jury on the relevance of mental disorders such as PTSD and EUPD.
3. Whether the sentences imposed on Appellant Two and Appellant Three were manifestly excessive, taking into account their age, mental health conditions, and circumstances of the offences.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant One's Arguments

• The trial judge failed to direct the jury that Appellant One's PTSD was relevant to both the qualifying trigger and his circumstances for the loss of control defence under sections 54(1)(b) and (c).
• PTSD should not be excluded under section 54(3) as it was relevant beyond merely affecting Appellant One's general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.
• The PTSD explained the gravity of the provocation and the Appellant’s reaction, thus should have been considered by the jury in assessing whether a person with a normal degree of tolerance but suffering PTSD might have reacted similarly.

Appellant Two's Arguments

• The diagnosis of EUPD was relevant to the third component of the loss of control defence because it affected how Appellant Two reacted to the traumatic event of her abuser’s death.
• The jury should have been directed to consider a hypothetical person with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint but in the distressed state caused by the recent death.
• A distinction was drawn between general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint (which EUPD impairs and should be excluded) and the ability to exercise self-control in particular circumstances (which should be included).
• The failure to give such direction rendered the conviction unsafe.

Prosecution's Arguments (General)

• For Appellant One, the PTSD diagnosis was speculative, relied heavily on self-reporting, and was not linked to the loss of self-control at the time of the killing.
• The provocation was minor and would not have caused a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged in a normal sober person.
• For Appellant Two, the EUPD affected her general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint and was therefore irrelevant for the third component of the loss of control defence under section 54(3).
• The appropriate partial defence for Appellant Two was diminished responsibility rather than loss of control.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework of the partial defence of loss of control under sections 54 and 55 of the CAJA 2009, emphasizing the three distinct components that must be separately considered: (i) loss of self-control, (ii) the presence of a qualifying trigger, and (iii) whether a person of the defendant’s age and sex, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the defendant’s circumstances, might have reacted similarly.

Section 54(3) was pivotal, excluding from the circumstances of the defendant those factors relevant only to the defendant's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. The court aligned with prior authority that personal characteristics affecting general capacity (such as mental disorders impairing self-control) are excluded from consideration in the third limb, but may be relevant to the gravity of the qualifying trigger.

Applying these principles to Appellant One, the court accepted that PTSD may be relevant in principle but found the evidence of PTSD weak and speculative, with little basis to conclude it affected his capacity for self-control at the time. The judge’s directions to the jury properly maintained the objective standard of a person with normal tolerance and self-restraint, excluding any reduction due to PTSD. The jury was directed to consider the appellant’s history and circumstances when assessing the qualifying trigger, which was appropriate.

Regarding Appellant Two, the court rejected the argument that EUPD was relevant beyond general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint. The judge correctly excluded evidence of EUPD insofar as it bore on general capacity, consistent with section 54(3). The traumatic event preceding the killing was not directly referable to her mental condition, so the partial defence of loss of control was properly left to the jury with appropriate directions.

The court also addressed the sentencing appeals. For Appellant Two, the sentencing judge applied the correct starting point and made significant reductions for age and mitigation. For Appellant Three, the judge properly assessed the factual basis for sentence according to the criminal standard, considering the evidence and the applicant’s mental health and background. The sentences were not deemed manifestly excessive.

Holding and Implications

Appellate court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal against conviction for Appellant One. The court held that the trial judge gave proper directions respecting the statutory framework, maintaining the objective standard and appropriately excluding evidence of mental disorder affecting general capacity from the third component of the loss of control defence. The conviction was not unsafe.

Leave to appeal against conviction for Appellant Two was refused. The court found that the trial judge correctly directed the jury to exclude EUPD evidence insofar as it bore on general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint, consistent with the statute and case law. The conviction was safe.

Leave to appeal against sentence was granted for Appellant Two but dismissed, and refused for Appellant Three. The court concluded the sentencing judges properly applied the law, considered all relevant factors including mental health and mitigation, and did not impose manifestly excessive sentences.

The decision reinforces the strict application of the objective standard in the loss of control defence under the CAJA 2009, excluding mental disorders that affect general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint from the defendant's circumstances in the third limb. It confirms that mental disorders may still be relevant to the qualifying trigger or to diminished responsibility, but not to lowering the objective standard of self-control. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles.