Barton (Appellant) v Wright Hassal LLP

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, acting without legal representation, issued a professional-negligence claim against the Defendant (a firm of solicitors) on 25 February 2013. Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) the claim form had to be served within four months. On 24 June 2013—the very last day—he emailed the claim form and particulars of claim to Company A (the Defendant’s instructed solicitors) without first obtaining their written agreement to accept service by email. CPR 6 and Practice Direction 6A require such prior agreement; consequently service was invalid and the claim form expired the next day.

The Appellant asked the courts to exercise their discretionary power under CPR 6.15(2) to treat the email as good service retrospectively. A District Judge, a Circuit Judge and the Court of Appeal each refused. If the order stands, a fresh action would be statute-barred. The Supreme Court—comprising Judge Sumption (with Judges Wilson and Carnwath concurring) forming the majority, and Judge Briggs (with Judge Hale) dissenting—heard the final appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, under CPR 6.15(2), there was “good reason” to validate the Appellant’s non-compliant email service of the claim form.
2. Whether refusal to validate service violated the Appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The essential purpose of service—the Defendant’s actual knowledge of the claim—was achieved, so retrospective validation should follow.
• As a litigant in person, the Appellant did not appreciate the technical requirements of CPR 6 and reasonably assumed Company A would accept email service because they had corresponded with him by that medium.
• Company A’s silence until after expiry of the limitation period amounted to “playing technical games” and should not be rewarded.
• Failure to validate service would breach Article 6 ECHR.

Defendant's Arguments

• Email service without prior written agreement was plainly non-compliant; ignorance of the rules is not a ground for validation.
• The Appellant had ample time to effect proper service by permitted methods but chose not to do so.
• Validating service would unfairly deprive the Defendant of a complete limitation defence.
• No Convention right is engaged; the problem flows from statutory limitation, not from court procedure.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Majority (Judge Sumption, Judges Wilson & Carnwath):

• The mere fact that the Defendant knew of the claim is a necessary but insufficient basis for validation; formal compliance matters because it fixes time limits and affects limitation periods.
• Key factors from Abela were applied: (i) the Appellant took no reasonable steps to serve correctly; (ii) the Defendant had notice but would suffer real prejudice—the loss of a limitation defence—if service were retrospectively validated; (iii) the Appellant’s ignorance of clear, accessible rules is not “good reason”, and litigants in person are generally held to the same standards.
• Company A was under no duty to alert the Appellant to his error; no “game-playing” occurred.
• Article 6 adds nothing: the bar stems from the Limitation Act, not from the procedural rules themselves.

Dissent (Judge Briggs, with Judge Hale):

• All three purposes of service—notice, commencement, and email-specific safeguards—were fully achieved; that is prima facie a “good reason.”
• The court should weigh whether the claimant’s culpability outweighs that prima-facie reason; here the breach was “modestly non-compliant” and understandable for a litigant in person.
• Validation would not improperly prejudice the Defendant; the limitation defence would be a mere “windfall.”
• The judge and Court of Appeal wrongly treated an additional, independent “good reason” for non-compliance as indispensable.

Holding and Implications

HELD: APPEAL DISMISSED (majority decision).

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ refusal to validate service. Consequently the claim is time-barred unless re-issued against a limitation defence. The judgment underscores that:

• Actual notice to the defendant does not by itself justify retrospective validation under CPR 6.15.
• Litigants in person must comply with procedural rules; ignorance is ordinarily no excuse.
• Courts will be reluctant to deprive a defendant of an accrued limitation defence unless the claimant has taken reasonable steps to comply with the rules.

The dissent invited the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to reconsider the email-service provisions; the majority also acknowledged that a review would be desirable, but no new precedent or rule change was enacted.