Stefan v. The General Medical Council (Medical Act 1983)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, a medical practitioner, had been subject to various forms of limited, provisional, and temporary registration since 1967. Beginning in 1993, the Health Committee of the Respondent repeatedly considered whether the Appellant’s fitness to practise was “seriously impaired” by reason of a mental condition. The Committee imposed conditional registration in 1993 and 1994, followed by successive suspensions in 1995, 1996, and 1997. Earlier appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against several of those orders were dismissed.

On 23 February 1998 the Committee ordered an indefinite suspension, but the Privy Council allowed the Appellant’s subsequent appeal because the Committee had given no reasons for imposing an indefinite term. The matter returned to the Committee, which on 27 May 1999 again found the Appellant’s fitness to practise “seriously impaired,” this time by reference to a “paranoid personality disorder,” and ordered a twelve-month suspension to take effect immediately under sections 37(1)(a) and 38(1) of the Medical Act 1983. The present appeal was brought against that decision to the Privy Council pursuant to section 40 of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Health Committee’s finding that the Appellant’s fitness to practise was “seriously impaired” was sustainable in law, having regard to the evidence before it.
2. Whether the Committee acted within its statutory powers in ordering an immediate twelve-month suspension under sections 37 and 38 of the Medical Act 1983.
3. Whether any question of law arose on the appeal, given that section 40(5) limits appeals to questions of law only.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• Contended that numerous procedural irregularities had occurred before the Health Committee, including alleged inaccuracies and dishonesty in the official transcript.
• Denied suffering from any paranoia or mental condition affecting professional judgment.
• Asserted that past events and statements had been taken out of context, leading to an unfair assessment of fitness to practise.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Privy Council, speaking through Judge Slynn, examined the evidence relied upon by the Health Committee, including written and oral testimony from a consultant psychiatrist, Dr. Adams. That evidence stated that while the Appellant could potentially practise under supervision, her condition was continuous and could be exacerbated by stress, posing risks to patient safety. The Board concluded that this amounted to evidence on which the Committee could lawfully find serious impairment under Rule 24(2) of its Procedure Rules.

The Board further held that the remainder of the Appellant’s submissions related purely to the merits and factual accuracy of the Committee’s findings, rather than presenting any arguable point of law. Under section 40(5) of the Medical Act 1983, appeals lie only on questions of law; therefore, no jurisdictional error was established.

Because the Committee had statutory authority to impose an immediate suspension for public protection and there was evidential support for its decision, the Privy Council found no basis to interfere.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Health Committee’s twelve-month suspension, effective immediately, remains in force. The decision affirms the Committee’s wide discretion to act on psychiatric evidence when protecting the public under the Medical Act 1983. No new precedent was set beyond confirming that appeals under section 40(5) are confined strictly to questions of law.